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ABSTRACT
The literature of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
describes a fundamental bias in its empirical 
application. The most notable problem is that the 
Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model produces betas 
which overestimate the returns of high-beta stocks and 
underestimate the returns of low-beta stocks. This has 
proven problematic in estimating public utilities' 
stocks expected returns in regulatory proceedings. The 
literature prescribes the use of a shift parameter, 
alpha, to correct for this bias. This dissertation 
aims to find the value of alpha and its statistical 
significance. In contrast to the literature, the 
following empirical analysis discovers that alpha is 
statistically insignificant. Diagnostics of this 
paradox conclude that alpha is not significant in a 
variety of applications. The probable cause of the 
literature's error is autocorrelation and data choice.
V l l l
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
I. The Reason for Regulating Utilities
Public Utilities, like the gas and electric 
service, are natural monopolies. They achieve greater 
returns to scale, i.e., lower per unit costs, as output 
increases. This is what causes the utility to become a 
natural monopoly. Customers and the companies 
themselves are best served by one producer. This 
avoids unnecessary duplication of productive resources 
that have more socially desirable uses in other 
industries. The result gives creates a conundrum that 
pits two of the economics profession's desired aims 
against each other; the competitive determination of 
prices in the marketplace and the efficient use of 
resources.
The history of public utility regulation in the 
United States begins with the establishment of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887.* The purpose 
was to regulate the rates that the railroads charged to 
shippers in a more equitable manner. Until that time.
‘Phillips, Charles F., Jr., "Chapter 4 ; 
Independent Regulatory Commissions, " The Regulation of 
Public Utilities, (Arlington, VA: Public Utilities 
Reports, Inc., 1993), p. 132.
the prices that shippers charged to individuals wishing 
their service was monopolistic. This gave the 
railroads the opportunity to charge any rate they 
wished. As other industries began to show the 
characteristics of decreasing costs, the legislative 
response was to expand coverage to limit monopoly 
power. Congress enacted a series of laws to protect 
the marketplace from anticompetitive behavior. The 
body of this legislation became known as antitrust law 
with the aim of protecting competition and stopping 
monopolies at their inception. The Sherman, Batman, 
and Robinson Acts aimed to capture the spirit of this 
goal at the turn of the Twentieth Century.
Most regulation of public utilities is the domain 
of state and local levels of government. A few federal 
bodies have the authority to set rates for those 
utilities engaged in interstate commerce. They include 
telecommunications, the transmission of electricity, 
and the transportation of natural gas. The goal of all 
regulatory commissions is to establish rates that are 
fair, equitable, and mimic what rates would be if 
competition existed in these industries. James C. 
Bonbright summed the purpose of public utility 
regulation when he stated:
"Regulation, it is said is a substitute for
competition. Hence its objective should be
to compel a regulated enterprise, despite its 
possession of complete or partial monopoly, 
to charge rates approximating those which it 
would charge if free from regulation but 
subject to the market forces of competition. 
In short, regulation should be not only a 
substitute for competition, but a closely 
imitative substitute.""
In essence, regulation is a correction for the 
failure of free markets to correct for the "problem" of 
a natural monopoly. Hdwever, natural monopoly is not 
the only necessary precondition for regulation. The 
industry must also provide an essential and necessary 
service to the market and to the community which it 
serves. These industries provide the basic 
infrastructure for modern industrial economies, like 
the United States, to function. As part of the social 
contract in which society grants public utilities 
exemption from some antitrust legislation, they assume 
the obligation to serve all who request their service. 
Regulation provides customers the least cost protection 
from monopoly power and the investor owned utility the 
opportunity to recover all costs associated with 
providing that service.
"Bonbright, J.C., Principles of Public Utility 
Rates, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 
p.93.
A. The Form of Utility Regulation
The responsibility of establishing rates falls
under the purview of legislatively empowered 
authorities. State regulatory commissions provide the 
bulk of such ratemaking. In a rate proceeding known as 
a rate case, the commission undertakes two tasks. The 
first is to determine the overall revenue required to 
cover the entire cost of service. The second objective 
is to develop the proper structure of rates that 
establishes equity between the company and the 
ratepayers, and equity among ratepayers.' The subject 
of this paper focuses on one element of the first 
objective, specifically the cost of equity capital.
The revenue requirement or cost of service 
includes all elements necessary for the utility to 
provide service to its customers. This includes all 
operation and maintenance costs, depreciation of 
assets, taxes, and a fair rate of return on the 
ratebase as determined by the commission. The last 
component is the most contentious of all.'*
^Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 1: Rate of Return 
Regulation," Regulatory Finance: Utilities' Cost of 
Capital, (Arlington, VA: Public Utilities Reports, 
Inc., 1993), pp. 1-32.
'Ibid.
B. Determination of a Fair Rate of Return
Unfortunately no golden rule exists that
establishes the appropriate rate of return that any 
given company may earn. However, the Supreme Court has 
defined the legal principles for such determination in 
two landmark cases to guide regulators in determining 
what constitutes a fair rate of return. The Court 
outlines them in Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co.
V. Public Service Commission of West Virginia (262 U.S. 
679, 1923)- and Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas Company (320 U.S. 291, 1944)®. The aim of 
both these decisions is to ameliorate conflicts between 
aggressive, pro-consumer commissions and commissions 
friendly to the utilities.
In the Bluefield case, the Supreme Court creates 
the standard which commissions must use to determine 
just and reasonable rates. The Court states:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as 
will permit it to earn a return on the value 
of property which it employs for the 
convenience of the public equal to that 
generally being made at the same time and in 
the same general part of the country on 
investments in other business undertakings 
which are attended by corresponding risks and 
uncertainties. The return should be
" Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company v. 
Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679(1923), 165n, 
203n, 258n, 370n, 412n, 413n, 414n, 613n.
® Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas 
Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), 203n, 204n, 302n, 304n, 
358n, 359n, 412n, 431n, 531n, 533n.
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reasonable, sufficient to assure confidence 
in the financial soundness of the utility, 
and should be adequate, under efficient and 
economical management, to maintain and 
support its credit and enable it to raise 
money necessary for the proper discharge of 
its public duties.'
The Hope case further elaborates upon the 
standards that commissions must utilize to adjudicate a 
reasonable allowed return. The Court restates its 
original rulings in the Bluefield case and recognizes 
the need to allow for revenues that also cover capital 
costs associated with the provision of service. The 
Court states:
From the investor or company point of view it 
is important that there be enough revenue not 
only for operating expenses but also allow 
for the capital costs of the business. These 
include service on the debt and dividends on 
the stock. By that standard the return to 
the equity owner should be commensurate with 
returns on investments in other investments 
in other enterprises having corresponding 
risks. That return, moreover, should be 
sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial integrity of the enterprise, so as 
to maintain its credit and attract capital.’
The decisions of the Court in the Bluefield and 
Hope cases create the standards for commissions to 
follow to determine fair and reasonable, allowed rates 
of return. First, they create a standard of capital 
attraction. Second, they promote a standard of
Bluef ield, ibid.
 ^Hope Natural Gas, ibid.
comparable earnings corresponding to comparable risks. 
Last, they seek a standard to maintain the financial 
integrity of the regulated enterprise.
C. The Economic Reasons for Regulation
These standards have a very fundamental economic 
logic inherit in them. An opportunity cost exists for 
those who provide capital to finance the development of 
utility companies. The opportunity cost that investors 
forgo is the expected return they would earn in 
ventures with comparable risks. As such, bondholders 
and shareholders must have the opportunity to earn a 
similar return on like investments. Going further, a 
utility must have the opportunity to maintain its 
credit worthiness to allow it access to capital markets 
for future investment. With these goals in mind, a 
regulated company should earn a return sufficient to 
assure confidence in its financial health, maintain its 
credit, and continue to attract funds at reasonable 
terms.
Several other cases sharpen the criteria further. 
The Court states in Federal Power Commission v. Memphis 
Lightr Gas & Water Division (411 U.S. 458, 197 3)^  and
 ^Memphis Light & Gas Water Division, In re, 411 
U.S. 458 (1973), 413n.
the Permian Basin Rate Cases (390 U.S. 747, 1968)' the 
goals of Bluefield and the end-result doctrine of the 
Hope case. The Permian Basin Rate Cases adds emphasis 
to the regulator's mission that a rate of return order 
shall :
...reasonably be expected to maintain 
financial integrity, attract necessary 
capital, and fairly compensate investors for 
the risks they have assumed...'
The Duquesne Light Company et al. v. David M. 
Barasch et al. (488 U.S. 299, 1989)' restates the 
standards set forth in the Bluefield and Hope cases, 
but also adds more guidelines in determining rates for 
regulated public utilities. In Duquesne, the Court 
recognizes regulatory risk as risk which a utility 
assumes. As such, commissions must compensate 
companies for it in rate of return judgments.
The Hope case creates the end-result doctrine. By 
this, the Court gives less weight to the methodology a 
given commission chooses. Instead, the Hope decision 
places the emphasis of ratemaking on achieving results 
that are equitable to both ratepayers and shareholders. 
As such, the Court does not bind the regulator to a
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 7 47 
(1968), 728n.
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, ibid.
"^Duquesne Light Company v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 
(1989), 413n.
outcome must provide a fair result. This ruling 
provides a zone of comfort to regulators given the 
empirical difficulties and theoretical assumptions that 
circumscribe most financial models of the cost of 
capital calculation. As the name implies, the outcome 
is the goal which is to replicate competition and not 
to subvert it.--
II. Methods for Calculating the Cost of Equity
While the legal and economic conception of what 
comprises the substance of a fair rate of return is 
concrete, the actual determination of it is suspect and 
controversial.-'’ Rancorous debate often emerges among 
experts about the proper use of accepted methods. 
Likewise, witnesses argue about what constitutes a fair 
rate of return given specious data. In addition, they 
question the variety of assumptions an analyst may make 
about the firm and associated market conditions. 
However, analysts typically make their judgments based 
on the following financial models; Comparable Earnings, 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis, Risk Premium, and 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 1: Rate of Return 
Regulation," Regulatory Finance: Utilities' Cost of 
Capital. (Arlington, VA: Public Utilities Reports,
Inc., 1993), pp. 9-11.
Morin, pp. 28-30.
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A. The Comparable Earninas Method
Until the mid-1960's, analysts relied solely on 
the Comparable Earnings method. Analysts chose a group 
of unregulated companies that in their judgment 
possessed the same level of risk as the utility in 
question. From the calculation of the return on common 
equity of these firms, experts determined a fair rate 
of return. Early, the comparable earnings method 
proved controversial as analysts would debate what 
essentially were the characteristics of the chosen 
sample that made them "comparable." Experts found 
themselves arguing over whether to use book equity or 
market equity. Again, witnesses debated about the 
appropriate time period over which to consider returns. 
Finally, they squabbled over what adjustments one 
needed to make to determine a fair rate of return. The 
major roadblock to successful application of the 
comparable earnings method was a proper measurement of 
risk. ■'
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 16: Comparable 
Earnings," pp. 393-408.
10
B. The Risk Premium Method
Starting in the mid-1960's through the mid-1970's, 
analysts began to apply principles gathered from modern 
finance theory to develop more accurate measurements of 
the fair cost of capital. The most basic method 
utilized is the risk premium model. This tool rests on 
the premise that the return on equity is more costly or 
expensive than a less risky or risk-free instrument.
As such, all an analyst needs to do is find the 
difference appropriate for the utility in question and 
use that to determine the rate of return on common 
equity. The most common method is to take the 
difference of the historical return on book equity for 
the regulated company, and subtract the yield on some 
long-term bond. Next, the analyst simply adds this 
difference of premium to the risk-free rate to 
determine the rate of return. Analysts soon found 
themselves engaged in disputes about what the 
appropriate risk-free rate, the length of time used to 
calculate the risk premium, and the stability of the 
risk premium."®
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 11: Risk Premium," pp. 
269-300.
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c. The Discounted Cash Flow Method
The most ubiquitous method of rate of return 
analysis is the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis.
The DCF theory holds that the value of a financial 
asset derives from its ability to generate future 
income streams. The fundamental notion is that the 
security's price reflects all of its future income 
discounted by its cost of capital. The price also 
represents the marginal investor's valuation of the 
future cash flows. In the mathematical form, one 
expresses the DCF model as :
= 2  ( i ; * )
Which simplifies to:
Where :
P - current price of the security in question 
D - current dividend of the security in question 
g - growth rate of dividends 
k - cost of equity capital
The DCF method has the advantage of mechanically 
producing a cost of capital when all the assumptions of 
the model hold true. As such, analysts found 
themselves debating what adjustments, if any.
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 4: Discounted Cash Flow 
Concepts," pp. 99-132.
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regulators must make to determine a fair rate of 
return.
D. The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The other tool that analysts have at their 
disposal is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
The financial theory underlying it states that 
investors face two types of risk, systematic and 
unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk is the risk that 
an investor assumes when he purchases one security. 
Systematic risk is the risk that an investor faces in 
the entire marketplace of securities. As such, 
investors can diversify for unsystematic risk by 
diversifying their investment portfolios. The CAPM 
method utilizes a measure of risk of an individual 
security called beta that measures the differential 
risk of a given security relative to the market risk. 
Mathematically, one can represent the CAPM as"':
k - Rf-h P(Rm - Rf)
Thompson, Howard E., "Chapter 4; Traditional 
Models: CAPM and Risk Analysis," Regulatory Finance : 
Financial Foundations of Rate of Return Regulation, 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 43-56.
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Where :
k - required return
- risk-free rate
- required return of the overall market
B - security's beta risk measure
Like the DCF method, the CAPM also gives analysts 
the opportunity to determine mechanically a fair rate 
of return. However, such crass empiricism has led to 
much debate about the appropriate expected market 
return. Likewise, analysts debate about which 
risk-free rate controls for all risk in the market. 
Further, they argue about whether the estimated beta 
accurately reflects the implicit risk of the asset in 
question.
All of the aforementioned financial models have 
their individual shortcomings. As such, most analysts 
in regulatory proceedings chose to use them in tandem 
to produce an estimate of the fair rate of return. 
Given the nature of the regulatory environment, any 
misjudgment on the behalf of either ratepayers or the 
regulated entity can seriously affect the return a 
company earns. To compensate all parties, regulators 
have at their disposal the legislative authority to
14
adjust rates to maintain the goal of regulation; fair 
and reasonable rates.
III. Correction of the CAPM
Analysts primarily rely on the DCF model to make 
cost of common equity judgments. Typically they then 
utilize the CAPM as a check on the DCF. Since the DCF 
produces a result that reflects the desires of the 
marginal investor, one must perform some adjustments to 
reflect more accurately the "true" return on equity.
The bulk of the return on equity literature suggests 
various ways to adjust the DCF to provide these 
adjustments. DCF adjustment theories are quite broad 
and numerous. However, the body of literature about 
adjustments to the CAPM is quite small.
A. Areas of Correction of the CAPM
The literature falls into two broad categories; 
size-adjusted CAPM's and empirically adjusted CAPM's. 
The size-adjusted CAPM's rely primarily on the 
theoretical and empirical work of Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French (1992).^* Fama and French take the
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, "The 
Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," Journal of 
Finance, Volume 48, Number 2, June 1992, pp. 427-465.
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market capitalization of a stock in question as an 
important determinant of stock returns. They find that 
it makes the CAPM a more effective estimator of 
expected returns. The broadest and most complete 
empirical work in this area comes from Roger Ibbotson's 
Stock, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Yearbook, published 
annually."^ It provides basis point adjustments across 
all sizes and classes of equity assets. Analysts 
throughout the financial community whether public 
utility economists, portfolio managers, financial 
advisors, stockbrokers, or financial journalists, rely 
upon Ibbotson's work when studying stocks. Ibboston 
Associates publishes it annually, most libraries or 
investment firms subscribe to it, and it carries 
acceptance in the investment community.
The other vein of CAPM adjustments follows the 
work Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and 
Litzenberger, Ramaswamy and Sosin (1980)^% In broad
^^Ibbotson, Roger, "Chapter 8: Estimating the Cost 
of Capital or Discount Rate," Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and 
Inflation 1997 Yearbook, (Chicago: Ibbotson Associates, 
1997), pp. 140-161.
Black, Fischer, Michael Jensen, and Myron Scholes, 
"The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical 
Tests," Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets, 
edited by Michael C. Jensen, (New York: Praeger, 1972), 
pp. 79-121.
Litzenberger, Robert, Krishna Ramaswamy, and 
Howard Sosin, "On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation 
of A Public Utility's Cost of Capital," Journal of 
Finance, Volume 35, Number 2, May 1980, pp. 369-387.
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terms, this approach empirically recognizes that the 
CAPM overestimates the return on equity for high-beta 
stocks and underestimates the return for low-beta 
stocks. As such, it seeks to find a shift parameter 
that "flattens" the CAPM's Market Return Line to 
control for this inherit bias. The literature in this 
area has less definition and more controversy.
B. The Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model
Since the works of Fama and French and Ibbotson 
carry a lot of weight among utility analysts, they 
offer fewer possibilities for extension or criticism. 
Financial economists have conducted little work on 
finding an empirical correction for the CAPM. The only 
serious academic works in this field of the estimation 
of the cost of common equity are the separate works of 
Litzenberger et al and Roger A. Morin. The 
Litzenberger et ai is rather old, dating from 1980. 
While the analysis of Morin is newer, it has less 
acceptance among utility and financial economists. The 
method that this dissertation will explore is the 
empirically adjusted CAPM.
17
c. Reasons for Correcting the CAPM
The overriding question one must ask is why is 
finding a more accurate empirical CAPM important for 
return on equity estimation of public utilities. This 
inquiry requires three responses. The first issue one 
must address is whether a stable adjustment to the CAPM 
exists. The second is then what is the size of that 
adjustment. The reason for finding out the answer to 
both of these questions is that the ECAPM will provide 
analysts with another tool with which to make return on 
equity estimates of utilities. The third reason 
follows from the second. The coming deregulation of 
utility services requires more accurate, longer-term 
estimates of cost of common equity.
D. Restructuring of the Utility Industry
Financial analysts have always had many tools at 
their disposal to make cost of capital judgments. 
However, as the industry becomes more competitive, the 
number of rate cases that public utility commissions 
review will decrease. As such, analysts must provide 
more accurate estimates of the "true" cost of common 
equity. Most restructuring proposals call for use of 
performance based ratemaking or deadband regulation.
The current test case in performance based regulation
18
is for San Diego Gas & Electric in California. The 
California Public Utility Commission has given the 
company a bandwidth inside its return on equity may 
fall. If the return increases beyond the top end of 
the bandwidth, San Diego Gas & Electric must provide 
customers with a refund, called a ratepayer dividend, 
reflected in lower rates. Likewise, if the return on 
equity should fall below the lower end of the 
bandwidth, then the company may raise its rates to 
cover any losses. The other piece of this regulatory 
compact is that the California Commission promised San 
Diego Gas & Electric a five year moratorium on rate 
cases.
E. Performance Based Ratemaking
Performance based ratemaking has two pitfalls that 
require more precise estimates of the cost of capital. 
Performance based ratemaking regimes have rate case 
moratoria as part of their prescription. Exceedingly 
generous or decidedly stingy allowed rates of return 
can have lasting consequences. A deadband that errs on 
the low side of the true cost of equity will subsidize 
ratepayers at the expense of the company's
Performance-Based Regulation, "1995 Statistical 
Report & Five Year Forecast, 1995 Annual Report of the 
Enova Corporation, pp. 8-11.
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stockholders. Future rate case will require 
commissions to award utilities higher rates of return, 
since such a result will increase the company's cost of 
capital. In the opposite case, a deadband that errs on 
the high side of the true cost of equity will serve to 
transfer wealth from ratepayers to shareholders of the 
company. Given, the long period of most proposed rate 
moratoria, this solution is just as undesirable.'^
With this in mind, one can readily see the attraction 
of having more perfected tools of financial analysis 
like the Empirical CAPM.
IV. Conclusion
The previous discussion identifies two threads in 
the public utility economics. First, the utility 
industry is preparing for major restructuring. The 
ultimate aim of which is to introduce competition among 
companies to reduce or eliminate cost of service 
regulation. The new regimen of performance based 
regulation exists as a legal "bridge" to more 
competitive markets. The goals of this new paradigm
Navarro, Peter, "The Simple Analytics of 
Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide for the PER 
Regulator," Yale Journal on Regulation, Volume 13, 
Number 1, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 
pp. 105-161.
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are to lower costs, to promote energy efficiency, to 
price efficiently, and to improve service quality.
Since the performance based ratemaking scheme is 
relatively new, little empirical evidence exists to 
show how firms respond under it,"' The first thread is 
broad and overreaching.
The second thread is more sublime and follows from 
the first. To implement performance based ratemaking, 
regulators must adopt a cost of common equity deadband 
that promotes the goals of cost reduction, pricing 
efficiency, and service quality. Estimates of the 
longer-term return on equity must have a higher degree 
of accuracy and durability than they now possess. The 
academic literature presents many of the shortcomings 
of the Discounted Cash Flow method and the 
size-adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model. The 
literature prescribes appropriate adjustments to the 
cost of common equity for their use in rate 
proceedings. However, the literature on the Empirical 
CAPM is thin. The coming restructuring requires a more 
accurate and robust Empirical CAPM.
Here, the two threads intertwine. The broad 
perspective is industry-wide restructuring and
Hill, Lawrence J., "Incentives Under Performance 
Based Regulation," A Primer on Incentive Regulation for 
Electric Utilities, (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, 1995), pp. 25-34.
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deregulation which form the "weave” of the regulatory 
"tapestry." The need for accurate longer-term 
estimates of the cost of capital will determine the 
success of restructuring. Accurate estimates of the 
cost of common equity require more empirically sound 
models such as the Empirical CAPM. This forms the 
"woof" of the regulatory "tapestry."
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW
I. Introduction
The literature surrounding the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) falls into three broad schools of 
economic thought. The first is the Fischer Black 
school which, generally speaking, regards the CAPM as 
imperfect but correctable with adjustments to beta.
The second school of thought is the Fama and French 
school which regards the CAPM as useless. This school 
posits that variables other than beta provide more 
accurate assessments of risk. Both the Fischer Black 
school and the Fama and French school are more academic 
in nature and focus on generalities about the CAPM 
applied to all securities. The third school of thought 
is the Litzenberger school which takes the above 
mentioned academic critiques and applies them 
specifically to cost of capital estimation for public 
utilities. Together, these three schools provide the 
basis of criticism that states that the basic CAPM 
underestimates the returns for public utilities.
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A. The Fischer Black School Defined
The Fischer Black school holds that the CAPM has
inherit empirical bias against low beta securities.
The first is the work of Sharpe, Linter and Black which 
establishes the theoretical underpinnings of the CAPM. 
Their research establishes the basic mathematical form 
of the CAPM as an extension of risk premium analysis. 
Unlike risk premium analysis, the CAPM assesses risk 
relative to other securities in the market. The second 
is the work of Robert S. Hamada which frames the CAPM 
with a few assumptions. When these assumptions hold, 
they allow the CAPM to more accurately measure the risk 
of a given security.
The third study is the work of Louis K. C. Chan 
and Josef Lakonishok that uses a practitioner's 
approach to rebut the great body of work of the Fama 
and French school. Chan and Lakoninshok base their 
approach on the fact that a great deal of portfolio 
managers use beta in their investment decisions. They 
further note that many financial analysts regard beta 
as one of the most important contributions of the 
academic financial community. The fourth thread of the 
Fischer Black school is the work of Fischer Black 
himself. Black poses his own rebuttal of Eugene Fama 
and Kenneth French. He simply argues that Fama and 
French are wrong. Black does this by updating the work
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of Black, Jensen, and Scholes and Miller and Scholes.
He finds that the bias against low beta stocks is more 
significant now than it was previously. The latest 
work in the Fischer Black school is the analysis of 
Kevin Grundy and Burton Malkiel. They also take issue 
with the Fama and French school. Grundy and Malkiel 
find that beta is a useful measure of the downside risk 
of low beta stocks in bear markets.
B. The Fama and French School Defined
The Fama and French school of thought centers on
the work of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French. Fama and
French study cross-sectional variation of average stock
returns. They find that market capitalization and
book-to-market equity ratios contribute more to the
estimation of the return on equity than beta. Fama and
French discover that when one controls for size or
book-to-market equity that the relationship between
beta and returns is statistically indeterminate. This
indicates that beta has no predictive power in
determining the cost of common equity. Others in this
camp include Reinganum and Lakoninshok who examine the
relationship between dividend yields and market
returns.
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c. The Litzenberger School Defined
The third school of thought is the Litzenberger
school which applies the lessons of the other two
schools specifically to the public utility industry.
The first study of the use of the CAPM in regulatory 
proceedings is the work of William Breen and Eugene 
Lerner. They find the use of beta wanting. They note 
that the empirical estimates of beta are unstable at 
best. The second body of knowledge is the work of 
Eugene Brigham and Roy Crum. They discuss the numerous 
problems associated with the model and its use as an 
estimator of the cost of capital in regulatory
proceedings. Brigham and Crum's criticisms are both
academic and procedural. They find the model's 
assumptions unrealistic, the choice of the risk-free 
rate unsettling, estimates of the market premium 
controversial, and generally unstable betas.
The third study is the work of John Glister and 
Charles Linke. Their rebuttal of Brigham and Crum 
argues against the instability of the betas of public 
utilities. Rather than discarding the CAPM, Glister 
and Linke suggest operating under the assumption that 
the betas of public utilities are stable. They make 
this assumption based on the premise that utility 
stocks are more conservative assets. The fourth 
article is the summation of the efforts of Richard
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Pettway. Like Glister and Linke, Pettway argues that 
the instability of beta is not an issue in estimating 
utilities' cost of equity. Empirically, Pettway finds 
that market shocks have caused the instability in 
betas. Thus, those betas estimated in periods of 
relative market calm produce betas which have 
predictive value in rate cases.
Robert Litzenberger, Krishna Ramaswamy, and Howard 
Sosin attempt to develop a grand unification theory on 
how to correct the CAPM for the estimation of the 
return of common equity of public utilities. 
Litzenberger et al acknowledge the various possible 
effects whether they are from dividend yields, 
taxation, unlimited borrowing, firm size, etc., and try 
to apply them all to correct the CAPM. They note that 
low betas possess an inherit bias in the estimation of 
the cost of capital which creates a systematic 
skewness. Their cure for the problem is to adjust beta 
with a shift parameter, alpha. It shifts beta closer 
to unity. The aim of the alpha shift parameter is to 
account for all of the possible influences upon beta's 
instability and inaccuracy.
The last work in the Litzenberger school is the 
update of Litzenberger et al's measurement of alpha by 
Roger Morin. Morin uses Litzenberger et al's
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methodology to update the alpha estimate. He assumes 
that all of the other variables to explain returns such 
as book-to-market ratios, skewness, firm size, and 
dividend policy serve to obfuscate the analysis. 
Instead, Morin lumps them all into one category and 
uses alpha to explain them. The results of his 
analysis show that the CAPM is flatter than other 
empirical methods describe. Morin demonstrates that 
unadjusted betas understate the true cost of capital of 
public utilities.
II. The Fischer Black School of Thought
A. Theoretical Development of the CAPM
Through a series of articles, Sharpe (1964)',
Linter (1965)", and Black (1972)' construct a
mathematical theory of asset returns known as the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The model began as
an extension of risk premium analysis, the predominant
theory of finance at the time. The first CAPM theory,
also known as the Sharpe-Linter-Black Model, explains
'Sharpe, William, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory 
of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk,"
Journal of Finance, (September 1964), pp. 425-442.
Linter, J., "Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal 
Gains from Diversification, " Journal of Finance, 
(December 1965), pp. 587-615.
 ^Black, Fischer, "Capital Market Equilibrium with 
Restricted Borrowing," Journal of Business, Volume 45 
(July 1972), pp. 444-455.
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the relationship between two types of risk; systematic 
risk and unsystematic risk. The systematic risk is the 
risk of any given security or asset. The unsystematic 
or market risk is the risk associated with the whole 
market of capital assets. The appeal of the CAPM is 
its presentation of a simple, measurable relationship 
between risk and expected return. It describes the 
expected return of an asset or security as the sum of 
the return on a risk free asset and a premium for risk. 
One assesses risk solely as the sensitivity of a given 
asset to the movements of a broad market index. The 
risk premium depends exclusively on this sensitivity 
and on the spread between the expected rate of return 
on the broad index and the risk-free rate. The appeal 
of the CAPM is its simplicity. Mathematically, the 
Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM is:
R m - R f +  -  Rf)
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Where :
Rj - the expected return of the security 
Rj- - the risk free return 
B -  sensitivity of the security 
R^ - the expected return to the market
B. Underlying Assumptions of the CAPM
Robert S. Hamada (1969) in his article entitled,
"Portfolio Analysis, Market Equilibrium, and
Corporation Finance," frames the CAPM by adding a few
underlying assumptions’. He posits that for the CAPM
to predict returns accurately for a given security,
then one must assume that capital markets are perfect.
This implies that information is available to all, no
taxes or transaction costs exist, and assets are
infinitely divisible. Further, one must assume that
investors are risk averse and maximize the expected
utility of their wealth at the end of their planning
horizon. Third, the planning horizon is the same for
all investors, and they make their portfolio decisions
at the same time. Fourth, all investors have identical
estimates of expected rates of return. Fifth, one must
'Hamada, Robert S., "Portfolio Analysis, Market 
Equilibrium and Corporate Finance," Journal of Finance, 
Volume 24, Number 1, (March 1969), pp. 13-31.
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assume that expected bankruptcy or default risk and the 
risks of interest rate and purchasing power fluctuation 
are negligible. Sixth, one must presuppose that 
dividend policy has no effect on the market value of a 
firm's cost of capital. Last, one must ignore future 
investment opportunities that exist at rates of return 
greater than the firm's current cost of capital.
C. A Practitioner's Approach to the CAPM
Louis K.C. Chan and Josef Lakonishok (1993) take a
practitioner's approach to rebut Fama and French's
dismissal of the CAPM'. In their 1993 article, they
examine portfolio managers' use of beta to make
investment decisions. They state that many
professionals regard the concept of beta as the single
most important contribution of academic researchers to
the financial community. They start their discourse by
asking the simple question: is there sufficient
evidence to bury beta? Further, they assert that the
question adds urgency when one considers the dramatic
acceptance of beta in portfolio management in the past
decade. Portfolio managers are now using optimization
techniques to find more efficient portfolios. Chan and
Lakonishok note that the trend is growing. Technology
^Chan, Louis K.C., and Josef Lakonishok, "Are the 
Reports of Beta's Death Premature?," Journal of 
Portfolio Management, (Summer 1993), pp. 51-62.
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has advanced in such a way to optimize portfolios from 
thousands of asset choices. Chan and Lakonishok find 
it ironic that the industry should accept beta for 
twenty years with thin empirical evidence only to 
discover academics discarding it. Indeed, they think 
that beta may emerge in the future as an important 
measure of risk.
Chan and Lakonishok warn that numerous reasons 
exist as to why returns may bear little relation to 
betas. They note that Roll and Ross emphasize the 
problems associated with testing the relationship 
between return and beta when one cannot observe the 
true market portfolio. They do not dispute that a 
fundamental difficulty exists with current tests of the 
CAPM. However, their approach is more pragmatic. They 
focus on the practical use of the CAPM. Their standard 
approach is to utilize some broad-based proxy for the 
market index, calculate beta with respect to this 
proxy, and relate future returns to these betas. Since 
Fama and French find no association between returns and 
betas, Chan and Lakonishok focus on that conclusion.
As such, they exclude all the debate about which other 
variables one should include in the CAPM. The 
variables Chan and Lakonishok ignore are market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratios, etc. They focus
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exclusively on beta. They note that while it is true 
that other variables may help explain returns, no firm 
guidelines exist as to which variables one should 
include.
D. Betas Are Still Biased
Fischer Black (1993) also takes issue with the
findings of Fama and French in his treatise entitled,
"Beta and Return: Announcements of the 'Death' of Beta
Seem Premature."*' Black attributes Fama and French's
dismissal of the CAPM to the wrong interpretation of
their own results. He cites studies by Black, Jensen,
and Scholes (1972) and Miller and Scholes (1972).
These authors found that during the period of 1931
through 1965 low-beta stocks performed better than the
CAPM predicts while high-beta stocks did worse. The
above authors found that the estimated slope of the
line relating average return and risk is flatter than
the CAPM predicts. Further, they find that if one
chooses his data carefully, one can find a period of
two decades where the risk-return line is essentially
flat. Black states that the results of Fama and French
are more than likely the result of data-mining or
statistically loaded arguments.
° Black, Fischer, "Beta and Return: Announcements of 
the 'Death' of Beta Seem Premature," Journal of 
Portfolio Management, (Fall 1993), pp. 8-18.
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Black describes a market phenomenon he calls the 
"beta effect" where borrowing restrictions have higher 
than expected returns. He states that many investors 
who can borrow, and who deduct the interest they pay 
from their income taxes, are nonetheless reluctant to 
borrow. Those who accept market risk will bid up the 
prices of high-beta stocks. This makes low-beta stocks 
more attractive and high-beta stocks unattractive to 
investors who have low-beta portfolios or who are 
unwilling to borrow. Evidence of this exists in the 
market's reaction to a change in a firm's leverage 
position. An offer to exchange debt for equity 
generally causes the firm's stock price to rise, while 
an offer of equity for debt causes the stock price to 
decrease.
Black chooses to update his previous study with 
Jensen and Scholes (1972) to rebut Fama and French. In 
doing so, he finds that high-beta stocks have lower 
returns accented by negative alphas. Likewise, the 
low-beta stocks have higher than expected returns with 
positive alphas. Black stands by the original 
assertion that he and others have made previously. He 
states that the CAPM will continue to overestimate the 
returns of high-beta stocks and underestimate the 
returns of low-beta stocks. Black caps his argument
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with Fama and French by posing a mûre intuitive logic 
rather than an empirical demonstration. If the 
relationship between risk and return is essentially 
flat, then the market underprices low-beta stocks. As 
such, a wise fund or portfolio manager would do well to 
purchase low-beta assets. This way one minimizes risk 
and maximizes return.
E. Beta is a Robust Measure of Downside Risk
Kevin Grundy and Burton G . Malkiel (1996) follow
Fischer Black's latest rebuttal (1993) of Fama and
French's conclusions and find beta to be a serviceable
measure of downside risk, ex ante. Using statistical
methods similar to Fama and French, Grundy and Malkiel
find that while beta shows little predictive power in
bull markets, it does help to find low risk assets in
bear markets. As such, they view the death of beta as
an illusion if one places it in the correct context.
Grundy, Kevin and Burton G . Malkiel, "Reports of 
Beta's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated," Journal of 
Portfolio Management, (Spring 1996), pp. 36-44.
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III. The Fama and French School of Thought
Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French in their 1992 
treatise entitled, "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns," all but declare that the CAPM is dead." They 
take two easily measured variables, size and 
book-to-market equity and empirically demonstrate that 
they combine to capture the cross-sectional variation 
in average stock returns associated with market betas. 
Further, they show that when tests allow for variation 
in beta unrelated to size, then the relation between 
market betas and average returns is nonexistent. This 
questions the empirical validity of beta as an 
explanatory variable of returns. Fama and French's 
results concur with the studies of Reinganum (1981) and 
Lakoninshok (1986) which also illustrate that beta 
alone does not explain average market returns. Their 
conclusions are simple. Beta does not help explain 
cross-section average stock returns. Fama and French 
empirically demonstrate that size and book-to-market 
ratios are more useful predictors of returns than beta.
’ Fama, Eugene and Kenneth French, "The 
Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," Journal of 
Finance, Volume 48, Number 2, pp. 427-465.
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IV. The Litzenberger School of Thought
A. The CAPM as a Measure of the Cost of Capital 
In their 1972 article "On the Use of Beta in
Regulatory Proceedings," William J. Breen and Eugene M,
Lerner undertook the first critical examination of the
CAPM to estimate the return on equity of public
utilities.' Their study explores the use of beta in
regulatory proceedings and finds its use wanting. They
note that the empirical estimates of betas are
unstable. The estimates range for any given firm from
very positive to very negative. Breen and Lerner
attribute this to three factors; the estimating
equation utilized, the choice of market index, and the
specific time period selected to derive beta. They
assert that these unstable betas are a result of
changes in managerial decisions. As a result they
develop an empirical and theoretical construct that
checks the validity of estimated betas as
representative of "true" betas. Breen and Lerner
conclude that if the CAPM provides the underlying
framework for the valuation of firms in regulatory
proceedings, then financial analysts must conduct more
^Breen, William J., and Eugene M. Lerner, "On the 
Use of Beta in Regulatory Proceedings," Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, (Autumn 1972), pp. 
612-621.
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research. This research must examine the relationship 
between individual corporate activities and the risk 
associated with the individual firm. They also assert 
that given the nature of public utilities that 
regulatory decisions may have underlying influence on 
the betas of utility stocks. This hypothesis has a 
strange familiarity in the conclusions of the Blue field 
Waterworks decision that ruled that regulatory risk is 
a risk that commissions must consider in their 
decisions.
3. Problems with the CAPM in Regulation
Eugene F. Brigham and Roy L. Crum (1977) in their
article, "On the Use of the CAPM in Public Utility Rate
Cases," write of the numerous problems associated with
the model.^ First, the model has unrealistic
assumptions. Second, disagreement exists among
academics over the choice of the appropriate risk-free
interest rate. Third, one cannot measure the market
risk premium accurately. Fourth, not only is an
individual stock's beta unstable, but no one knows how
to estimate a stock's future beta coefficient. In
addition, Brigham and Crum state that the dividend
policy of a given corporation affects the asset's
Brigham, Eugene F., and Roy L. Crum, "On the Use 
of the CAPM in Public Utility Rate Cases," Financial 
Management, (Summer 1977), pp. 7-15.
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price. In other words, dividend yields influence 
betas.
Brigham and Crum conclude that the CAPM probably 
produces downward-biased betas resulting in lower cost 
of capital estimates. Calculated beta coefficients 
will tend to decline whenever a company's fundamental 
risk position changes. This is true even if the market 
as a whole is rising while investors expect moderate or 
deteriorating earning prospects. Thus, betas can 
measure risk in the exactly the opposite direction from 
actual market and firm conditions. Brigham and Crum 
then cite the examples of Penn Central, W. T. Grant, 
and Franklin National Bank, three of the largest 
bankruptcies in history. They note that these firms 
had declining betas and poor earnings forecasts prior 
to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy should have served to raise 
their risk, hence their betas. Similarly, the electric 
and telephone utilities' betas remained constant or 
even declined from 1964 to 1975 when the industries 
fundamental risks increased. At the same time, 
analysts were downgrading the companies' stocks and 
bonds from "widow and orphan stocks" to assets that 
pose a significant degree of risk. The implication of 
Brigham and Crum is that the use of the CAPM in utility 
cost of capital estimation is unclear. Historical
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betas do not necessarily reflect the risks inherent in 
utility equity due to their bias on the past.
C. Exercise Caution When Using the CAPM in Regulation 
John E. Glister, Jr. and Charles M. Linke quickly
counter Brigham and Crum. In their 1978 article, "More
on the Estimation of Beta for Public Utilities: Biases
Resulting from Structural Shifts in True Beta," Glister
and Linke present two discrepancies of opinion on the
instability of estimated betas." First, they argue
that a size and closure rate discrepancy occurs between
a firm's true beta and its regressed beta. This
difference usually follows a structural shift in the
firm's systematic risk. This discrepancy is a function
of the correlation between changes in returns due to
changes in true beta or changes in returns due to all
other causes. Glister and Linke note that Brigham and
Crum fail to acknowledge this correlation effect.
Likewise, they note that Brigham and Crum overlook the
"arithmetic phenomenon" of a declining beta while risk
for the firm is increasing. Brigham and Crum assume
that this is not unique to the CAPM. Glister and Linke
take issue with Brigham and Crum's empirical support
"Glister, John E ., and Charles M. Linke, "More on 
the Estimation of Beta for Public Utilities: Biases 
Resulting from Structural Shifts in True Beta," 
Financial Management, (Autumn 1978), pp. 60-65.
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for the "arithmetic phenomenon" by their choice of 
firms approaching financial embarrassment. Glister and 
Linke offer an alternate explanation for the declining 
estimated betas for companies approaching bankruptcy. 
They contend that the phenomenon of falling betas was 
simply a reflection of investors' expectations of lower 
earnings. Glister and Linke also view Brigham and 
Crum's application of the misleading beta to public 
utilities as inappropriate for purposes of simplicity. 
They question the notion of using a complex calculation 
to find a stable beta instead of simply assuming a 
stable betas for utility stocks. All in all. Glister 
and Linke do agree with Brigham and Crum. They concur 
that one must exercise a great deal of caution when 
estimating betas for calculation of the return on 
equity.
D. Assumption of Stable Betas
Richard H. Pettway undertakes an empirical
examination of the CAPM in his 1978 study entitled, "On
the Use of Beta in Regulatory Proceedings: an Empirical
Examination."^^ Pettway notes that the CAPM has become
a way to estimate the return on equity that investors
‘^ Pettway, Richard H ., "On the Use of Beta in 
Regulatory Proceedings: An Empirical Examination," Bell 
Journal of Economics, Volume 9, Number 1, (Spring 
1978), pp. 239-248.
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anticipate. As a forecast of the equity portion of the 
cost of capital, the CAPM does not require structural 
stability of beta. However, one must assume that it 
exists, or else the model is useless. Through his 
empirical work, Pettway comes to three conclusions. 
First, periods exist when the estimated parameters of 
the CAPM showed a strong resilience. They made good 
estimators of future observed values. Second, some 
periods during severe energy shocks caused disruption 
in the ability to make stable estimates. The result is 
unstable estimates and poor predictions of future 
returns. Third, after the period of instability, the 
estimated parameters return to their previous 
stability. Pettway concludes that a fundamental 
problem exists when using historical data to forecast 
future returns. He notes that no reliable test exists 
to demonstrate if such ex post parameters make 
effective ex ante estimators. However, if markets are 
free from substantial shocks and disruptions, then the 
ex post betas are reliable. Consequently, Pettway 
concludes that when one uses historical data one must 
consider such possibilities.
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E. The Litzenberqer CAPM
The boldest critique of the pure or theoretical
CAPM comes from an article entitled, "On the CAPM 
Approach to the Estimation of A Public Utility's Cost 
of Equity Capital," by Robert Litzenberqer, Krishna 
Ramaswamy, and Howard Sosin {1980).*' Litzenberqer et 
al identify a prevailinq assumption in CAPM estimates 
that the betas are strictly proportional to market 
returns. As previously noted, the empirical literature 
does not support this presupposition. The empirical 
literature supports a (non-proportional) linear 
relationship between risk premia and market betas with 
a positive intercept. Their survey of the literature 
finds that other factors besides beta have profound 
influence on returns includinq systematic skewness and 
dividend yields. They find that the work of others so 
overwhelminq that they state:
"The version of the CAPM that should be employed 
in estimatinq a public utility's cost of equity capital 
cannot be conclusively demonstrated by theoretical 
arquments . "*■*
By this statement, they imply that a positive theory of 
the valuation of risky assets cannot rely exclusively
Litzenberqer, Robert, Krishna Ramaswamy, and 
Howard Sosin, "On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation 
of a Public Utility's Cost of Equity Capital," Journal 
of Finance, Volume 35, Number 2, (May 1980), pp. 
369-387.
Ibid.
43
on the validity of its assumptions, but it must also 
rely on the accuracy of its a priori predictions. 
Litzenberqer et al demonstrate empirically that risk 
premia behave in direct proportion to some market index 
beta. However, they produce downward biased 
predictions of the cost of equity when betas are less 
than unity. They note that the cause may be the high 
dividend yields of utility stocks relative to the 
weighted yield of market index stocks.
Litzenberqer et al have performed studies of the 
relationship between dividends and returns to find 
that, besides beta, dividends have a strong, positive 
association with cost of equity capital estimates. 
Further study indicates that the relationship between 
this estimate of returns and dividend yields is 
nonlinear in nature. In addition, their conclusions 
about market skewness indicate that the effect is 
unstable, hence a capricious determinant of future 
returns. In computing beta, Litzenberqer et ai suggest 
following the theoretical advice of Blume (1971) by 
adjusting historical betas towards unity. The 
underlying thesis of this argument is that in the long 
run all returns converge to the market return, ceteris 
paribus. In addition, adjusted betas make better 
forecasters of future returns. Litzenberqer et al opt
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for two types of adjustment to beta; global and 
Bayesian. The global adjustment applies the same shift 
to each beta equally, while the Bayesian adjusts each 
beta according to its own unique variance. Their study 
concludes that utilities generally have residual 
standard deviations that are smaller than most 
industrial firms. Hence, the Bayesian adjustment does 
not have the same predictive ability that the global 
adjustment procedure does. They find that the global 
adjustment has a more profound a priori effect that 
warrants further investigation.
F. Morin's Empirical CAPM
Roger A. Morin (1994) counters Fama and French's
thesis with a paraphrasing of Mark Twain's quip, "The
reports of the death of the CAPM have been greatly
exaggerated."'" He dismisses Fama and French's
argument by pointing out that they used realized
returns rather than expected returns. Morin recognizes
that the CAPM remains a valuable theory in the
estimation of the return on equity in public utility
rate cases. Therefore, he embarks on an effort to give
the model some regulatory credibility. Using the
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 13: CAPM Extensions," 
Regulatory Finance: Utilities' Cost of Capital, 
(Arlington, VA: Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 1994), 
pp. 321-342.
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methodology of Litzenberqer, Ramaswamy, and Sosin 
(1980) as a basis, Morin assumes that the various 
correction variables suggested by others (i.e., firm 
size, dividend policy, skewness, debt-to-equity ratios) 
serve to obfuscate the analysis, Morin offers to lump 
them all into one explanatory variable that he uses as 
a shift parameter of the raw beta. The result of this 
shift parameter is to flatten the CAPM and its 
graphical counterpart, the Market Return Line (MRL).
As the previous literature indicates, the CAPM has an 
empirical bias against firms with betas less than unity 
and those that pay high dividends. Likewise, the CAPM 
empirically overestimates the returns of betas greater 
than unity and those with small dividends. To test his 
hypothesis, Morin separates securities from the Center 
for Research of Security Prices into forty-two 
portfolios based on betas and dividend yields and 
regressed them on the following equation:
R, = R^+ a(R„-R^ +  (I-a)p, ( R^-R^
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Where :
- Portfolio Risk Return
Rf - Risk Free Return
a - Alpha Shift Parameter
- Beta of the Given Portfolio
R^ - Market Risk Return 
Morin proceeds to test the hypothesis that alpha 
is not equal to zero. If alpha were zero, then the 
CAPM would not show a bias against low beta and high 
dividend stocks."" One must note that Morin uses 
portfolios that describe the market as a whole. He 
includes over 450 companies in his analysis, most of 
which are not public utilities. His shift parameter is 
a global one to describe all stocks and is not unique 
to utilities.
V. Conclusion
As the above body of literature demonstrates, a 
general dissatisfaction has existed with the results
Morin, Roger A., "Appendix B: Rebuttal Testimony 
of Roger A. Morin," In the Matter of the Commission's 
Examination of the Rates and Charges of the Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, Arizona 
Corporation Commission, Docket No. E-1051-88-146, 
(March 28, 1989), pp. 1-28.
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produced by the theoretical CAPM since its 
introduction. The criticism is widespread. Whether it 
attempts to reconcile the bias of beta or it dismisses 
the CAPM outright, all agree that the CAPM produces 
biased results. Two dominant trends emerge from the 
preceding discussion in the areas of estimation bias 
and underestimation of risk. All give some credence to 
the idea that the CAPM produces biased betas.
Likewise, they acknowledge that the CAPM understates 
the returns for stocks with betas less than unity. In 
addition, the literature indicates that high dividend 
stocks have betas that do not fully account for their 
returns. Further, beta does not fully measure risk 
related to the market capitalization of a given 
security. Beta also does not completely describe the 
relationship between book-to-market ratios and returns 
on equity.
The previous discussion makes little mention of 
alpha as a way to correct for the bias against low beta 
stocks. The first authors to address this issue are 
Litzenberger et al and their case is compelling. Black 
tends to concur; however, his discussion of alpha is 
more superficial. Although he previously addressed the 
topic of an alpha shift parameter, it has the 
appearance of an afterthought. Morin concurs with the
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results produced by Litzenberger et al and uses them as 
a basis to update their efforts. All of the others do 
not give the idea of a shift parameter, such as alpha, 
much thought as a solution to the empirical bias of the 
CAPM. However, the use of the alpha shift variable 
emerges as a solution to the bias produced by more 
traditional methods of beta estimation.
Last, no serious scholarly work has materialized 
to develop the alpha shift parameter further. The work 
of Morin appears as an appendix to support rate of 
return testimony he filed with the Arizona Public 
Service Commission.' However, one must allow Morin 
the benefit of the doubt. He replicates the results in 
his book Regulatory Finance.*’^ The last exclusively 
academic research on the size and statistical 
significance of alpha is the work of Litzenberger et 
al."' It stands to this day as the only work on the 
subject of developing a global adjustment to betas to 
account for the biases of the traditional CAPM. 
Nevertheless, both Litzenberger et ai and Morin find 
global shift alphas that apply to betas. Given the 
unique characteristic of utility stocks as income 
assets, their alphas may not truly represent the bias
Ibid.
Morin, Roger A., "Chapter 13: CAPM Extensions,"
ibid.
Litzenberger, ibid.
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against accurate return on equity estimates. For 
ratemaking purposes, a more precise alpha may result by 
directly estimating the alpha for a group of utility 
stocks. Given the minimal amount of discussion of 
alpha in the literature of the CAPM, an alpha unique to 
utilities may exist. Because of its application to 
utility regulation, it has potentially significant 
policy implications. Further, it is possible to test 
for that alpha empirically.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I. The Problem Defined
The previous literary discussion illustrates that 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has many serious 
empirical shortcomings in estimating the expected 
return on equity of utilities. As noted, the simple 
CAPM produces betas that have inherit biases against 
low beta stocks and those yielding high dividends. The 
result is to estimate a cost of common equity that 
differs from the true cost. Likewise, beta does not 
fully account for risk associated with market 
capitalization, firm size, and book-to-market ratios- 
Further, the literature has little discussion of the 
use of the alpha shift parameter to correct the model's 
empirical shortcomings. In addition, the academic 
literature surrounding the empirical CAPM is out of 
date. Finally, this particular branch of CAPM theory 
draws general inferences related to all stocks. It 
does not focus exclusively on the issue of the 
underestimation of returns to public utilities' 
securities. All in all, CAPM theory in its present 
form does not serve the function as an accurate measure
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in the current, deregulated, less-frequent regulatory 
environment.
A. Beta is a Biased Estimator
Beta is a biased estimator of risk as Fischer
Black makes clear. Unadjusted betas produce biases in
the estimation of expected returns. The nature of the
empirical process derives raw betas that understate the
returns of low beta stocks and overestimate the returns
of high beta stocks. Since utilities fall into the
former category, the use of the CAPM as a measure of
the cost of capital can cause shareholders to receive
less compensation for the risk they assume. In the
longer-term, inadequate returns will discourage capital
investment for infrastructure development. Morin
further asserts that beta has a bias against stocks
that pay high dividend yields. Once again, the
investors who hold the equities of public utilities
receive earnings that are less than they should for
securities of comparable risk. This can hamper any
given utility's ability to attract capital for future
investments in plant to serve its customers. As
illustrated, beta is a biased estimator of expected
risk.
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B. Beta Does Not Fully Measure Risk
Beta does not fully account for risk that any firm
possesses based on unique characteristics of the firm 
in question. As Fama and French discover, the CAPM and 
beta do not adequately measure the risk associated with 
the market capitalization of smaller companies. The 
general tendency of beta is to understate the true cost 
of equity for firms with smaller market capitalization. 
With no adjustment to account for this possibility, 
shareholders of smaller utilities will either subsidize 
ratepayers or will cease investment. Litzenberger et 
al raise the issue of beta as a skewed estimator of 
risk which underreports the risk of small firms and 
those with low betas. Another possibility is the issue 
raised by Breen and Lerner that beta has an inherit 
bias that does not account for regulatory risk. In 
order to account for the underestimation of risk 
associated with raw betas, one must adjust them.
C. Scant Academic Discussion of Alpha
In the literature, little discussion exists about
the alpha shift parameter as a means to account for the 
biases inherit in beta. Black does acknowledge that 
the CAPM should produce results that are flatter than 
the ordinary model predicts. However, he develops an 
alpha that is merely additive rather than rebalancing
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the CAPM to capture the possible causes of the skewness 
of the unadjusted CAPM. Litzenberger et al are the 
only authors that view the alpha shift parameter as a 
viable solution to the skewness of beta. The results 
of Litzenberger et al demonstrate that the use of alpha 
to correct the CAPM produces more robust estimates of 
the cost of capital for public utilities. Morin's 
reworking of the efforts of Litzenberger et al serves 
to confirm this. In the vast academic literature of 
the CAPM, only the last two address the adjustment of 
beta with an alpha shift in the estimation of the 
return on common equity for public utilities.
D. All Studies of Alpha are Out of Date
The last exclusively academic research on the use
of alpha to adjust the betas is the aforementioned
analysis of Litzenberger et al. Given that they
conducted this research almost two decades ago, the
empirical results are out of date. The data they
analyzed were security prices that end in the late
1970's. The utility industry has undergone two major
changes which have had an impact upon the risks
associated with holding these securities. The first is
the vertical divestiture in the natural gas industry.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) no longer
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regulates wellhead gas prices. Although FERC still 
regulates the rates charged for the interstate 
transportation of natural gas, it is far more limited 
and FERC performs this function more at an arm's 
length. Many shippers and pipelines negotiate their 
rates directly. Consequently, pipeline rate cases are 
infrequent, and FERC limits them to regulation of the 
rates of return that the pipelines earn. The only 
traditional regulation remains with the states which 
establish the rates that local gas distribution 
companies (LDC's) charge. The second emerging trend is 
the move toward deregulation of the retail utility 
business which ultimately aims to offer more retail 
customers the choice of their gas and electricity 
suppliers. Although the work of Morin is more recent, 
it relies upon data drawn from a period of time before 
this industry-wide restructuring. The need to more 
accurately account for the cost of future capital needs 
of utilities and to cope with less frequent rate cases 
requires a more precise and timely measurement of 
alpha.
E. Restructuring Requires a Precise Estimate
The current restructuring of the industry and the
movement of the utility industry toward competition
necessitate an estimate of the return on equity which
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produces a robust, long-term estimate of the cost of 
capital. The aim of the newer performance based 
ratemaking is to reduce costs to ratepayers by 
conducting fewer regulatory proceedings. The current 
paradigm of cost of service regulation allows utility 
companies to seek rate adjustments to cover revenue 
shortfalls to avoid financial peril. The major crux of 
restructuring is to force the market to regulate rates 
in the off years. As such, regulators, customers and 
utilities need more accurate long-term estimates of the 
true cost of capital. In order for the empirical CAPM 
to have any value in a performance based rate making 
regimen, it must have long-term stability.
F. Transparency is Necessary
Other policy considerations exist that influence
the methodologies suitable for measuring the cost of
capital in ratemaking as well. The primary modus
operandi of any regulatory model is transparency.
Whether it is the setting of the rates of public
utilities or limiting the tailpipe emissions of
dangerous "greenhouse" gases, both the regulators and
the regulated entities deserve a process that all
concerned will understand. In the case of ratemaking,
the goal of transparency requires tools that estimate
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the cost of capital with minimal complexity. The CAPM 
is a simple model to do such an estimate. However, 
both the regulator and the firm must understand its 
limitations and make adjustments, like the alpha shift, 
that more fully account for the biases inherit in the 
CAPM. The alpha adjustment is a simple change to the 
CAPM that an analyst can easily explain to all 
stakeholders in a rate proceeding and it is easy to 
replicate.
G. The Empirical CAPM is Simple
The appeal of the empirical CAPM is its
simplicity. All one needs to do is take a risk free 
rate of return and add it to a calculated risk premium 
for an individual firm. This characteristic is 
especially true in utility rate cases. An analyst must 
testify to a regulatory commission about a required 
rate of return to attract the necessary capital to 
provide a fair rate of return. Complex and esoteric 
discussions about minute adjustments to the CAPM serve 
to overwhelm regulators. A brief discussion of the 
inadequacies of the CAPM followed with a concise 
adjustment to the CAPM will aid all involved.
A plausible explanation of the CAPM's statistical 
imperfections may lie with its assumptions. Most 
glaring among them is the assumption of homogeneous
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dividend policies for all firms. As Litzenberger et ai 
establish, this assumption has led to a downward bias 
in cost of equity estimates. An appropriate analysis 
of the CAPM as it applies to high dividend stocks like 
public utilities would relax this assumption to allow 
for inclusion of a "dividend effect."
The rule of parsimony requires that should an 
analyst make any empirical adjustments to the CAPM, 
then one must keep them to a minimum. As such, the 
argument of Fama and French regarding the use of other 
variables falls short of achieving this end. Indeed, 
one might even consider ignoring them outright. 
Otherwise, the result is an unfortunate subsidization 
of ratepayers by the company or vice versa. However, 
one must make some adjustment.
Following Litzenberger et al and Morin's lead the 
logical step is to conduct an analysis and synthesis 
that globally adjusts the returns of utilities to 
minimize their variances and remove any instability 
associated with any given parameter. This catch-all 
adjustment takes into account the variety of influences 
upon any given security to eliminate any 
multicollinearity that those variables may have on one 
another. At this point the issue devolves into three 
straight-forward questions:
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♦What is size of this alpha adjustment? 
♦Is alpha statistically significant?
♦Is alpha statistically robust?
II. Methodology
A. Introduction
The purpose of this analysis is to determine
whether the Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model
(ECAPM) is a useful predictor of the cost of capital
for electric and gas utilities in the emerging
regulatory environment. The unique characteristic of
the ECAPM is that it attempts to envelop all of the
shortcomings that the previous discussion illustrates.
The ECAPM uses the alpha shift parameter as a
"catch-all" for the plausible causes of the bias
inherit in raw betas. For the model to be useful as an
estimator of the return on common equity in utility
rate-making, one must assess its statistical stability.
One cannot estimate alpha directly. The
estimation of alpha requires a two step regression.
The first step is the regression of the raw beta using
the Sharp-Linter-Black CAPM. The second step to
estimate alpha involves using the raw beta to derive
alpha. The equation which one utilizes is the formula
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developed by both Litzenberger et al and Morin. Then, 
one can obtain an estimate of the alpha shift 
parameter.
B. Estimation of the Raw Beta
The raw beta is a measure of the sensitivity of
the utility portfolio relative to the market portfolio
To calculate the utility portfolio beta, one must
regress the returns of the utility portfolio as the
dependent variable relative to the returns of the
market portfolio. With the CAPM developed by Sharp,
Linter, and Black, the only step necessary is to find
an estimate of beta. The CAPM in the theoretical form
is as follows:
R i = R f  + P i (Rm — R f ) + £/ {1 )
Where :
- Return of the Utility Portfolio 
Rf- Risk Free Return
- Raw Beta of the Utility Portfolio 
Rg, - Return of the Market Portfolio
- Error term
One can estimate the raw beta by using any simple 
regression technique. The key in this step is to find
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the covariance between the utility index and the market 
index to later estimate alpha and test the raw beta for 
statistical significance.
C. The Estimation of Alpha
Since one cannot estimate alpha directly, the
ECAPM developed by Litzenberger et al and Morin must
undergo a transformation for empirical convenience. In
its theoretical form, the ECAPM is as follows:
R i  =  R f  +  Oi{Rm —  R f )  +  (1 —  Ot)Praw(^/n ~  R f )  +  S/ (2 )
Where :
Rj - Return of the Utility Portfolio
- Risk Free Return
a - Alpha Shift Parameter
- Return of the Market Portfolio
^raw ~ Raw beta of the Utility Portfolio
Si - error term 
However, equation (2) requires some modification before 
one may estimate its parameters. The first step is to 
isolate the risk return of the utility portfolio in 
equation (1). Therefore equation (1) becomes:
( R i  —  R f )  =  Oi +  b i (R m  — R f )  +  Si (3)
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Using equation (2) as a guide, the parameters for 
estimation in equation (3) are as follows:
a. =  a(R^-Rf) (4)
(5)
The next step is to estimate the parameters of equation 
(3) to find the values of a. and b.. The last step is 
to test the values of a. and h; for significance.
Then, using the raw beta from the previous regression 
allows one to estimate alpha.
D. Finding the Alphas for All Industry Segments
The final step is to perform the regression and
calculation of alpha for the three data sets. Given
the possibility that differences may exist among the
LDC's, the electric companies, and the combined
utilities, a prudent step is to include the results of
any possible beta bias for each industry.
The selected data sets represent all three
segments of the utility industry. The Dow-Jones
Utility Index and the Standard & Poor's Utility Index
represent the industry overall. Given the recent
increase in mergers and alliances that pair electric
companies with gas utilities, the need exists for an
alpha to account for any biases that affect utilities
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overall. The convergence of gas and electric companies 
and the move toward competition between the two has 
given rise to finding any bias that might exist. 
However, some companies will chose to remain dedicated 
to the lines of business in which they began.
Therefore, the analysis must consider the differences 
in alpha that may exist for the gas and electric 
industries on their own. As such, the Moody's Gas 
Companies Index will provide a estimate of the alpha 
for gas companies. Likewise the Moody's Electric 
Companies will establish the alpha for electric only 
companies. These three regressions will examine if any 
such differences do exist.
III. The Data Set
The calculation of beta and alpha require three 
sets of data. The first is a portfolio that represents 
the market return rate that accounts for systematic 
risk. The second is a portfolio of individual 
securities that represent the public utility industry 
as a whole. The third data series is the risk free 
rate. These three data series allow one to estimate 
both beta and the alpha shift parameter.
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A. The Standards for Data Set Selection
Each set of data must meet three criteria for
their use in this analysis. First, the data must have 
general acceptance as appropriate representatives of 
the various components of the CAPM. Second, the data 
must be readily available from reliable sources. This 
gives the analysis more credibility. Finally, the data 
series must possess statistical stability. All data 
must meet these standards.
It is necessary to replicate the empirical 
correction to the CAPM in regulatory proceedings. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to choose data that 
commissioners, regulatory staffs, investors, and 
financial analysts use in assessing the returns on 
common equity. The data should be readily available 
and acceptable to all to satisfy the regulatory
requirement of transparency. In addition, the choice
of market indices and utilities that comprise a 
representative cross section of the industry should fit 
these conditions.
B. The Choice of the Market Portfolio
The first choice of data involves the selection of
a portfolio that represents the returns of the market 
as a whole. In the literature of the CAPM, the choice
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of a market index is the subject of controversy. 
However, some consensus emerges as to how to select an 
index. The criteria are twofold; the index must have 
general acceptance and have the property of ready 
availability. Litzenberger et al use NYSE Composite 
Index. However, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index also 
fits this criterion. In addition, as companies merge 
with other companies, leave the indices, offer 
share-splits and any other possible disturbance to 
share prices. Standard & Poor's adjusts its index to 
account for these possibilities. The purpose is to 
maintain the statistical stability of these indices. 
Therefore, the S&P 500 fits the statistical stability 
requirement.
B. The Choice of a Utility Portfolio
The choice of a utility portfolio is far more
difficult. In their analysis, Litzenberger et al and
Morin divide all stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange into ten portfolios. However, Litzenberger et
al leave open the possibility that any portfolio will
allow one to make at least a crude point estimate of
alpha. The use of a utility portfolio will more fully
correct for any bias beta that it may cause to the
industry. Like the choice of a market portfolio, the
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utility portfolio must have general acceptance and 
ready availability. The possibility of constructing a 
portfolio has the potential for "data-mining" through 
the careful selection of a given handful of companies. 
This violates the condition of general acceptance.
However, several utility indices do exist which 
fairly represent the industry as a whole. Indices that 
fit this criterion are the Dow-Jones Utilities Index, 
the Moody's Electric Index, the Moody's Gas Companies 
Index, and the Standard & Poor's Utilities Index. To 
satisfy the criterion of availability, the Wall Street 
Journal publishes the Dow-Jones Utilities Index daily. 
Moody's publishes the Moody's Electric and Gas 
Companies indices monthly. Standard & Poor's provides 
monthly measurements of its Utility Index. Further, 
Dow-Jones, Moody's and Standard & Poor's adjust their 
indices as other companies acquire index components, 
companies offer stock-splits, and any other occurrence 
that might adversely affect share prices. They do this 
to maintain statistical stability. So all of these 
indices satisfy all three requirements for the utility 
portfolio data set.
C. The Choice of a Risk Free Rate Data Set
The choice of a risk free rate of return is the
subject of some controversy among financial theorists
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regarding the CAPM. Some economists argue that the 
appropriate risk free rate of return is the yield of 
90-Day Treasury Bills while others contend that longer 
term bonds serve to forecast a more long-term return on 
common equity." As such, one cannot meet the general 
acceptance criterion for the risk free rate of return. 
When one considers the requirement that the risk free 
rate have statistical stability, yields on 90-Day 
T-Bills vary more widely than the longer term U.S. 
Bonds. However, some analysts do come to a consensus 
around using long-term U.S. Treasury bonds which vary 
less than short term debt instruments. In this sense, 
the statistical stability criterion trumps the general 
acceptance requirement because of the need to produce 
statistically robust alphas and betas. The proxy that 
this study will use for the risk free rate is the 
Monthly Ten-Year Composite as reported in the Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release publication known as H15. 
Since the Federal Reserve releases this data weekly to 
all who wish to have it, this meets the criterion of 
ready availability. The Federal Reserve 10-Year 
Composite yield of U.S. Treasury bonds meets two of the 
three criteria required for this analysis.
‘ Ibbotson, Roger, "Chapter 8: Estimating the Cost 
of Capital or Discount Rate," Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and 
Inflation 1997 Yearbook, (Ibbotson Associates: Chicago, 
1997), pp.150-153.
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The literature supports the use of long-term 
Treasury bonds as the risk-free rate. Brigham and 
Gapenski (1985) note that long-term Treasury bonds have 
several characteristics that make them superior to 
Treasury bills. First, capital market rates include a 
real rate (between two and four percent) and an 
inflation premium. This premium accounts for the 
market's expectation of future inflation rates that the 
returns on equities must pay. Since common stocks are 
long-term securities, investors hold them for long 
investment horizon. A longer maturity Treasury bond 
will also have the same long-term focus as common 
stocks. Last, Treasury bill rates are subject to more 
random disturbances than Treasury bonds due to their 
central role in monetary policy. All in all, long-term 
Treasury bonds will produce more statistically robust 
estimates of alpha and beta.^
E. The Length of the Time Series Data
The next question about choice of data is the
length of the time series. Litzenberger et al suggest
that using sixty months of price data is sufficient to
calculate beta. Likewise, the financial literature
■Brigham, Eugene F., and Louis C. Gapenski,
"Chapter 7A: Estimating the Cost of Equity in 
Practice," Financial Management: Theory and Practice, 
Fourth Edition, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1985), pp. 
279-281.
68
suggests that both Value Line and Merrill Lynch use 
sixty months of data to calculate their betas.' To 
satisfy the requirement of general acceptance, this 
analysis will use sixty months of data.
F. The Use of the Data
Using the above mentioned data sets, the analysis
will begin with an estimate of the alpha for the
electric utility industry. The second regression will
attempt to find the alpha for the natural gas utility
industry. The last analysis will find the alpha for
the utility industry as a whole.
 ^Statman, Meir, "Betas Compared : Merill Lynch vs. 
Value Line," Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 
1981, pp. 41-44.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS
The previous chapter established the method by 
which one estimates the alpha shift-parameter in the 
Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). As 
stated in the previous chapter, the Empirical CAPM is:
(Ri  — Rf ) =  <3/ + b i ( R m  — Rf ) +  S;
Where :
R, - Return for the Index Portfolio 
R. - Risk Free Return 
R^  - Return for Market Portfolio 
£. - Error Value 
a. = a(R^-R.)
= (1 -a)
The analysis will find estimates of a., b., and 
to determine the empirical bias of the CAPM.
I. Summary of the Methodology
The statistical analysis consists of a two-stage 
regression process. The first statistical analysis 
involves using the SAS statistical software package to 
estimate the raw betas of the Moody's Electric Index,
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the Moody's Local Distribution Companies (Gas 
Utilities), and the Dow-Jones Utility Index. The first 
step of which is to estimate both the raw alpha and raw 
beta of the given portfolios. The total annual rates 
of return of the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) is the 
independent variable. The total annual rates of return 
of the various utility indices are the dependent 
variables. The next step is to test the hypothesis 
that raw alpha and raw beta are equal to zero; that is 
to test the null hypothesis.
The second stage involves finding the a and b 
parameters identified in Chapter Three. The data 
series of the various indices require adjustment to 
complete the study. Each needs a conversion from index 
values to annual rates of return to effectively compare 
their returns to those of the market index. The 
hypothesis to test regarding a and b is if either is 
statistically significant.
II. Electric Utilities' Alpha
The first analysis is of the electric industry.
The reason for analyzing the electric industry 
separately is determine if a separate alpha exists for 
that industry. The first regression uses the annual
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returns of the Standard and Poor's 500 as the 
independent variable and the annual returns of the 
Moody's Electric Index as the dependent variable. The 
SAS AUTOREG procedure begins with an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression. This yields a raw beta of 0.838984 
and an alpha of -0.087198 for the electric industry.
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.1965 indicating 
autocorrelation.* Since the Durbin-Watson shows the 
presence of autocorrelation, it is necessary to have 
SAS correct for this bias. The data has 
autocorrelation with one lagged period.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta, and it yields a 
beta of 0.565482 and an intercept of -0.058762. The 
estimate of the intercept is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Table 1 shows the results.^
■ Appendix A reports the results of the Ordinary 
Least Squares analysis which includes these statistics.
 ^Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
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Table 1 .— Electrics' Total Returns
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.12 DF 57
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.05
Reg R" Q. 18 Total R‘ 0.89
Durbin-Watson 1.61
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 -0.06 0.06 -0.96 0.34
SPDELTA I 0.57 0.16 3.44 0
A(l) : -0.91 0.06 -16.35 0
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept -0.06 0.06 -0.96 0.34
SPDELTA I 0.57 0.16 3.49 0
The next step is to find the a and b estimates to 
determine the value of alpha. The independent variable 
is the annual return for the Standard & Poor's 500 less 
the yield of a ten-year Treasury Bond. The dependent 
variable is the annual return of Moody's Electric Index 
less the yield of a ten-year Treasury Bond. The 
results of the SAS Ordinary Least Squares analysis are 
a beta of 0.859561 and an intercept of -0.099795.^ The
"Appendix A contains the Ordinary Least Squares
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beta is statistically significant, but the intercept is 
not. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.1981 
indicating autocorrelation. The SAS AUTOREG procedure 
corrects for this by finding a correlation with this 
first period lag.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta, and it yields a 
beta of 0.609533 and an intercept of -0.093321. The 
estimate of the intercept is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Table 2 shows the results.^
Table 2.— Electrics' Risk Premium
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.12 DF 57
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.05
Reg R‘ 0.2 Total R' 
Durbin-Watson 1.61
0.89
analysis from which these statistics come.
■* Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
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Table 2.— Continued
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 -0.09 0.06 -1.63 0.11
SPLESS 1 0.61 0.16 3.76 0
A(l) X -0.9 0.06 -16.06 Q
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept : -0.09 0.06 -1.64 0.11
SPLESS 1 0.61 0.16 3.82 0
The intercept is the estimate of the a parameter 
through which one indirectly measures alpha. Since the 
a parameter is statistically insignificant, the null 
hypothesis stands. Alpha is not statistically 
different from zero in the electric industry. A 
statistically insignificant alpha is inconsistent with 
the literature of the CAPM.
III. Local Distribution Companies' Alpha
The second analysis is of the local distribution 
companies (LDC's) of the natural gas industry. The 
reason for analyzing the LDC's separately is to 
determine if a separate alpha exists for that industry. 
Unlike the electric companies, the LDC's have
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experienced a measure of competition and restructuring 
since the beginning of this decade. The first 
regression uses the annual returns of the S&P 500 as 
the independent variable and the annual returns of the 
Moody's LDC Index as the dependent variable. The SAS 
AUTOREG procedure begins with an Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. This yields a raw beta of 0.661066 and an 
intercept of -0.012822 for the LDC industry. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2103 indicating 
autocorrelation.' Since the Durbin-Watson shows the 
presence of autocorrelation, it is necessary to have 
SAS correct for this bias. As is the case with the 
electric industry, the data require correction for 
autocorrelation. The data has autocorrelation with the 
first, the ninth, and the tenth lagged periods.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta, and it yields a 
beta of 0.355608 and an intercept of 0.017167. The 
estimate of the intercept is statistically 
insignificant. Table 3 shows the results."'
"Appendix A contains the Ordinary Least Squares 
analysis that produces these statistics.
 ^Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
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Table 3. — Local Distribution Companies' Total Returns
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.09 DF 55
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.04
Reg R- 0.11 Total R‘ 0.9
Durbin-Watson 2.11
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 0.02 0.04 0.49 0.63
SPDELTA 1 0. 36 0.14 2.49 0.02
A ( 1) 1 -0.99 0.05 -16.66 0
A(9i : -0 .42 0.13 -3.18 0
Ai 10) : 0.49 0.13 3.87 0
Variable DF 3 Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 0.02 0.03 0.49 0.62
SPDELTA 1 0.36 0.14 2.57 0.01
The next Step is to find the a and b estimates to
determine the value of alpha. The independent variable
is the annual return of the S&P 500 less the yield of a 
ten-year Treasury Bond. The dependent variable is the 
annual return of the Moody’s LDC Index less the yield 
of a ten-year Treasury Bond. The results of the SAS 
Ordinary Least Squares analysis are a beta of 0.685063
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and an intercept of -0.038253. The beta is 
statistically significant, but the intercept is not. 
However, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2111 
indicating autocorrelation. The SAS AUTOREG procedure 
corrects for this by finding a correlation with the 
first, ninth, and tenth period lags.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta, and it yields a 
beta of 0.386694 and an intercept of -0.106921. The 
estimate of the intercept is statistically 
insignificant. Table 4 shows the results.'
Table 4.— Local Distribution Companies' Risk Premium
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.1 DF 55
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.04
Reg R‘ 0.13 Total R- 0.9
Durbin-Watson 2.1
 ^Appendix A contains the Ordinary Least Squares 
analysis which produced these statistics.
® Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
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Table 4.--Continued
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept I -0.03 0.03 -0.99 0.33
SPLESS I 0.39 0.14 2.72 0.01
A(l) I -0.89 0.05 -16.62 0
A(9) 1 — 0.4 0.13 -3.05 0
A(ic; 1 0.48 0.13 3.75 0
Variable DF E Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept - -0.03 0.03 0.32
SPLESS 1 0.39 0.14 2.81 0.01
The intercept is the estimate of the a parameter 
by which one indirectly measures alpha. Since the a 
parameter is statistically insignificant, the null 
hypothesis stands. Alpha is negative and not 
statistically different from zero in the natural gas 
distribution industry. Like the electric industry, the 
statistically insignificant alpha is contrary to the 
literature surrounding the CAPM.
IV. Combination Utilities' Alpha
The third analysis is of the overall utility 
industry. The reason for analyzing a utility index
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separately is determine if a separate alpha exists for 
the converged companies. The first regression uses the 
annual returns of the S&P 500 as the independent 
variable and the annual returns of the Dow-Jones 
Utility Index as the dependent variable. The SAS 
AUTOREG procedure begins with an Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. This yields a raw beta of 0.919748 and an 
alpha of -0.099718 for the utility industry. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2666 indicating 
autocorrelation.’ Since the Durbin-Watson shows the 
presence of autocorrelation, it is necessary to have 
SAS correct for this bias. The data has 
autocorrelation with one lagged period.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta. It yields a 
beta of 0.518260 and an intercept of -0.059372. Once 
again, the estimate of the intercept is statistically 
insignificant. Table 5 shows the results.
 ^Appendix A contains the Ordinary Least Squares 
analysis which produces these statistics.
Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
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Table 5.--Combination Utilities' Total Returns
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.14 DF 57
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.05
Reg R‘ 0.14 Total R‘ 0.87
Durbin-Watson 1.78
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept j- -0.06 0.06 -1.06 0.3
SPDELTA 1 0.52 0.18 2. 93 0
a ;1) 1 -0.89 0.06 -14.75 0
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 -0.06 0.06 -1.06 0.29
SPDELTA 1 0.52 0.17 3.03 0
The next step is to find the a and b estimates to 
determine the value of alpha. The independent variable 
is the annual return for the S&P 500 less the yield of 
a ten-year Treasury Bond. The dependent variable is 
the annual return of Dow-Jones Utility Index less the 
yield of a ten-year Treasury Bond. The results of the 
SAS Ordinary Least Squares analysis are a beta of
0.946449 and an intercept of -0.106921. The beta and
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the intercept are statistically significant. However, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2111 indicating 
autocorrelation. The SAS AUTOREG procedure corrects 
for this by finding a correlation with the first period 
lags.
Having adjusted for the autocorrelation problem, 
the data is ready for another estimate of the 
parameters. The Maximum Likelihood method derives a 
more accurate measure of the raw beta, and it yields a 
beta of 0.569174 and an intercept of -0.097563. The 
estimate of the intercept is statistically 
insignificant. Table 6 shows the results."
Table 6.--Combination Utilities' Risk Premium
Analysis of Variance
SSE 0.14 DF 57
MSE 0 Root MSE 0.05
Reg R' 0.17 Total R' 
Durbin-Watson 1.77
0.88
Appendix A contains the Ordinary Least Squares 
analysis which produces these statistics.
Appendix A contains the SAS output to support this 
table.
82
Table 6.--Continued
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept I -0.1 0.05 -1.9 0.06
SPLESS 1 0.57 0.18 3.25 0
All) 1 -0.88 0.06 -14.53 0
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Prob
Intercept 1 -0.1 0.05 -1.9 0.06
SPLESS : 0.57 0.17 3.38 0
The intercept is the estimate of the a parameter 
by which one indirectly measures alpha. Since the a 
parameter is statistically insignificant, the null 
hypothesis stands. Alpha is not statistically 
different from zero in the overall utility industry. 
Like the electric and gas utilities individually, the 
alpha of the combination utilities is not statistically 
significant in contrast to the literature of the CAPM.
V. Conclusion
In stark contrast to the body of literature 
surrounding the empirical CAPM, the alpha shift 
parameter does not appear to exist for the utility 
industry. From the empirical evidence previously
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presented, the empirical bias in the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) does not exist. While the 
analysis acknowledges an alpha, it is negative and not 
statistically significant. This is true whether one 
examines the electric industry, the regulated 
distribution of natural gas, or the utility industry 
overall. Table 7 summarizes the results of the 
analysis.
Table 7.— Summary of Results
Industry Beta Significant Alpha Significant
Electric 0.61 Yes -0 . 03 No
Natural Gas 0 . 39 Yes -0.11 No
Consolidated 0.57 Yes -0 .1 No
The conclusions of this analysis are a paradox of 
the accepted opinions on the empirical shortcomings of 
the CAPM. Fischer Black maintains that the CAPM has an 
even larger bias than he originally estimated in his 
previous work."" Likewise, Litzenberger et al and 
Morin*' conclude that alpha is significant and estimate 
its value.^ The only school of thought that these 
results do not contradict is the work of Fama and
Tables A, B, and C present the data from which 
these conclusions come.
Black, ibid.
Morin, ibid.
Litzenberger, Ramaswamy, and Sosin, ibid.
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French." These conclusions may buttress their 
argument that beta is not a sufficient measure of risk 
when one controls risk for the market capitalization of 
the security in question. The results of the previous 
study may be "correct" if beta offers little predictive 
power.
The results are inconsistent with the literature 
surrounding the CAPM. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
the literature states that the CAPM has an empirical 
bias. Although no way exists to ennumerate all of the 
possible causes of this result, one can list several 
causes. The possible reasons may have some association 
with the choice of methodology or data to derive the 
industry betas for the selected studies. One possible 
explanation is that the period from which the data 
come, 1991 to 1996, is an incongruity. A second 
possibility is the length of the time series inspected. 
Another possibility is that the lack of a statistically 
significant alpha is unique to the utility industry and 
does not exist in others. A fourth explanation flows 
from the third. It is possible that the nature of 
administered prices in a regulatory environment has an 
impact on the security prices. This impact precludes
" Fama and French, ibid.
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the ordinary empirical inconsistencies that the CAPM 
has for industries that have no price regulation.
A fifth possible cause for this inconsistency, 
which is also a result of the industries studied, is 
the so-called "Dividend Effect." The majority of 
returns for public utility stocks are dividends rather 
than capital gains. Historically, investors have come 
to expect dividend income from them. Since the CAPM 
excludes dividend income from the calculation of betas, 
the model may estimate an insignificant alpha. A sixth 
possible reason is the difference in the length of the 
time periods to calculate returns. This analysis used 
annual returns and long-term Treasury Bond yields. 
Litzenberger et al and Morin used monthly stock returns 
and 90-Day T-Bill yields as data. A final and more 
troubling explanation is that the previous analyses did 
not test for statistical problems like autocorrelation, 
and they did not adjust their results to account for 
them. Consequently, any of these possible 
explanations, or combinations of them, may account for 
the inconsistent results.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPLORING THE PARADOX
With the given set of data, the results of Chapter 
Four show that that the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) has no empirical bias. Indeed, none of the 
alphas analyzed were statistically significant. The 
preceding statistical analysis suggests that the 
empirical bias of the CAPM is a mirage. At least this 
is true of the recent past if one accepts the previous 
investigation as sacrosanct. This position, however, 
is a hasty and quixotic one to assume. The former 
analysis is in conflict with the literature outlined in 
Chapter Two. The discrepancy may be the consequence of 
poor research methods, faulty conclusions, or 
differences in methods and assumptions between this 
study and the work of Litzenberger" et al and Morin."
A variety of plausible explanations exist that might 
explain the inconsistencies. Whether this study has 
erred or the previous work requires reconsideration, it 
is wise to attempt to reconcile the differences between 
the two.
The possible explanations are as follows, but this 
list is not exhaustive or all inclusive. One potential
 ^Litzenberger, Ramaswamy, and Sosin, ibid. 
"Morin, ibid.
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reason is the choice of the time period for the 
analysis. A second, related reason is the length of 
the data series examined. Third, a viable cause of the 
inconsistency is that the absence of a bias is industry 
specific. Related to this explanation is the 
possibility that the inconsistency is due to the nature 
of the price regulation inherit in the utility 
industry. A fifth potential cause for the difference 
is the exclusion of dividend yields in the estimation 
of beta. A sixth possibility is the use of a long-term 
risk-free rate. A seventh possible reason is lax 
statistical methodology of the previous empirical work.
The prudent course to follow is to test each of 
the above stated hypotheses using the methodology 
outlined in Chapter Three. This allows for the 
opportunity to test the validity of the investigation 
of Chapter Four. Concomitantly, it tests the arguments 
established in Chapter Two. Scholastic integrity 
requires one to rectify the inconsistency between the 
results of Chapter Four and the body of literature 
surrounding the empirical CAPM. The aim of the current 
chapter is to diagnose the causes of this paradox and 
reconcile them. Further, this chapter will explore 
whether this dissertation is in error or if the 
literature of the CAPM is.
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I. Time Period
Both the gas and electric utility industries have 
experienced two very profound institutional shocks 
during the time frame under inspection. Between 1992 
and 1996, both industries have restructured and have 
moved towards competition. During this time, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has 
implemented two decisions that aim to restructure the 
industries and introduce competition to them. Indeed, 
FERC Order 436 has had the effect of driving the 
Moody's Local Distribution Company (LDC) index down in 
1994. Likewise, FERC Order 888 caused reverses in the 
Moody's Electric index in 1996. Such institutional 
disturbances have the effect of contaminating the data.
A. The Period of 1987 to 1991
A logical solution to eliminate the effects of
FERC ordered restructuring is to choose a time period 
that precedes both decisions. As a check on this 
scenario, this study analyzes the five years preceding 
the data set used in chapter Four. This study attempts 
to find the alpha for the time period 1987 to 1991. 
These fall outside the bounds of the previous work and 
the implementation of FERC Orders 436 and 888. Table 8
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illustrates the results of using the five years of data 
prior to the previous data set.'
Table 8.— Summary of 1987 to 1991 Data
Industry Beta Prob Sig Alpha Prob Sig
Electric 0.31 0.01 Yes -0.01 0.83 No
Natural Gas 0.36 0 Yes -0.02 0.7 No
Consolidated 0.42 0 Yes — 0.06 0.2 No
Like the previous analysis in Chapter Four, the 
alphas are not statistically significant. What is 
notable is that the risk of LDC stocks has changed 
little in ten years as measured by the beta. The beta 
of the period of 1987 to 1991 is 0.36. In contrast, 
the beta of the later period is 0.39. Whether this is 
an indication that the natural gas industry has already 
adjusted to the risk of restructuring is a question 
worth examining. Even more notable than that is the 
change in the betas in both the electric industry and 
the utility industry overall. In the period 1987 to 
1991, the beta for the electric industry is 0.31. In 
contrast, the beta of the 1992 to 1996 period is 0.61. 
The statistics imply that the market has recognized 
that restructuring and competition will make the 
electric utilities more risky. This also serves to
Appendix B contains the SAS analysis that supports 
this table.
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confirm beta as a measure of risk, and that it has 
adjusted to changes in the industry. The results from 
the Dow-Jones Utility Index conform to this 
observation, moving from a beta of 0.42 in 1987 to 
1991, to a beta of 0.57 in 1992 to 1996.
That the alphas are negative and not significant 
in either time period eliminates restructuring and 
competition as the cause of the statistical 
insignificance of alpha in the utility industry. 
Likewise, the increase in the betas for the electric 
industry and the combined utilities is a recognition of 
the fact that many utilities have reorganized as 
holding companies. This reorganization has separated 
traditional utility operations from those ventures 
associated with energy marketing and movement toward 
competition with other utility companies. The 
increased betas due to this exposure to competition 
reflects this reorganization.
B. The Period of 1961 to 1965
Another possibility is that the current time frame
is not representative of the returns for the industry.
Another one might prove otherwise. As a check on the
possibility that both of the time periods of 1992 to
1996 and 1987 to 1991 are statistical anomalies, an
examination of a more distant time period is
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appropriate. The selected period for study is 1961 to 
1965. This is an era in the utility industry that has 
no extraneous events to disturb stock returns, (i.e., 
the Energy Crisis of 1970's). Moody's LDC and electric 
indices have data that go back to the 1960's. However, 
the Dow-Jones Utility Index is not available. 
Fortunately, Standard & Poor's produces its own Utility 
Index which is a substitute for the Dow-Jones Index. 
Table 9 illustrates the results of the analysis 
outlined in Chapters Three and Four using data from the 
period 1961 to 1965.^
Table 9.— Summary of 1961 to 1965 Data
Industry Beta Prob Sig Alpha Prob Sig
Electric 0.81 0 Yes -0.39 0 .11 No
Natural Gas 0.89 0 Yes — 0.66 0.05 Yes
Consolidated 0.82 0 Yes -0.3 0.05 Yes
The analysis of Utility Returns in the 1960's 
produces results different from those of Chapter Four. 
The a coefficients for the LDC's and the Consolidated 
Companies have a measure of statistical significance. 
However, they imply negative alphas which also 
contradict the literature surrounding the empirical 
CAPM. One must consider these results in the light of
 ^Appendix C contains the SAS analysis that supports 
this table.
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their application in the area of cost of capital 
estimation for public utility stocks. The implication 
of the a estimates is that one can determine the cost 
of equity with the CAPM by first decreasing the results 
by the amount of the a. In the case of the LDC's, the 
CAPM overestimates the returns of common equity by 
approximately sixty basis points. Likewise, the CAPM 
overstates the returns for the S&P Utility Index 
companies by approximately thirty basis points. Given 
that in any given trading day a stock price can vary by 
as much as those estimates, the alpha estimates are 
probably not significant.
II. Length of the Data Set
Another possible cause of the disparity between 
the results in Chapter Four and the Litzenberger et ai 
and the Morin studies is the difference in the time 
periods examined. Litzenberger et ai examines a much 
broader, fifty-year period from 1928 to 1978.
Likewise, Morin analyzes a time series that begins in 
1928 and ends in 1990. During this time, the country 
has experienced the Great Depression, World War II, the 
Cold War, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the Energy 
Crisis, and two stock market crashes. Such
93
institutional shocks can have the effect of 
contaminating data for useful empirical study. In 
contrast, the study in Chapter Four only examines the 
past five years.
The effect of the longer time period studied by 
Litzenberger et al may produce the empirical bias in 
the CAPM. This masks a larger consideration though.
The fundamental question exists whether a fifty-year 
time span can accurately reflect the expected future 
risks in the near term. The longer data series may 
account for risks that no longer exist in the market. 
Indeed, extraneous disturbances, whether they are from 
wars or supply shocks, can cause variations in betas 
that would have absolutely no impact on the current 
risk of utility stocks. Likewise, a longer time series 
may not account for the risk to which the market 
currently has exposure. If the longer data set masks 
the current risk, it is the work of Litzenberger et al 
and Morin that needs questioning. In sum, the 
empirical bias of beta may be a result of Litzenberger 
et ai and Morin's use of a very long time series and 
not an inaccurate specification of risk by beta.
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III. Peculiar to the Industry
A possible cause of the insignificant alphas is 
that they are the result of conditions specific to the 
industry. In other words, alpha does not exist for the 
utility industry and the CAPM does not produce a biased 
empirical estimate of the expected return of common 
equity. This is a hypothesis worth examining. Good 
candidate industries for this study are ones that have 
similar characteristics to the utility industry. Such 
aspects include conservative and established 
enterprises, large capital needs, and no price 
regulation. Representative industries that fit these 
criteria are transportation, finance, and insurance. 
Using the same methodology as outlined in Chapter 3, 
the study analyzes the industries. Table 10 
illustrates the results.'
Table 10.--Unregulated Industries
Industry Beta Prob Sig Alpha Prob Sig
Transportation 0.94 0 Yes -0.26 0.43 No
Finance 1.23 0 Yes -0.14 0.71 No
Insurance 0.83 0 Yes — 0.06 0.91 No
' Appendix D contains the SAS analysis that supports 
this table.
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The results conform to the conclusions established 
in Chapter Four. These unregulated industries do not 
show the empirical bias which the CAPM literature 
addresses. This suggests that the literature itself is 
either dated or inaccurate. Even more so, one must 
note that the probabilities of insignificant a 
parameters are quite high. The fact that none of the a 
parameters of the unregulated industries have any 
statistical significance and are negative is both 
informative and enlightening. The smallest probability 
that the null hypothesis holds true is in the 
transportation industry. Compared to the results of 
Chapter Four, the alphas of the unregulated industries 
are even more statistically insignificant than the 
alphas of the utility industry. This warrants further 
examination of other unregulated industries to find if 
their alphas are insignificant as well.
IV. The Nature of Regulated Industries
Public utilities are industries with administered 
prices for the services they sell and regulated returns 
on their shareholders' equity. Ordinary market forces 
do not entirely determine the returns afforded to the 
stockholders of utilities. Despite deregulation and
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the movement towards competition, this is still true.
As such, the possibility exists that the regulatory 
process itself causes the alphas of utilities stocks to 
be insignificant. Instances exist that illustrate that 
regulators ignore generally accepted financial 
principles to achieve politically popular rate 
settlements. This nuance of the regulatory environment 
may remove any statistical significance of alpha. A 
reasonable test of such a hypothesis is to find the 
alpha of one or more unregulated industries.
The outcome the investigation of the previous 
section (Section III) appears to refute this 
possibility. If one examines the results of Table 10, 
then one will see that regulation does not remove the 
statistical significance of alpha. In the 
transportation, finance, and insurance industries, 
alpha is not statistically significant. This suggests 
that regulation is not the cause of insignificant 
alphas.
V. The Dividend Effect
Investors receive equity income in two forms: 
capital gains and dividends. The calculation of beta 
for the use of measuring risk in the CAPM utilizes only
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capital gains. The exclusion of dividends is a 
possible cause of the alphas statistical 
insignificance. The study in Chapter Four estimates 
betas by comparing the annual growth rates in the 
utility indices and regresses them on the annual growth 
rates in the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) Index.
This is consistent with the literature, but it only 
measures the growth in utility stocks' share prices. 
However, capital appreciation is a small portion of the 
total returns to utility stocks. Since another 
description of utility stocks is that they are the 
"widows and orphans" stocks, a prudent analysis will 
include examination of dividend income as well. 
Investors in utility stocks have an interest in 
dividend income rather than capital appreciation.
Given that most utilities have dividend payout ratios 
of between sixty and eighty percent, excluding this 
stream of income when calculating beta may cause 
alpha's statistical insignificance. This is especially 
telling when one considers that the dividend payout 
ratios of the typical S&P 500 company is twenty to 
thirty percent. The status of utility stocks as income 
equities may contribute to the insignificance of alpha.
If one contrasts this study with the methodology 
of Litzenberger at al and Morin, the possibility that
98
dividend income has an impact on the statistically 
significance of alpha becomes a real one. Litzenberger 
et al and Morin examine portfolios of over fifteen 
hundred different stocks representing all industries. 
These stocks typically have lower payout ratios than 
utility stocks. Since most of the returns measured in 
the CAPM literature focus on capital gains, the 
statistical bias of the CAPM may be the result of 
measuring capital gains and not dividend income. This 
opens the possibility that both this study and the 
literature are correct about the statistical 
significance of alpha.
VI. Use of Long-term Interest Rates
Litzenberger et ai used the 90-Day Treasury Bill 
yield for the risk-free rate. The yields on short-term 
securities are far more unstable and have a greater 
variance than longer-term Treasury Bonds.* The 
advantage of using long-term bond yields is that they 
are more stable and absorb the effects of other market 
risks such as inflation. Likewise, Litzenberger et al 
and Morin used monthly returns on stock portfolios to 
calculate their alphas. In contrast, the analysis in
® Brigham and Gapenski prefer to use long-term 
T-Bonds for this reason. Brigham and Gapenski, ibid.
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Chapter Four uses annual stock returns reported 
monthly. This allows for a greater fit with the 
returns of the longer-term risk-free securities. A 
reasonable analysis, using the same data for the study 
in Chapter Four adjusted to calculate monthly returns 
rather than annual returns, is prudent. Table 11 shows 
the results of using the methodology outlined in 
Chapter Three applied to monthly return data and 90-Day 
T-Bill yield for the risk-free rate.
Table 11.— Summary of Monthly Return Data
Industry Beta Prob Sig Alpha Prob Sig
Electric 6.7 0.25 No -2.56 0.22 No
Natural Gas 5 .59 0.32 No -2 . 33 0.25 No
Consolidated 6.05 0.08 No -1.35 0 .27 No
The previous analysis produces more curious 
results. All of the alphas and betas estimated with 
monthly return data are statistically insignificant. 
Even a cursory examination of the beta parameters 
yields unrealistic returns. The implication of betas 
greater than unity suggests that utility stocks are 
more risky than the market as a whole. Given the 
excess size of the estimates in Table 11, one can 
discard the use of monthly returns to calculate beta
' Appendix E contains the SAS analysis that supports 
this table.
100
and alpha with great impunity. This suggests that the 
choice of data studied causes the empirical bias in the 
CAPM.
Autocorrelation is not a problem with monthly 
returns. Unlike all other statistical analyses 
conducted in this dissertation, the one which uses 
monthly returns to estimate beta does not have an 
autocorrelation problem. This conclusion raises the 
possibility of an empirical mirage once again. Given 
that Litzenberger et al utilized monthly rather than 
annual returns, the paradox outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter may simply be the result of their 
choice of using monthly returns rather than annual 
returns.
VII. Potential Problems in the Original Study
Litzenberger et al and Morin did not test for 
autocorrelation. At least they made no indication that 
such statistical problems exist. With the exception of 
the monthly returns, all of the diagnostic regressions 
presented in this chapter had some form of 
autoregression or statistical instability. The SAS 
software detected it and made corrections. It is 
conceivable that the software analysis package that
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Litzenberger et al used for their study lacked 
diagnostic tools like those available now. Indeed, 
Savin and White (1977)’ derived the critical values of 
the Durbin-Watson Statistic at the same time 
Litzenberger et al conducted their study. It is 
conceivable that SAS had yet to incorporate tests for 
autocorrelation at that time. As a result, an 
empirical bias may have appeared where one does not 
necessarily exist. As Chapter Four demonstrated, 
correcting for autocorrelation eliminates the 
statistical significance of alpha. Table 12 compares 
the results of the analysis of Chapter Four before and 
after correction for autocorrelation.
Table 12.— Comparison 
After Correcting for
of Alphas Before and 
Autocorrelation
Before After
Industry Alpha Sig Alpha Sig
Electric -0.1 Yes -0 . 09 No
Natural Gas -0.04 Yes -0.03 No
Consolidated -0.11 Yes -0.1 No
® Savin, E. and K. White, "The Durbin-Watson Test 
for Serial Correlation with Extreme Sample Sizes or 
Many Regressors," Econometrica, Volume 45, (1977), pp.
1989-1996.
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It is conceivable that the use of random 
portfolios in the Litzenberger et al and Morin studies 
produced the empirical bias of the CAPM. Litzenberger 
et al and Morin calculated the alpha terms of stock 
portfolios with only one common characteristic, the 
value of their beta. This use of beta segregated 
portfolios raises some suspicion because it assumes 
that beta measures all the risk of a group of 
securities. Litzenberger et al and Morin group their 
securities into these portfolios assuming that similar 
betas imply similar risks. As a result, very diverse 
industries can appear in the same portfolio. This 
indicates that the fundamentals of those industries are 
similar which, of course, is contrary to the facts.
Fama and French showed that if one were to include just 
one other determinant of risk (i.e., market 
capitalization), then beta loses all predictive and 
statistical significance. Perhaps, this dissertation's 
findings are more consistent with Fama and French than 
the work of Litzenberger et al and Morin.
VIII. Conclusion
This chapter has the aim of providing plausible 
reasons why the results of Chapter Four conflict with
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the literature surrounding the Empirical CAPM. The 
goal of the chapter is to find if the CAPM truly has an 
empirical bias for which alpha can correct as the 
literature claims. Likewise, its goal is to disprove 
the hypothesis raised by the results of Chapter Four 
Namely, alpha is not statistically significant. In 
this regard, the analysis presented supports 
statistically insignificant alphas. The basic question 
that this chapter has attempted to ask is if the CAPM 
has a fundamental empirical bias. The explanations 
fall into two neat categories; those that support the 
thesis that alpha is not significant, and those that 
say that alpha is statistically significant.
Ironically, another way to state that is those 
hypotheses this dissertation tested, and those that it 
did not. Table 13 summarizes the conclusions that each 
of the preceding sections found. Table 13 shows the 
possibilities that support the literature which claims 
significant alphas, or this dissertation which claims 
insignificant alphas.
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Table 13.— Is Alpha Significant or Insignificant •p
Cause Litzenberger & This
Morin Study
Time Period Analyzed No No
Length of Time Series Data No No
Peculiar to Utilities No Yes
Peculiar to Regulation No Yes
Dividend Effect Yes No
Long-term Risk Free Rate No Yes
Correcting for Autocorrelation No Yes
Table 13 requires some explanation of what it 
wishes to demonstrate. Table 13 compares all the 
possible causes of the discrepancy of the results this 
dissertation produces and what the body of literature 
says about the empirical application of the CAPM- The
literature, of course, states that beta has an
empirical bias and alpha has a measure of statistical 
significance. The work that demonstrates this the most 
is the analyses of Litzenberger et al and Morin. This 
study has found that alpha is statistically
insignificant. One must note that two possible causes
produce indeterminate results. The choice of the 
period examined and the length of time analyzed both 
produce results that support the possibility that alpha 
could be either significant or insignificant.
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A. Alpha is statistically insignificant.
Those hypotheses that support the notion that
alpha is not statistically significant are numerous. 
First, the idea that the specific block of time chosen 
for this dissertation is an anomaly does not prove 
true. Tests of three different time spans confirm this 
hypothesis. Second, the use of long-term Treasury 
Bonds as the risk-free rate removes the possibility of 
an empirical bias. Short-term returns prove to be too 
statistically unstable for use as the risk free rate in 
calculation of betas. Third, the idea that 
insignificant alphas are peculiar to the utility 
industry does not bear fruit either. The other 
industries tested demonstrate the lack of an empirical 
bias. Fourth, the idea that insignificant alphas arise 
from the result of regulation also holds little sway. 
This is true because alpha does not appear 
statistically significant in the other industries 
tested. All of these explanations do not suggest that 
one can make sweeping generalities about the CAPM from 
the industries examined. However, they provide 
direction for further exploration. This is especially 
important if the CAPM is to continue to be a useful 
tool in measuring the cost of capital for public 
utilities.
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B. Alpha is statistically significant.
The other hypotheses fall into the category of
possible explanations that support a significant alpha, 
but as noted, they remain untested. The full 
accounting of the cost of equity may reveal itself 
through the inclusion of dividend income to find both 
alpha and beta. This has the potential to produce 
biased betas. The unique status of utility stocks as 
high income stocks rather than growth equities may 
cause the alpha to be insignificant. Without entirely 
reproducing the study of Litzenberger et al, one can 
merely speculate on the possible causes of it finding a 
significant alpha. Good scholarship dictates that one 
explore the possibility that the original study did not 
perform all of its appropriate diagnoses of time series 
data. Of course, the possibility remains that the 
original concept Litzenberger et al and Morin tested 
has flaws. Their method may have produced this 
statistical bias which in reality is a mirage. Based 
on the results present here, this may be the case. As 
such, it merits further inquiry.
C. Alpha is statistically indeterminate.
The possibility exists that one cannot precisely
determine the statistical significance of alpha.
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Table 14.— Is Alpha Statistically Indeterminate?
Cause Outcome
Time Period Analyzed Yes
Length of Time Series Data Yes
Peculiar to Utilities No
Peculiar to Regulation Nc
Dividend Effect No
Long-term Risk Free Rate No
Correcting for Autocorrelation No
Table 14 illustrates the possible causes that can 
indicate that both this study and the work of 
Litzenberger et al and Morin are correct. In other 
words, the choice of the period analyzed and the length 
of time examined can produce results that will make 
alpha both statistically significant and insignificant. 
This extends from a larger debate about what data one 
should use when empirically applying the CAPM. 
Litzenberger et al and Morin chose time series that 
were fifty years in length. This study examined only 
five years of historical data. The question of the 
appropriate length of time series data is still 
controversial in the financial literature. It is easy 
for one to say that the most appropriate empirical 
method to chose is the one the produces the best least
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unbiased estimate of alpha. However, the best method 
to chose is the empirical method that produces the best 
estimate of the expected cost of equity capital. 
Therefore, the issue remains unresolved as to whether 
the literature is correct or this study provides new 
direction on the empirical application of the CAPM.
D. Summary Remarks
Ultimately, the reason for addressing the previous
issues is to test the validity of the CAPM as a measure
of the cost of equity capital of public utility stocks.
Given the evolution of industry restructuring and the
movement towards competition, the assessment of the
cost of capital that mirrors competitive markets is of
great importance. The assessment of the return on
equity requires more accurate tools. The question now
becomes one that begs the effectiveness of the
empirical CAPM. The work of Chapters Four and Five
casts doubt on the reported empirical bias of the CAPM.
Placing these findings into the regulatory realm gives
regulators the opportunity to ignore the body of
literature about the CAPM's inherit empirical biases.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CONCLUSION
Chapter One begins this dissertation by 
recognizing the changes within the utility industry, 
deregulation and the movement towards competition. In 
this light, this dissertation presupposes a need for 
capital pricing models that will more accurately assess 
the cost of equity for public utilities. Chapter Two 
outlines the literature of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and its application to utilities' cost of 
capital. The literature notes that the CAPM is 
theoretically sound. However, its empirical 
application has limits due to an inherit statistical 
bias. This bias leads to underestimates of the return 
on common equity. Chapter Three establishes the 
methodology of this dissertation. The methodology aims 
to test the validity of the CAPM literature and it 
claims of biased betas. The results of Chapter Four 
cast doubt on the literature's notion of biased betas 
and statistically significant alphas. Chapter Five is 
an addition that seeks to validate the findings of 
Chapter Four. Further, it attempts to reconcile them 
with the literature of the CAPM. Chapter Four and Five
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focus on responding to the questions that Chapter Three
poses. They ask:
• What is the size of alpha?
• Is alpha statistically significant?
• Is alpha statistically robust?
I. Three Questions
Chapter Three, the methodology outline, begins by 
posing three questions which this dissertation aimed to 
answer. The first question is what is the size of the 
alpha adjustment. The second question asks if alpha is 
statistically significant. The third one questions 
whether alpha is statistically robust. The literature 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), outlined in 
Chapter Two, states that the answer to the first 
question is that alpha is a positive value between zero 
and one. Likewise, it states that alpha is 
statistically significant and statistically robust. 
Because of the literature, one has anticipated that the 
value of this dissertation would be answering these 
three questions.
In the case of the electric industry, the answers 
to these three questions are the complete opposite of 
what the literature of the CAPM says they should be. 
Alpha is negative for the electric utilities. Alpha is
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not statistically significant. Alpha is not 
statistically robust.
The case of the local distribution companies (LDC) 
of natural gas, like the electric utilities, 
contradicts the literature of the CAPM. Alpha is 
negative for LDC's. Alpha is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, one must conclude that it is 
zero. Further, the alpha of the LDC's is not 
statistically robust.
Also in stark contrast to the literature of the 
CAPM, the combination utilities show the same results 
as the others. The alpha value is negative. Alpha is 
not statistically significant. By extension, it is not 
statistically robust.
The answers to these three questions from Chapter 
Three for all three types of utilities are negative, 
no, and no. However, one can stop the analysis at the 
negative response to the second question. Since alpha 
is not statistically significant, this dissertation had 
to explore the possibility that the methodology and 
data outlined in Chapters Three and Four were in error. 
The goal of Chapter Five was to address the possible 
causes of the paradox between the literature and the 
results from Chapter Four. The analysis of Chapter
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Five concurs with the proposition that alpha is equal 
to zero.
II. Serendipitous Findings
The analyses of Chapters Four and Five produce two 
conclusions about the Empirical CAPM and its 
application to the cost of capital of public utilities. 
Both of these findings were not the primary goal of 
this dissertation, but their discovery is useful in 
estimating public utilities' cost of capital. As such, 
they have value from the perspective of both regulatory 
and financial economics. First, beta accounts for risk 
associated with owning public utility stocks. Second, 
the increased risk measured by beta includes exposure 
from unregulated affiliates of public utilities.
Beta accounts for the risk associated with public 
utility stocks. Chapter Five notes that both the 
electric utilities and the combined utility companies 
have experienced an increase in their betas from 1987 
to 1996. The most logical explanation is that the 
market has adjusted to the increased risk associated 
with the coming deregulation of the utility business 
and the convergence of gas and electricity. As Chapter 
Five noted, the electric utilities and the combined
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companies have had a doubling of their betas over the 
past ten years.
The increased risk measured by beta includes 
exposure from unregulated affiliates of public 
utilities. Starting in 1996, many utilities 
reorganized themselves as holding companies to prepare 
themselves for deregulation and competition. One of 
the effects of this reorganization is the formation of 
unregulated marketing subsidiaries. Since the state 
commissions or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
activities do not regulate these divisions, the risk 
associated with responding to market pressures has 
increased. Logically, this increases the cost of 
capital as returns become more uncertain. Regulators 
must recognize that this increased cost of capital is 
due to nontraditional utility functions. As such, 
regulators need to adjust their rate of return 
judgments to account for them.
III. Generalizations
This dissertation has produced five conclusions 
that are within the scope of its original goal of 
testing the validity of the Empirical CAPM. First, 
when calculating the betas of stocks one must check for
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autocorrelation. Second, one must use only current 
data within a short time period to calculate betas. 
Third, one must use long-term government bond yields 
for the risk-free rate of return when estimating betas. 
Fourth, the CAPM is a clumsy tool for the estimation of 
public utilities cost of capital, but it still has use 
in measuring risk. Last, alpha is statistically 
insignificant, but one must continue checking for it.
When estimating betas, one must check for 
autocorrelation. All of the time periods and 
industries tested have a measure of autocorrelation.
The problem manifests itself when one uses annual rates 
of return and long-term risk-free rates. Fortunately, 
statistical analysis software such as SAS can correct 
for this problem. Without correcting for 
autocorrelation, the CAPM produces an empirical bias 
that underestimates the cost of equity capital for 
public utility stocks.
When calculating betas, the choice of a short time 
series such as five years eliminates the empirical bias 
of the CAPM. As this dissertation has shown, the bias 
may be the result of an inordinately long set of time 
series data. Litzenberger et al and Morin use time 
series that span fifty years. As this dissertation has 
demonstrated, shorter time spans of five years do not
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produce empirical biases in the CAPM. Likewise, 
shorter time series produce betas that more closely 
replicate current market conditions. Longer data 
series rely on information that may have no bearing on 
future expectations of utilities' stock returns.
One must use long-term government bond yields as 
the risk-free rate when estimating betas. The analysis 
in this dissertation demonstrates that the use of 
90-Day T-Bill yields as the risk-free rate produces 
unstable and biased betas. The use of the short-term 
yields produces biased betas that led to Litzenberger 
et al and Morin's conclusions. The combination of 
annual rates of return and long-term interest rates 
produces statistically robust and unbiased betas.
These unbiased betas provide more accurate measures of 
the risk associated with the security under scrutiny.
The CAPM remains a useful tool in measuring the 
risk associated with public utility stocks, yet it is a 
clumsy one in its empirical application. The 
theoretical foundations of the CAPM remain intact. It 
is not the function of this dissertation to challenge 
them, nor does anything undertaken here imply their 
undoing. The aim of this dissertation was to test its 
application in the estimation of risk associated with 
public utility stocks. Likewise, it tests the
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empirical application of the CAPM and the bias that the 
literature purports to exist. In sum, the CAPM is on 
sound theoretical ground in the assessment of risk. It 
is when one uses the CAPM that one must take care to 
acknowledge its empirical limits in a regulatory 
setting.
While alpha is statistically insignificant in the 
data analyzed here, one must consider the possibility 
that alpha may be statistically significant in the 
future. Since this dissertation examined time series 
data, the possibility that future betas will have 
biases still exists. Therefore, when one estimates 
betas, one must test to see if alpha is statistically 
significant in the future. This purpose is to 
foreclose the possibility of biased betas. This has 
application to the empirical use of the CAPM both 
inside and outside the utility industry. As shown 
previously, the alphas of unregulated industries are 
insignificant. Therefore, continued testing for alpha 
is prudent in estimating risk.
IV. Terminus
This dissertation is about two things: utilities' 
cost of common equity and the CAPM. The evidence
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presented above casts doubt on the Empirical CAPM as a 
measure of the returns on equity. However, this 
statement does not aim to dismiss capital asset pricing 
theory completely. The CAPM has a valuable place in 
the measurement of public utilities' cost of common 
equity. Regulators and analysts alike need to continue 
to use it for its analytical value. Since a goal of 
this dissertation is to find more robust measures for a 
more competitive market, then one knows that the 
Empirical CAPM method is not a useful tool.
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APPENDIX A 
SAS OUTPUT FOR UTILITIES (1992-1996)
The SAS System 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 1
}BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
1 Jan-92 0.2783 0.0176 0.1648 0.1677 0.0776 0.2007 -0.0600 0.0872 0.0901
2 Feb-92 0.1389 -0.0336 0.1005 0.1356 0.0777 0.0612 -0.1113 0.0228 0.0579
3 Mar-92 0.0942 -0.0532 0.0687 0.0792 0.0797 0.0145 -0.1329 -0.0110 -0.0005
4 Apr-92 0.0742 0.0050 0.1102 0.1165 0.0803 -0.0061 -0.0753 0.0299 0.0362
5 May-92 0.0974 0.0079 0.1362 0.1247 0.0781 0.0193 -0.0702 0.0581 0.0466
6 Jun-92 0.0793 0.0724 0.1327 0.2379 0.0765 0.0028 -0.0041 0.0562 0.1614
7 Jul-92 0.0916 0.1171 0.1422 0.2007 0.0726 0.0190 0.0445 0.0696 0.1281
8 Aug-92 0.0733 0.0517 0.0844 0.2091 0.0725 0.0008 -0.0208 0.0119 0.1366
9 Sep-92 0.0808 0.0365 0.0465 0.1636 0.0710 0.0098 -0.0345 -0.0245 0.0926
10 Oct-92 0.0662 0.0191 0.0270 0.1087 0.0741 -0.0079 -0.0550 -0.0471 0.0346
11 Nov-92 0.0957 -0.0006 0.0027 0.0889 0.0748 0.0209 -0.0754 -0.0721 0.0141
12 Dec-92 0.1213 -0.0227 -0.0206 0.1164 0.0726 0.0487 -0.0953 -0.0932 0.0438
13 Jan-93 0.0460 0.0771 0.0634 0.1372 0.0725 -0.0265 0.0046 -0.0091 0.0647
14 Feb-93 0.0706 0.1680 0.1487 0.2197 0.0698 0.0008 0.0982 0.0789 0.1499
15 Mar-93 0.1051 0.1744 0.1563 0.3012 0.0702 0.0349 0.1042 0.0861 0.2310
16 Apr-93 0.0876 0.1340 0.1079 0.1949 0.0701 0.0175 0.0639 0.0378 0.1248
17 May-93 0.0734 0.1167 0.0899 0.1636 0.0701 0.0033 0.0466 0.0198 0.0935
18 Jun-93 0.0975 0.1594 0.1204 0.1262 0.0668 0.0307 0.0926 0.0536 0.0594
19 Jul-93 0.0777 0.1091 0.0927 0.1514 0.0656 0.0121 0.0435 0.0271 0.0858
20 Aug-93 0.0866 0.1709 0.1458 0.1284 0.0623 0.0243 0.1086 0.0835 0.0661
21 Sep-93 0.0974 0.1325 0.1213 0.1084 0.0627 0.0347 0.0698 0.0586 0.0457
22 Oct-93 0.1246 0.0937 0.1136 0.1442 0.0623 0.0623 0.0314 0.0513 0.0819
23 Nov-93 0.0947 0.0304 0.0436 0.1035 0.0651 0.0296 -0.0347 -0.0215 0.0384
24 Dec-93 0.0696 0.0375 0.0400 0.1100 0.0654 0.0042 -0.0279 -0.0254 0.0446
25 Jan-94 0.0868 -0.0026 -0.0130 0.0845 0.0637 0.0231 -0.0663 -0.0767 0.0208
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26 Feb-94 0.0676 -0.1237 -0.1292 -0.0172 0.0682 -0.0006 -0.1919 -0.1974 -0.0854
27 Mar-94 0.0303 -0.1872 -0.1664 -0.0592 0.0725 -0.0422 -0.2597 -0.2389 -0.1317
28 Apr-94 0.0094 -0.1670 -0.1521 -0.0429 0.0745 -0.0651 -0.2415 -0.2266 -0.1174
29 May-94 0.0127 -0.2194 -0.2038 -0.0864 0.0759 -0.0632 -0.2953 -0.2797 -0.1623
30 Jun-94 0.0151 -0.2762 -0.2543 -0.1364 0.0774 -0.0623 -0.3536 -0.3317 -0.2138
31 Jul-94 0.0092 -0.2544 -0.2339 -0.1532 0.0746 -0.0654 -0.3290 -0.3085 -0.2278
32 Aug-94 0.0223 -0.2624 -0.2462 -0.1616 0.0761 -0.0538 -0.3385 -0.3223 -0.2377
33 Sep-94 0.0168 -0.2736 -0.2657 -0.1622 0.0800 -0.0632 -0.3536 -0.3457 -0.2422
34 Oct-94 -0.0002 -0.2466 -0.2595 -0.1405 0.0809 -0.0811 -0.3275 -0.3404 -0.2214
35 Nov-94 -0.0041 -0.2033 -0.2094 -0.1700 0.0808 -0.0849 -0.2841 -0.2902 -0.2508
36 Dec-94 -0.0231 -0.2084 -0.2127 -0.1759 0.0799 -0.1030 -0.2883 -0.2926 -0.2558
37 Jan-95 -0.0164 -0.1455 -0.1297 -0.1594 0.0780 -0.0944 -0.2235 -0.2077 -0.2374
38 Feb-95 0.0219 -0.0786 -0.0728 -0.0962 0.0758 -0.0539 -0.1544 -0.1486 -0.1720
39 Mar-95 0.0633 -0.0440 -0.0559 -0.0748 0.0755 -0.0122 -0.1195 -0.1314 -0.1503
40 Apr-95 0.1357 -0.0245 -0.0361 -0.0430 0.0745 0.0612 -0.0990 -0.1106 -0.1175
41 May-95 0.1617 0.1094 0.1027 -0.0310 0.0677 0.0940 0.0417 0.0350 -0.0987
42 Jun-95 0.1858 0.1406 0.1498 0.0265 0.0670 0.1188 0.0736 0.0828 -0.0405
43 Jul-95 0.2348 0.0944 0.0968 -0.0082 0.0691 0.1657 0.0253 0.0277 -0.0773
44 Aug-95 0.2044 0.0697 0.0860 0.0330 0.0674 0.1370 0.0023 0.0186 -0.0344
45 Sep-95 0.2394 0.1809 0.2019 0.0785 0.0663 0.1731 0.1146 0.1356 0.0122
46 Oct-95 0.2568 0.1828 0.2148 0.0684 0.0641 0.1927 0.1187 0.1507 0.0043
47 Nov-95 0.2918 0.2019 0.1974 0.2186 0.0623 0.2295 0.1396 0.1351 0.1563
48 Dec-95 0.3501 0.2417 0.2372 0.2283 0.0603 0.2898 0.1814 0.1769 0.1680
49 Jan-96 0.3530 0.1954 0.1757 0.2107 0.0609 0.2921 0.1345 0.1148 0.1498
50 Feb-96 0.3260 0.1315 0.1304 0.1717 0.0659 0.2601 0.0656 0.0645 0.1058
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51 Mar-96 0.3077 0.1338 0.1209 0.1391 0.0684 0.2393 0.0654 0.0525 0.0707
52 Apr-96 0.2818 0.0802 0.0350 0.1040 0.0706 0.2112 0.0096 -0.0356 0.0334
53 May-96 0.2734 0.0263 0.0153 0.1452 0.0717 0.2017 -0.0454 -0.0564 0.0735
54 Jun-96 0.2395 0.0902 0.0347 0.1607 0.0703 0.1692 0.0199 -0.0356 0.0904
55 Jul-96 0.1370 0.0056 -0.0514 0.1184 0.0707 0.0663 -0.0651 -0.1221 0.0477
56 Aug-96 0.1635 0.0594 -0.0254 0.1829 0.0726 0.0909 -0.0132 -0.0980 0.1103
57 Sep-96 0.1853 0.0121 -0.0735 0.0767 0.0704 0.1149 -0.0583 -0.1439 0.0063
58 Oct-96 0.2015 0.0568 -0.0362 0.1237 0.0671 0.1344 -0.0103 -0.1033 0.0566
59 Nov-96 0.2678 0.0922 0.0125 0.1194 0.0643 0.2035 0.0279 -0.0518 0.0551
60 Dec-96 0.2053 0.0316 -0.0483 0.0686 0.0673 0.1380 -0.0357 -0.1156 0.0013
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Dependent Variable = ELEDELTA
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.677378
0.011679
-90.5709
0.3820
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.108069
-94.7596
0.3820
Durbin-Watson 0.1965
Variable OF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.087198
0.838984
0.0226
0.1401
3.851
5.987
0.0003
0.0001
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Electricity- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.01129 1 .000000
1 0.01003 0.888395
2 0.008543 0.756670
3 0.007664 0.678896
4 0.006452 0.571467
5 0.004898 0.433849
6 0.003698 0.327541
7 0.002663 0.235900
8 0.00134 0.118657
9 0.000323 0.028571
10 -0.00052 -0.045933
11 -0.00158 -0.139523
12 -0.00236 -0.209022
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* 
* * * 
* * * *
* * * * *
* *
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
10 0.009924
6 0.020065
t Ratio Prob 
0.0443 0.9648
0.0896 0.9290
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Autoreg Procedure
12 -0.045203 -0.3250 0.7466
4 0.080867 0.3908 0.6976
7 -0.129636 -0.8534 0.3975
8 0.113798 0.7758 0.4415
9 -0.061272 -0.5755 0.5674
11 0.075929 1.1736 0.2458
2 0.341697 1.8619 0.0681
3 -0.155641 -1.3578 0.1801
5 0.109646 1.4957 0.1403
Preliminary MSE = 0.002379 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.88839455
Std Error 
0.060807
t Ratio 
-14.610
Dissertation Regressions
Electricity- Total Returns
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 7
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.121842
0.002138
-187.674
0.1763
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.046234
-193.957
0.8888
Durbin-Watson 1.6092
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
-0.058762
0.565482
-0.907291
0.0614
0.1644
0.0555
-0.956
3.440
16.354
0.3429
0.0011
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 8
Electricity- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.058762 0.0613 -0.959 0.3419
SPDELTA 1 0.565482 0.1619 3.494 0.0009
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Total Returns
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 9
Dependent Variable = LDCDELTA
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.63935
0.011023
-94.0376
0.2890
Durbin-Watson 0.2103
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.104992
-98.2263
0.2890
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.012822
0.661066
0.0220
0.1361
0.583
4.856
0.5622
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Total Returns
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 10
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.010656 1.000000
1 0.009511 0.892524
2 0.008698 0.816263
3 0.007621 0.715177
4 0.00687 0.644675
5 0.00657 0.616581
6 0.006346 0.595504
7 0.006002 0.563236
8 0.005502 0.516342
9 0.004851 0.455241
10 0.003539 0.332160
11 0.002535 0.237911
12 0.001294 0.121464
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
8 -0.028398
11 -0.045392
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.1568 0.8761
-0.2516 0.8024
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 11
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
7 0.083851 0.5126 0.6106
6 -0.082708 -0.5616 0.5770
4 0.076964 0.4676 0.6421
12 0.121178 1.1307 0.2635
2 -0.229345 -1.4376 0.1566
3 0.145838 1.1227 0.2666
5 -0.131956 -1.5546 0.1259
Preliminary MSE = 0.001917
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient Std Error t Ratio
1 -0.89387229 0.066783 -13.385
9 -0.29709204 0.131843 -2.253
10 0.33992906 0.126810 2.681
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 12
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.8935
2 0.7976
3 0.7112
4 0.6333
5 0.5629
6 0.4992
7 0.4414
8 0.3889
9 0.3410
10 0.2303
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Total Returns
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 13
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.094106
0.001711
-192.377
0.1069
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
55
0.041365
-202.848
0.8954
Durbin-Watson 2.1071
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
A(9)
A(10)
0.017167
0.355608
0.887116
0.415907
0.489900
0.0351
0.1426
0.0532
0.1309
0.1268
0.489
2.494
16.662
-3.177
3.865
0.6268
0.0157
0 .0001
0.0024
0.0003
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 14
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.8908
2 0.7912
3 0.6999
4 0.6161
5 0.5388
6 0.4673
7 0.4007
8 0.3384
9 0.2797
10 0.1287
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Total Returns
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 15
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.017167
0.355608
0.0348
0.1386
0.493
2.566
0.6242
0.0131
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 16
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = DJDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.600828
0.010359
-97.7662
0.4558
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.10178 
-101.955 
0.4558
Durbin-Watson 0.2666
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
■0.099718
0.919748
0.0213
0.1320
4.676
6.969
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 17
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.010014 1.000000
1 0.008491 0.847960
2 0.007051 0.704175
3 0.006209 0.620058
4 0.005216 0.520894
5 0.003593 0.358839
6 0.002711 0.270719
7 0.002035 0.203212
8 0.000569 0.056839
9 -0.00041 -0.040970
10 -0.00107 -0.107204
11 -0.00227 -0.226729
12 -0.00366 -0.365513
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
*
**
* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * *
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
3 0.033582
10 -0.056067
t-Ratio Prob 
0.1688 0.8667 
-0.3029 0.7633
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
18
Autoreg Procedure
12 0.063084 0.4445 0.6587
6 -0.112614 -0.6321 0.5303
2 0.147493 1.0230 0.3113
9 -0.233581 -1.6533 0.1044
11 0.126754 1.4425 0.1552
4 -0.203013 -1.4802 0.1447
5 0.146649 1.3575 0.1803
7 -0.255344 -1.9735 0.0535
8 0.120450 1.7078 0.0932
Preliminary MSE = 0.002814 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.84796027
Std Error 
0.070208
t Ratio 
-12.078
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 19
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.138216
0.002425
-180.305
0.1388
DFE
Root MSE 
AID
Total Rsq
57
0.049243
-186.588
0.8748
Durbin-Watson 1.7777
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
0.059372
0.518260
0.885914
0.0563
0.1769
0.0601
-1.055
2.930
14.748
0.2958
0.0049
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given,
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.059372 0.0560 -1.061 0.2932
SPDELTA 1 0.518260 0.1710 3.031 0.0037
Dissertation Regressions
Electricity- Risk Premium
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 21
Dependent Variable = ELELESS
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.680265
0.011729
-90.3158
0.4083
Durbin-Watson 0.1981
DFE
Root MSE 
AID
Total Rsq
58
0.108299
-94.5044
0.4083
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
-0.099795
0.859561
0.0159
0.1359
6.264
6.327
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 22
Electricity- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.011338 1.000000
1 0.010062 0.88 7496
2 0.008559 0.754886
3 0.007681 0.677479
4 0.006475 0.571067
5 0.004924 0.434266
6 0.003736 0.329555
7 0.002716 0.239530
8 0.001396 0.123168
9 0.000389 0.034336
10 -0.00044 -0.038840
11 -0.0015 -0.132122
12 -0.00229 -0.202317
1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
*
* * *
* * * *
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
10 0.010278
6 0.014837
t Ratio Prob 
0.0459 0.9636
0.0663 0.9475
Dissertation Regressions
Electricity- Risk Premium
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 23
Autoreg Procedure
12 -0.042247 -0.3038 0.7626
4 0.076519 0.3696 0.7133
7 -0.132834 -0.8754 0.3855
8 0.115286 0.7873 0.4347
9 -0.062421 -0.5872 0.5596
11 0.075594 1.1655 0.2490
2 0.345428 1.8828 0.0651
3 -0.154361 -1.3481 0.1832
5 0.107666 1.4624 0.1492
Preliminary MSE = 0.002408 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient 
1 -0.88749625
Std Error 
0.061036
t Ratio 
-14.540
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 24
Electricity- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.124177
0.002179
-186.559
0.2041
DFE
Root MSE 
AID
Total Rsq
57
0.046675
-192.842
0.8920
Durbin-Watson 1.6103
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
0.093321
0.609533
-0.904937
0.0571
0.1622
0.0563
-1.634
3.758
16.062
0.1077
0.0004
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions
Electricity- Risk Premium
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Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
•0.093321
0.609533
0.0568
0.1594
1.643
3.824
0.1059
0.0003
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Risk Premium
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 26
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.644647
0.011115
-93.5425
0.3163
Durbin-Watson 0.2111
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.105426
-97.7312
0.3163
Variable DF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.038253
0.685063
0.0155
0.1323
2.467
5.180
0.0166
0 .0001
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Risk Premium
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Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.010744 1.000000
1 0.009584 0.892019
2 0.008756 0.814992
3 0.007667 0.713589
4 0.006908 0.642923
5 0.006604 0.614618
6 0.006394 0.595130
7 0.006055 0.563569
8 0.005557 0.517251
9 0.004902 0.456237
10 0.003589 0.334079
11 0.002575 0.239700
12 0.00132 0.122877
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
8 -0.021515
11 -0.049597
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.1187 0.9060
-0.2754 0.7842
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Risk Premium
12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 28
Autoreg Procedure
7 0.080253 0.4904 0.6261
4 0.094351 0.5557 0.5809
6 -0.077156 -0.5386 0.5925
12 0.125804 1.1725 0.2465
2 -0.226344 -1.4120 0.1639
3 0.143670 1.1042 0.2745
5 -0.129563 -1.5244 0.1332
Preliminary MSE = 0.00195
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.89330812
9 -0.29230673
10 0.33422418
Std Error 
0.067119 
0.132138 
0.127086
t Ratio 
-13.309 
- 2 .2 1 2  
2.630
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Gas- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.8929
2 0.7967
3 0.7100
4 0.6320
5 0.5616
6 0.4980
7 0.4404
8 0.3882
9 0.3406
10 0.2311
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Risk Premium
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Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.096505 
0.001755 
-191.017 
0.1254
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
55
0.041888 
-201.489 
0.8976
Durbin-Watson 2.1026
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
A(9)
A(10)
■0.030605
0.386694
-0.886831
0.402343
0.477649
0.0308
0.1420
0.0534
0.1317
0.1276
-0.993
2.724
16.619
-3.054
3.745
0.3252
0.0086
0.0001
0.0035
0.0004
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Gas- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.8909
2 0.7909
3 0.6990
4 0.6144
5 0.5360
6 0.4631
7 0.3950
8 0.3310
9 0.2704
10 0.1206
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions
Gas- Risk Premium
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Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
-0.030605
0 .38 6 6 9 4
0.0307
0.1377
■0.996
2.808
0.3237
0.0069
Dissertation Regressions 12:24 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium
33
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = DJLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.602836
0.010394
-97.566
0.4857
Durbin-Watson 0.2694
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.10195 
-101.755 
0.4857
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
-0.106921
0.946449
0.0150
0.1279
7.129
7.400
0.0001
0.0001
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4
0 0.010047 1.000000 1
1 0.008494 0.845428 1
2 0.007035 0.700147 1
3 0.006195 0.616590 1
4 0.005213 0.518838 1
5 0.003593 0.357589 1
6 0.002729 0.271660 1
7 0.002078 0.206860 1
8 0.000629 0.062595 1
9 -0.00033 -0.032485 1
10 -0.00096 -0.095579 1
11 -0.00215 -0.214000 1
12 -0.00355 -0.353671 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* 
* *  
* * * *  
* * * * * * *
* * * * * 
* * * *
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
3 0.032577
10 -0.060400
t-Ratio Prob 
0.1640 0.8705
-0.3264 0.7456
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
12 0.067967 0.4789 0.6342
6 -0.113176 -0.6349 0.5284
2 0.147591 1.0238 0.3108
9 -0.234085 -1.6553 0.1040
11 0.125187 1.4207 0.1614
4 -0.203645 -1.4844 0.1436
5 0.145334 1.3432 0.1848
7 -0.253301 -1.9548 0.0557
8 0.117310 1.6466 0.1052
Preliminary MSE = 0.002866 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.84542767
Std Error 
0.070742
t Ratio 
-11.951
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.141278
0.002479
-179.005
0.1667
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.049785
-185.288
0.8795
Durbin-Watson 1.7739
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
0.097563
0.569174
0.884060
0.0513
0.1751
0.0609
-1.900
3.251
14.526
0.0625
0.0019
0 .0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
-0,097563
0.569174
0.0513
0.1686
-1.903
3.376
0.0621
0.0013
APPENDIX B 
SAS OUTPUT FOR UTILITIES (1987-1991)
The SAS System 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 1
IBS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
1 Jan-87 0.27041 0.27025 0.26293 0.22777 0.0778 0.19261 0.19245 0.18513 0.14997
2 Feb-87 0.28031 0.17834 0.11535 0.18278 0.0763 0.20401 0.10204 0.03905 0.10648
3 Mar-87 0.25915 0.09787 0.04101 0.10587 0.0795 0.17965 0.01837 -0.03849 0.02637
4 Apr-87 0.21555 0.13723 0.04764 -0.02736 0.0859 0.12965 0.05133 -0.03826 -0.11326
5 May-87 0.21216 0.03818 -0.01506 -0.07528 0.0880 0.12416 -0.04982 -0.10306 -0.16328
6 Jun-87 0.22870 0.02899 -0.03113 -0.04335 0.0877 0.14100 -0.05871 -0.11883 -0.13105
7 Jul-87 0.29101 -0.01152 -0.12743 -0.07335 0.0907 0.20031 -0.10222 -0.21813 -0.16405
8 Aug-87 0.34449 -0.05343 -0.15916 -0.07787 0.0936 0.25089 -0.14703 -0.25276 -0.17147
9 Sep-87 0.33739 -0.01382 -0.08524 -0.06283 0.0992 0.23819 -0.11302 -0.18444 -0.16203
10 Oct-87 0.18029 -0.12827 -0.16314 -0.15600 0.0926 0.08769 -0.22087 -0.25574 -0.24860
11 Nov-87 -0.00041 -0.17504 -0.18383 -0.15671 0.0931 -0.09351 -0.26814 -0.27693 -0.24981
12 Dec-87 -0.03057 -0.15014 -0.17086 -0.15007 0.0920 -0.12257 -0.24214 -0.26286 -0.24207
13 Jan-88 -0.05293 -0.15441 -0.16415 -0.12040 0.0852 -0.13813 -0.23961 -0.24935 -0.20560
14 Feb-88 -0.08117 -0.16089 -0.15184 -0.09908 0.0854 -0.16657 -0.24629 -0.23724 -0.18448
15 Mar-88 -0.09162 -0.19380 -0.16091 -0.13015 0.0901 -0.18172 -0.28390 -0.25101 -0.22025
16 Apr-88 -0.09229 -0.16468 -0.14426 -0.03857 0.0929 -0.18519 -0.25758 -0.23716 -0.13147
17 May-88 -0.11415 -0.10429 -0.07628 0.01418 0.0952 -0.20935 -0.19949 -0.17148 -0.08102
18 Jun-88 -0.10186 -0.12059 -0.08457 -0.00687 0.0917 -0.19356 -0.21229 -0.17627 -0.09857
19 Jul-88 -0.13222 -0.09346 -0.05789 0.02406 0.0947 -0.22692 -0.18816 -0.15259 -0.07064
20 Aug-88 -0.19945 -0.13855 -0.08887 -0.06665 0.0950 -0.29445 -0.23355 -0.18387 -0.16165
21 Sep-88 -0.15908 -0.07824 -0.03685 0.02192 0.0917 -0.25078 -0.16994 -0.12855 -0.06978
22 Oct-88 -0.00999 0.02564 0.02978 0.11364 0.0889 -0.09889 -0.06326 -0.05912 0.02474
23 Nov-88 0.10612 0.05598 0.03499 0.12511 0.0923 0.01382 -0.03632 -0.05731 0.03281
24 Dec-88 0.14730 0.06397 0.07110 0.12311 0.0918 0.05550 -0.02783 -0.02070 0.03131
25 Jan-89 0.13932 0.00500 0.00360 0.05109 0.0903 0.04902 -0.08530 -0.08670 -0.03921
The SAS System 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 2
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
26 Feb-89 0.13909 -0.00452 -0.00568 0.00553 0.0935 0.04559 -0.09802 -0.09918 -0.08797
27 Mar-89 0.10162 0.07325 0.03592 0.08329 0.0929 0.00872 -0.01965 -0.05698 -0.00961
28 Apr-89 0.15118 0.12641 0.11828 0.12649 0.0918 0.05938 0.03461 0.02648 0.03469
29 May-89 0.22569 0.13645 0.12440 0.12582 0.0878 0.13789 0.04865 0.03660 0.03802
30 Jun-89 0.19579 0.15812 0.14833 0.11457 0.0821 0.11369 0.07602 0.06623 0.03247
31 Jul-89 0.23337 0.20973 0.21355 0.16400 0.0801 0.15327 0.12963 0.13345 0.08390
32 Aug-89 0.31437 0.21600 0.18105 0.24112 0.0841 0.23027 0.13190 0.09695 0.15702
33 Sep-89 0.29590 0.19076 0.15100 0.20885 0.0847 0.21120 0.10606 0.06630 0.12415
34 Oct-89 0.25234 0.17070 0.14765 0.22016 0.0810 0.17134 0.08970 0.06665 0.13916
35 Nov 89 0.25535 0.21160 0.19745 0.26247 0.0808 0.17455 0.13080 0.11665 0.18167
36 Dec-89 0.26076 0.26176 0.21379 0.34912 0.0816 0.17916 0.18016 0.13219 0.26752
37 Jan-90 0.19121 0.17113 0.13242 0.22880 0.0865 0.10471 0.08463 0.04592 0.14230
38 Feb-90 0.12398 0.20485 0.17032 0.24441 0.0876 0.03638 0.11725 0.08272 0.15681
39 Mar-90 0.15634 0.16644 0.15835 0.18599 0.0889 0.06744 0.07754 0.06945 0.09709
40 Apr 90 0.11869 0.05660 0.05064 0.09081 0.0924 0.02629 -0.03580 -0.04176 -0.00159
41 May-90 0.11580 0.05489 0.03971 0.09872 0.0883 0.02750 -0.03341 -0.04859 0.01042
42 Jun-90 0.11335 0.00148 0.01124 0.07237 0.0864 0.02695 -0.08492 -0.07516 -0.01403
43 Jul-90 0.08475 -0.05059 -0.03193 -0.01144 0.0860 -0.00125 -0.13659 -0.11793 -0.09744
44 Aug-90 -0.04573 -0.10847 -0.07740 -0.03788 0.0920 -0.13773 -0.20047 -0.16940 -0.12988
45 Sep-90 -0.09182 -0.08142 -0.08142 -0.00864 0.0914 -0.18322 -0.17282 -0.17282 -0.10004
46 Oct-90 -0.11595 -0.02696 -0.01488 0.01599 0.0898 -0.20575 -0.11676 -0.10468 -0.07381
47 Nov-90 -0.07322 -0.05700 -0.02338 -0.02200 0.0858 -0.15902 -0.14280 -0.10918 -0.10780
48 Dec-90 -0.05694 -0.10781 -0.03877 -0.06997 0.0844 -0.14134 -0.19221 -0.12317 -0.15437
49 Jan-91 -0.04259 -0.07561 -0.00214 -0.01665 0.0837 -0.12629 -0.15931 -0.08584 -0.10035
50 Feb-91 0.09626 -0.03449 0.03587 -0.00267 0.0841 0.01216 -0.11859 -0.04823 -0.08677
The SAS System 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 3
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
51 Mar-91 0.09992 0.011739 0.07903 0.02428 0.0844 0.01552 -0.07266 -0.00537 -0.060123
52 Apr-91 0.12272 0.034074 0.13531 0.07615 0.0837 0.03902 -0.04963 0.05161 -0.007553
53 May-91 0.07920 0.001798 0.08005 0.08156 0.0845 -0.00530 -0.08270 -0.00445 -0.002940
54 Jun-91 0.04967 -0.062568 0.05947 0.03696 0.0860 -0.03633 -0.14857 -0.02653 -0.049039
55 Jul-91 0.05611 -0.039236 0.09587 0.12979 0.0850 -0.02889 -0.12424 0.01087 0.044788
56 Aug-91 0.17732 0.074950 0.21830 0.16245 0.0818 0.09552 -0.00685 0.13650 0.080652
57 Sep-91 0.22761 0.071763 0.27089 0.15353 0.0790 0.14861 -0.00724 0.19189 0.074533
58 Oct-91 0.25970 0.012800 0.17093 0.14407 0.0791 0.18060 -0.06630 0.09183 0.064974
59 Nov-91 0.22402 0.031779 0.18231 0.14072 0.0789 0.14512 -0.04712 0.10341 0.061815
60 Dec-91 0.18178 0.078445 0.22289 0.14202 0.0730 0.10878 0.00545 0.14989 0.069017
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Total Returns 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dependent Variable = ELEDELTA
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0,623262
0.010746
-95.5667
0.3182
Durbin-Watson 0.2519
DEE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.103662
-99.7554
0.3182
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.017538
0.486707
0.0167
0.0935
1.049
5.203
0.2984
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Total Returns 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
0.010388
0.008702
0.007375
0.006636
0.005165
0.003975
0.002638
0.002059
0.001677
0.000645
0.000377
- 0.00002
-0.00077
1.000000 
0.837730 
0.709966 
0.638853 
0.497233 
0.382700 
0.253953 
0.198187 
0.161399 
0.062067 
0.036258 
-0.002141 
-0.074357
* * * * *
* * * *
* * *
*
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
11 0.046726
8 -0.092931
t-Ratio Prob 
0.2366 0.8140
-0.4795 0.6338
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Total Returns 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
9 0.090632 0.5673 0.5732
10 -0.065623 -0.4348 0.6656
12 0.078644 1 .0227 0.3114
2 0.180401 1 .0255 0.3100
5 -0.139164 -0.8373 0.4062
7 -0.208593 -1.5527 0.1264
6 0.116770 1.1321 0.2626
4 0.245023 1.8743 0.0662
3 -0.088907 -0.8637 0.3914
Preliminary MSE = 0.003098 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.83772979
Std Error
0.072331
t Ratio 
-11.582
Dissertation Regressions; 1991
Electricity- Total Returns 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.143441
0.002517
-177.887
0.1142
DEE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.050165
-184.17
0.8431
Durbin-Watson 1.9019
Variable DF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
0.044812
0.299218
-0.906851
0.0645
0.1192
0.0597
0.695
2.510
15.183
0.4899
0.0149
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Total Returns
8
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
0.044812
0.299218
0.0623
0.1104
0.720
2.710
0.4746
0.0089
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Total Returns 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.612531
0.010561
-96.6087
0.2580
Durbin-Watson 0.2461
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.102766
-100.797
0.2580
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.013181
0.416389
0.0166
0.0927
0.795
4.490
0.4296
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Total Returns
10
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 0.010209 1.000000 1
1 0.008842 0.866154 1
2 0.007543 0.738865 1
3 0.006368 0.623740 1
4 0.005049 0.494535 1
5 0.003822 0.374381 1
6 0.002364 0.231604 1
7 0.001105 0.108227 1
8 0.000272 0.026625 1
9 -0.00055 -0.054096 1 *
10 -0.0007 -0.068580 1 *
11 -0.00105 -0.102437 1 **
12 -0.00166 -0.162210 1 ***
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* * 
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
11 -0.018630
2 0.035789
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0946 0.9251
0.1911 0.8493
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
11
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
4 0.035183 0.1909 0.8494
5 -0.027540 -0.1762 0.8609
3 -0.055496 -0.4597 0.6477
7 0.101340 0.5724 0.5696
8 -0.084555 -0.5584 0.5790
9 0.164095 1.1295 0.2638
10 -0.188650 -1.6693 0.1009
12 0.049063 0.7100 0.4807
6 0.107773 1.5272 0.1323
Preliminary MSE = 0.00255
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.86615392
Std Error
0.066197
t Ratio 
-13.084
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Total Returns
12
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.141591
0.002484
-178.94
0.1492
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.04984
-185.223
0.8285
Durbin-Watson 1.8425
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
0.037179
0.344607
0.875411
0.0491
0.1146
0.0644
0.757
3.006
13.593
0.4519
0.0039
0 .0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given,
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Total Returns
13
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.037179
0.344607
0.0486
0.1090
0.765
3.160
0.4473
0.0025
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = DJDELTA
14
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.400288
0.006902
-122.134
0.5412
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.083075
-126.322
0.5412
Durbin-Watson 0.3657
Variable DF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.045737
0.620069
0.0134
0.0750
■3.414
8.272
0.0012
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions; 1991
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
15
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.006671 1.000000
1 0.005267 0.789510
2 0.004078 0.611221
3 0.003359 0.503552
4 0.00227 0.340224
5 0.001753 0.262805
6 0.001075 0.161155
7 0.000902 0.135129
8 0.000853 0.127933
9 0.000223 0.033462
10 0.000111 0.016579
11 -0.00039 -0.058487
12 -0.00117 -0.175201
1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
*
* * * *
* * *  
* * * 
* * * 
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
8
Estimate
-0.053141
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.2508 0.8031
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
16
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
11 0.069342 0.3730 0.7108
9 0.120973 0.8033 0.4257
10 -0.052289 -0.4519 0.6533
2 0.250144 1.4034 0.1667
5 -0.235861 -1.3999 0.1676
6 0.167929 1.1563 0.2529
7 -0.095709 -0.9950 0.3242
3 -0.171939 -1.1997 0.2355
4 0.051221 0.5392 0.5919
12 0.129467 1.6120 0.1126
Preliminary MSE = 0.002513 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.78950990
Std Error
0.081292
t Ratio 
-9.712
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.126924
0.002227
-185.572
0.2173
DFE
Root MSE 
Aie
Total Rsq
17
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
57
0.047188 
-191.855 
0.8545
Durbin-Watson 1.8792
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
•0.004661
0.409385
■0.865517
0.0436
0.1120
0.0689
-0.107
3.655
12.560
0.9152
0.0006
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 18
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.004661 0.0432 -0.108 0.9144
SPDELTA 1 0.409385 0.1029 3.977 0.0002
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Risk Premium
19
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dependent Variable = ELELESS
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.642176
0.011072
-93.773
0.3395
Durbin-Watson 0.2507
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.105224
-97.9617
0.3395
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.062701
0.510011
0.0137
0.0934
4.573
5.460
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
20
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.010703 1.000000
1 0.008969 0.837999
2 0.007573 0.707571
3 0.006779 0.633357
4 0.005234 0.489047
5 0.003984 0.372201
6 0.002623 0.245044
7 0.002046 0.191173
8 0.00167 0.156043
9 0.00065 0.060744
10 0.000386 0.036050
11 -0.00001 -0.001194
12 -0.00077 -0.072133
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* * * * *
****
*
*
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
11 0.046627
8 -0.086437
t-Ratio Prob 
0.2352 0.8151
-0.4432 0.6597
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
21
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
9 0.083908 0.5252 0.6019
10 -0.050974 -0.3996 0.6912
12 0.078418 1 .0265 0.3096
2 0.188501 1.0664 0.2913
5 -0.134148 -0.8024 0.4259
7 -0.213779 -1.5932 0.1171
6 0.108291 1.0526 0.2972
4 0.248760 1.9047 0.0621
3 -0.080932 -0.7886 0.4336
Preliminary MSE = 0.003187 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.83799890
Std Error
0.072276
t Ratio 
-11.594
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Risk Premium
22
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.146533
0.002571
-176.577
0.1230
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.050703
-182.86
0.8493
Durbin-Watson 1.8744
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
0.013806
0.313516
0.909722
0.0646
0.1202
0.0592
-0.214
2.608
15.359
0.8315
0.0116
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Electricity- Risk Premium
23
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
-0.013806
0.313516
0.0630
0.1109
-0.219
2.827
0.8273
0.0065
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Risk Premium
24
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dependent Variable = LDCLESS
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.62727
0.010815
-95.1821
0.2778
Durbin-Watson 0.2448
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.103995
-99.3708
0.2778
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
0.038032
0.436058
0.0136
0.0923
2.806
4.723
0.0068
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
25
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 0.010454 1.000000
1 0.009055 0.866127
2 0.007711 0.737611
3 0.006489 0.620669
4 0.005107 0.488464
5 0.003819 0.365275
6 0.002318 0.221684
7 0.001041 0.099621
8 0.000197 0.018858
9 -0.00062 -0.059608
10 -0.00075 -0.071812
11 -0.00106 -0.101100
12 -0.00167 -0.159533
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* 
* 
* * 
***
*******
* * * *
* *
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
2 0.026629
4 0.035897
t-Ratio Prob 
0.1354 0.8929
0.1917 0.8488
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
26
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
5 -0.024613 -0.1549 0.8776
11 -0.045684 -0.2515 0.8025
3 -0.052556 -0.4355 0.6651
7 0.094504 0.5329 0.5964
8 -0.082086 -0.5419 0.5902
9 0.160819 1.1062 0.2736
10 0.192874 -1.7113 0.0928
12 0.047894 0.6964 0.4891
6 0.109271 1.5555 0.1255
Preliminary MSE = 0.002612 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.86612749
Std Error
0.066203
t Ratio 
-13.083
Dissertation Regressions; 1991
Gas- Risk Premium
27
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.144177
0.002529
-177.84
0.1589
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.050293
-184.123
0.8340
Durbin-Watson 1.8289
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
0.018825
0.358478
■0.877252
0.0480
0.1153
0.0642
-0.392
3.110
13.656
0.6964
0.0029
0 .0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1991
Gas- Risk Premium
28
12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
•0.018825
0.358478
0.0478
0.1093
0.394
3.280
0.6951
0.0018
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 29
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = DJLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.406517 
0.007009 
-121.207 
0.5556
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
0.083719
-125.396
0.5556
Durbin-Watson 0.3656
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.079076
0.632855
0.0109
0.0743
7.248
8.515
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 30
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
0 0.006775 1.000000 1 1******'
1 0.005348 0.789374 1 !******<
2 0.004122 0.608452 1 I***'**'
3 0.003373 0.497765 1 I**'***'
4 0.002244 0.331217 1 1******'
5 0.001694 0.249964 1 1*****
6 0.001014 0.149632 1 1***
7 0.000853 0.125845 1 1***
8 0.000815 0.120273 1 1 **
9 0.000199 0.029417 1 1*
10 0.000091 0.013367 1 1
11 -0.0004 -0.059496 1 * 1
12 -0.00118 -0.174523 1 ***;
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
8
Estimate
-0.049031
t Ratio Prob 
-0.2304 0.8188
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 31
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
11 0.066181 0.3561 0.7234
9 0.117549 0.7792 0.4397
10 -0,049823 -0.4303 0.6689
2 0.251642 1.4079 0.1654
5 -0.226797 -1.3402 0.1861
6 0.168508 1.1592 0.2517
7 -0.096442 -1.0078 0.3181
3 -0.170770 -1.1907 0.2390
4 0.058270 0.6169 0.5399
12 0.128011 1.5925 0.1169
Preliminary MSE = 0.002554 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.78937403
Std Error
0.081315
t Ratio 
-9.708
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 32
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
0.128754
0.002259
-184.701
0.2263
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
0.047527
-190.984
0.8592
Durbin-Watson 1.8587
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(1)
0.055096
0.420364
■0.867312
0.0422
0.1124
0.0687
-1.305
3.740
12.628
0.1972
0.0004
0.0001
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1991 33
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:30 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
•0.055096
0.420364
0.0421
0.1030
1.307
4.083
0.1963
0.0001
APPENDIX C 
SAS OUTPUT FOR UTILITIES (1961-1965)
The SAS System 12:32 Tuesday, August 18 , 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
1 Jan-61 . 4.04
2 Feb-61 8.55 6.88 0.57 8.50 3.92 8.67 7.00 0.69 8.62
3 Mar-61 5.08 2.57 2.81 1.30 3.97 5.03 2.52 2.76 1 .25
4 Apr-61 1 .58 1 .84 -0.71 9.35 3.91 1 .64 1.90 -0.65 9.41
5 May-61 2.31 0.47 4.49 -1.64 3.97 2.25 0.41 4.43 -1.70
6 Jun-61 -5.83 -6.85 -11.51 10.22 4.04 -5.90 -6.92 -11.58 -10.29
7 Jul-61 2.59 0.34 3.74 1 .28 4.04 2.59 0.34 3.74 1 .28
8 Aug-61 2.77 2.04 2.19 -1.37 4.10 2.71 1 .98 2.13 -1.43
g Sep-61 2.75 2.08 8.51 11.50 4.03 2.82 2.15 8.58 11.57
10 Oct-61 3.85 7.65 7.46 -1.26 4.00 3.88 7.68 7.49 -1.23
11 Nov-61 1 .58 4.97 1 .86 2.05 4.04 1 .54 4.93 1 .82 2.01
12 Dec-61 -1.84 -8.36 -14.55 -11.24 4.15 -1.95 -8.47 -14.66 -11.35
13 Jan-62 -10.64 -13.23 -11.06 -5.80 4.19 -10.68 -13.27 -11.10 -5.84
14 Feb-62 -2.71 -4.40 0.04 -5.68 4.14 -2.66 -4.35 0.09 -5.63
15 Mar-62 -3.33 -1.43 -2.23 -4.37 3.98 -3.17 -1.27 -2.07 -4.21
16 Apr-62 -6.25 -4.99 -3.29 -9.33 3.94 -6.21 -4.95 -3.25 -9.29
17 May-62 -8.65 -9.33 -14.76 -10.11 3.93 -8.64 -9.32 -14.75 -10.10
18 Jun-62 -9.94 -7.49 -2.80 -4.80 4.01 -10.02 -7.57 -2.88 -4.88
19 Jul-62 2.28 2.17 4.42 4.88 4.12 2.17 2.06 4.31 4.77
20 Aug-62 -0.73 -0.33 -2.42 -5.32 4.01 -0.62 -0.22 -2.31 -5.21
21 Sep-62 -0.10 -1.50 -4.68 -5.57 3.98 -0.07 -1.47 -4.65 -5.54
22 Oct-62 -3.63 -4.87 -5.48 -3.29 3.95 -3.60 -4.84 -5.45 -3.26
23 Nov-62 1 .87 -0.86 2.12 2.18 3.96 1 .86 -0.87 2.11 2.17
24 Dec-62 2.85 5.73 8.00 4.42 3.95 2.86 5.74 8.01 4.43
25 Jan-63 6.87 9.46 10.61 7.18 3.98 6.84 9.43 10.58 7.15
The SAS System 12:32 Tuesday, August 18 , 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA T80ND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESS
26 Feb-63 -0.31 -0.47 -5.59 0.56 4.00 -0.33 -0.49 -5.61 0.54
27 Mar-63 -0.45 -2.38 0.39 -2.40 4.01 -0.46 -2.39 0.38 -2.41
28 Apr-63 7.61 3.02 4.17 4.86 4.05 7.57 2.98 4.13 4.82
29 May-63 10.31 10.13 12.87 11.96 4.06 10.30 10.12 12.86 11.95
30 Jun-63 14.68 10.31 5.31 9.96 4.07 14.67 10.30 5.30 9.95
31 Jul-63 -4.79 -5.52 -8.13 -11.99 4.07 -4.79 -5.52 -8.13 -11.99
32 Aug-63 0.05 0.73 2.58 2.48 4.08 0.04 0.72 2.57 2.47
33 Sep-63 4.31 0.91 0.91 3.98 4.10 4.29 0.89 0.89 3.96
34 Oct-63 4.42 0.05 -2.19 5.82 4.15 4.37 0.00 -2.24 5.77
35 Nov-63 -9.07 -5.49 -9.25 -13.75 4.14 -9.06 -5.48 -9.24 -13.74
36 Dec-63 -2.54 -3.38 -2.80 -2.42 4.17 -2.57 -3.41 -2.83 -2.45
37 Jan-64 -0.90 -2.79 -4.89 -4.26 4.21 -0.94 -2.83 -4.93 -4.30
38 Feb-64 -0.11 -1.28 3.22 -0.32 4.24 -0.14 -1.31 3.19 -0.35
39 Mar-64 2.59 0.52 -2.65 1 .70 4.24 2.59 0.52 -2.65 1 .70
40 Apr-64 -3.73 -1.29 -0.68 -4.38 4.23 -3.72 -1.28 -0.67 -4.37
41 May-64 -1.18 -1.42 -0.73 -2.07 4.22 -1.17 -1.41 -0.72 -2.06
42 Jun-64 -0.63 1.57 2.93 1 .64 4.19 -0.60 1 .60 2.96 1 .67
43 Jul-64 6.04 4.85 4.89 3.55 4.21 6.02 4.83 4.87 3.53
44 Aug-64 -4.96 -2.21 -5.06 -0.92 4.23 -4.98 -2.23 -5.08 -0.94
45 Sep-64 -1.03 0.51 4.10 0.53 4.21 -1.01 0.53 4.12 0.55
46 Oct 64 1 .69 4.51 5.11 -0.60 4.21 1 .69 4.51 5.11 -0.60
47 Nov-64 1 .46 2.85 2.41 2.97 4.22 1 .45 2.84 2.40 2.96
48 Dec-64 -4.45 -1.68 -1.75 -0.43 4.23 -4.46 -1.69 -1.76 -0.44
49 Jan-65 -0.55 -0.30 1.84 4.44 4.22 -0.54 -0.29 1.85 4.45
50 Feb-65 -0.56 1.84 -0.78 -1.57 4.24 -0.58 1.82 -0.80 -1 .59
The SAS System 12:32 Tuesday, August 18 , 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBOND SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLES5
51 Mar-65 -1 .90 0.54 1 .25 -4.78 4.22 -1.88 0.56 1 .27 -4.76
52 Apr-65 -0.14 -0.41 -0.27 -0.20 4.22 -0.14 -0.41 -0.27 -0.20
53 May-65 0.55 0.40 -1.43 -2.53 4.23 0.54 0.39 -1.44 -2.54
54 Jun-65 -4.62 -5.49 -5.17 -0.84 4.23 -4.62 -5.49 -5.17 -0.84
55 Jul-65 -3.95 -3.60 -4.76 -3.87 4.24 -3.96 -3.61 -4.77 -3.88
56 Aug-65 3.45 -1.11 0.54 0.09 4.28 3.41 -1 .15 0.50 0.05
57 Sep-65 1.68 0.62 -0.35 0.55 4.33 1 .63 0.57 -0.40 0.50
58 Oct-65 0.55 -1.06 -0.96 -0.68 4.33 0.55 -1.06 -0.96 -0.68
59 Nov 65 0.14 -1.40 -2.65 -1.41 4.41 0.06 -1.48 -2.73 -1.49
60 Dec-65 1.40 -1.58 -0.78 -0.56 4.50 1 .31 -1.67 -0.87 -0.65
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dependent Variable = ELEDELTA
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
831.8323 
14.59355 
331.7093 
0.5294
Durbin-Watson 1.9712
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
3.82015
327.5543
0.5294
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.515125
0.847378
0.4975
0.1058
1.035
8.008
0.3048
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation
0 14.09885 1.000000
1 -0.13605 -0.009650
2 -0.85399 -0.060572
3 -2.42426 -0.171947
4 2.291394 0.162523
5 2.181173 0.154706
6 -0.1634 -0.011590
7 -2.9188 -0.207024
8 -2.00884 -0.142482
9 3.180983 0.225620
10 -0.18414 -0.013061
11 0.068682 0.004871
12 -7.39051 -0.524193
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
* 
* * *
* * * *
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
6 -0.007538
1 -0.020429
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0579 0.9541
-0.1562 0.8766
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
5 -0.027890 -0.2188 0.8278
11 -0.031090 -0.2435 0.8086
2 0.031785 0.2589 0.7968
3 0.051094 0.4141 0.6806
4 -0.067454 -0.5570 0.5800
10 0.068375 0.5864 0.5602
8 0.065932 0.5709 0.5705
7 0.124308 1.0848 0.2828
9 -0.139614 -1.2137 0.2301
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Preliminary MSE = 10.2248
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.52419253
Std Error
0.113800
t Ratio 
4.606
Dissertation Regressions; 1961-1965 7
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.5242
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 8
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
457.2781
8.165681
307.8913
0.5867
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
2.857566 
301.6587 
0.7413
Durbin-Watson 1.9138
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(12)
0.391913
0.816067
0.678639
0.2425
0.0919
0.0888
1.616
8.877
7.644
0.1117
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 9
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.6786
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 10
Electricity- Total Returns 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.391913
0.816067
0.2425
0.0915
1.616
8.915
0.1117
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Total Returns
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
682.8672 
11.98013 
320.0668 
0.6191
Durbin-Watson 2.4688
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
3.461232
315.9118
0.6191
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.645787
0.922940
0.4507
0.0959
1.433
9.626
0.1574
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Total Returns
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 11.57402 1.000000 1 1****
1 -2.73854 -0.236611 1
2 0.179823 0.015537 1 1
3 -3.27225 -0.282724 1 ****** 1
4 1 .459843 0.126131 1 1***
5 2.308696 0.199472 1 1****
6 -0.27784 -0.024005 1 1
7 -0.11079 -0.009572 1 1
8 -2.16538 -0.187090 1 ****1
9 1.789276 0.154594 1 1 * * *
10 1.110492 0.095947 1 1 * *
11 -0.73538 -0.063537 1 * 1
12 -2.96306 -0.256010 1 .....1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
9 -0.007687
2 0.015334
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0509 0.9596
0.1056 0.9163
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
4 -0.029262 -0,2023 0,8405
6 -0.053323 -0,3707 0,7125
8 0.069900 0,4995 0,6197
10 -0,097803 -0,7353 0,4656
7 -0.093576 -0,7461 0,4590
11 0,145217 1,1637 0,2498
12 0,233343 1,9234 0,0598
5 -0,236919 -1,9177 0,0604
1 0,232274 1,8507 0,0696
Preliminary MSE = 10.64888 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
3 0.28272379
Std Error
0.128179
t Ratio 
2.206
Dissertation Regressions; 1961-1965
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
14
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 -0.2827
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE 
MSE 
SBC 
Reg Rsq 
Durbin-Watson
619.2542 
11.05811 
318.6809 
0.6527 
2.4487
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
3.325374
312.4483
0.6546
Variable
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(3)
DF
1
1
1
B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
■0.662731
0.892451
0.311334
0.3342
0.0870
0.1266
-1.983
10.256
2.460
0.0523
0.0001
0.0170
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
15
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 -0.3113
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.662731
0.892451
0.3342
0.0870
-1.983
10.258
0.0523
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Dependent Variable = DJDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
280.7778
4.925926
267.6314
0.7674
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
2.219443 
263.4763 
0.7674
Durbin-Watson 1.5162
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
-0.377718
0.843113
0.2890
0.0615
-1.307
13.714
0.1965
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
17
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 4.758945 1.000000 1
1 1.103075 0.231790 1
2 -0.30347 -0.063769 1 *
3 -0.43968 -0.092391 1 **
4 0.354682 0.074530 1
5 0.696231 0.146299 1
6 0.403764 0.084843 1
7 -0.04377 -0.009198 1
8 -0.56324 -0.118353 1 A *
9 -0.14701 -0.030891 1 *
10 -0.16062 -0.033751 1 A
11 -0.14934 -0.031382 1 *
12 -2.12979 -0.447535 1 *********
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
*
* * * 
* *
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
9
Estimate
0.003869
t Ratio 
0.0285
Prob
0.9774
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
4 -0.045198 -0.3376 0.7372
3 0.037784 0.2940 0.7700
7 -0.054642 -0.4169 0.6786
8 0.055280 0.4553 0.6509
6 -0.073506 -0.5896 0.5581
11 -0.098237 -0.7841 0.4366
10 0.089129 0.7461 0.4589
5 -0.113073 -0.9598 0.3415
2 0.136599 1.1388 0.2598
1 -0.217960 -1.8628 0.0678
Preliminary MSE = 3.805788 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.44753490
Std Error
0.119501
t Ratio 
3.745
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 19
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure 
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.4475
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
20
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Variable
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(12)
SSE 175.9406 DFE 56
MSE 3.141797 Root MSE 1.772511
SBC 250.4668 AIC 244.2342
Reg Rsq 0.7880 Total Rsq 0.8543
Durbin-Watsor1 1.6001
DF B Value Std Error t Ratio ,
1 0.301691 0.1535 -1.966
1 0.821064 0.0573 14.323
1 0.640464 0.1012 6.329
0.0543
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 21
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure 
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.6405
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 22
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure 
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.301691 0.1534 -1.967 0.0542
SPDELTA 1 0.821064 0.0569 14.426 0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = ELELESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
832.3858 
14.60326 
331.7486 
0.5300
Durbin-Watson 1.9709
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
3.821421
327.5935
0.5300
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
•0.516453
0.848758
0.4976
0.1059
1.038
8.017
0.3037
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 14.10823 1.000000 1 1****
1 -0.13364 -0.009473 1 1
2 -0.85143 -0.060350 1 * 1
3 -2.42151 -0.171638 1 ***!
4 2.294693 0.162649 1 1 ***
5 2.180182 0.154533 1 1 * * *
6 -0.15803 -0.011201 1 1
7 -2.90666 -0.206026 1 ****1
8 -2.01155 -0.142580 1 ***!
9 3.186327 0.225849 1 1****
10 -0.19034 -0.013492 1 1
11 0.065208 0.004622 1 1
12 -7.39394 -0.524087 1 ********** 1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
6 -0.008401
1 -0.020767
t Ratio Prob 
-0.0645 0.9488
-0.1588 0.8745
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
5 -0.028176 -0.2211 0.8260
11 -0.030830 -0.2415 0.8102
2 0.031924 0.2600 0.7959
3 0.050804 0.4117 0.6823
4 -0.067744 -0.5593 0.5784
10 0.068503 0.5875 0.5594
8 0.065957 0.5711 0.5704
7 0.123393 1.0767 0.2864
9 -0.140020 -1.2173 0.2287
Preliminary MSE = 10.23316 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.52408714
Std Error
0.113808
t Ratio 
4.605
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 26
Electricity- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.5241
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 27
Electricity- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
457.5646 
8.170796 
307.932 
0.5882
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
2.85846 
301.6994 
0.7416
Durbin-Watson 1.9144
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(12)
■0.393043
0.817310
0.678762
0.2426
0.0918
0.0888
1.620
8.905
7.645
0.1108
0.0001
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions; 1961-1965 28
Electricity- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.6788
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Electricity- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
■0.393043
0.817310
0.2426
0.0914
1.620
8.944
0.1108
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
683.0635 
11 .98357 
320.0838 
0.6195
Durbin-Watson 2.4695
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
3.461729
315.9287
0.6195
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
0.646485
0.923915
0.4508
0.0959
1.434
9.634
0.1570
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 31
Gas- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 11.57735 1.000000 1
1 -2.74385 -0.237001 1 ***"1
2 0.185123 0.015990 1 1
3 -3.26966 -0.282419 1 ****** 1
4 1 .458339 0.125965 1 1***
5 2.307709 0.199330 1 1****
6 -0.28007 -0.024192 1 1
7 -0.10621 -0.009174 1 1
8 -2.16729 -0.187201 1 ****1
9 1.795943 0.155126 1 1***
10 1.103807 0.095342 1 1 * *
11 -0.73669 -0.063632 1 * 1
12 -2.96196 -0.255841 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
9
2
Estimate
•0.008341
0.015162
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0552 0.9562
0.1044 0.9173
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Risk Premium
Autoreg Procedure
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
4 -0.029173 -0.2017 0.8410
6 -0.053626 -0.3728 0.7110
8 0.070198 0.5017 0.6181
10 -0.097497 -0.7329 0.4670
7 -0.093680 -0.7470 0.4585
11 0.145453 1.1656 0.2491
12 0.233248 1.9223 0.0599
5 -0.236884 -1.9174 0.0605
1 0.232545 1.8528 0.0693
Preliminary. MSE = 10.65393 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
3 0.28241913
Std Error
0.128191
t Ratio 
2.203
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr 
0 1 .0000  
1 0 .0 0 0 0  
2 0.0000 
3 -0.2824
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
619.5416
11.06324
318.7079
0.6524
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
3.326145
312.4753
0.6549
Durbin-Watson 2.4495
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(3)
0.663587
0.893254
0.311141
0.3344
0.0871
0.1266
-1.985
10.251
2.458
0.0521
0.0001
0.0171
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965
Gas- Risk Premium
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12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr 
0 1.0000 
1 0 .0 0 0 0  
2 0.0000 
3 -0.3111
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
-0.663587
0.893254
0.3343
0.0871
-1.985
10.253
0.0521
0.0001
Dependent Variable = DJLESS
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 35
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
281.4375 
4.9375 
267.7698 
0.7676
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
2.222049
263.6148
0.7676
Durbin-Watson 1.5180
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
0.379101
0.844717
0.2894
0.0616
-1.310
13.722
0.1954
0.0001
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 36
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure 
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 4.770127 1.000000 1 r * "
1 1.100975 0.230806 1 1**"
2 -0.30047 -0.062989 1 * 1
3 -0.44025 -0.092292 1 ** 1
4 0.359737 0.075415 1 1 * *
5 0.699358 0.146612 1 1***
6 0.4069 0.085302 1 1 **
7 -0.0407 -0.008532 1 1
8 -0.57094 -0.119691 1 ** 1
9 -0.14325 -0.030031 1 *1
10 -0.16264 -0.034095 1 M
11 -0.14621 -0.030650 1 *1
12 -2.13525 -0.447629 1 ********* 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
9
Estimate
0.002460
t-Ratio
0.0182
Prob
0.9856
Dissertation Regressions: 1961-1965 37
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
4 -0.045612 -0.3409 0.7348
3 0.037531 0.2921 0.7715
7 -0.055308 -0.4223 0.6747
8 0.056249 0.4632 0.6452
6 -0.074442 -0.5971 0.5531
11 -0.098652 -0.7877 0.4345
10 0.089581 0.7497 0.4568
5 -0.113678 -0.9647 0.3391
2 0.135493 1.1295 0.2637
1 -0.217290 -1 .8568 0.0687
Preliminary MSE = 3.814328 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.44762919
Std Error
0.119495
t Ratio 
3.746
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.4476
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable
Intercept 
SPLESS 
A(12)
SSE 176.3072 DFE 56
MSE 3.148343 Root MSE 1.774357
SBC 250.5947 AIC 244.3621
Reg Rsq 0.7889 Total Rsq 0.8644
Durbin-Watson 1.6034
DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
1 -0.302817 0.1536 -1.972 0.0536
1 0.822502 0.0573 14.360 0.0001
1 0.640659 0.1012 6.330 0.0001
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1 .0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.6407
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:32 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.302817
0.822502
0.1535
0.0569
-1.972
14.464
0.0535
0.0001
APPENDIX D 
SAS OUTPUT FOR DNREGUIATED INDUSTRIES
The SAS System 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 1
)BS MONTH SPDELTA TRANDELT FINDELTA INSDELTA TBOND SPLESS TRANLESS FINLESS INSLESS
1 Jan-92 7.76
2 Feb-92 -13.94 -12.18 -24.35 -24.83 7.77 -13.95 -12.19 -24.36 -24.84
3 Mar-92 -4.47 0.59 -4.02 -4.30 7.97 -4.67 0.39 -4.22 -4.50
4 Apr-92 -2.00 -3.46 -7.61 -5.54 8.03 -2.06 -3.52 -7.67 -5.60
5 May-92 2.32 -0.71 5.86 6.90 7.81 2.54 -0.49 6.08 7.12
6 Jun-92 -1.81 -9.78 -2.34 4.85 7.65 -1.65 -9.62 -2.18 5.01
7 Jul-92 1 .23 -1.84 5.40 7.45 7.26 1 .62 -1.45 5.79 7.84
8 Aug-92 -1 .83 -4.77 -7.38 4.58 7.25 -1.82 -4.76 -7.37 4.59
9 Sep-92 0.75 0.65 -1.60 0.41 7.10 0.90 0.80 -1.45 0.56
10 Oct-92 -1.46 -5.36 3.48 7.22 7.41 -1.77 -5.67 3.17 6.91
11 Nov-92 2.95 7.18 6.27 -2.92 7.48 2.88 7.11 6.20 -2.99
12 Dec-92 2.56 4.86 6.29 2.10 7.26 2.78 5.08 6.51 2.32
13 Jan-93 -7.53 -6.22 -7.79 -7.29 7.25 -7.52 -6.21 -7.78 -7.28
14 Feb-93 2.46 -1.00 4.56 11.73 6.98 2.73 -0.73 4.83 12.00
15 Mar-93 3.45 -0.46 4.93 3.29 7.02 3.41 -0.50 4.89 3.25
16 Apr-93 -1 .75 4.79 1 .46 3.76 7.01 -1.74 4.80 1.47 3.77
17 May-93 -1.42 -4.95 -9.51 -1.41 7.01 -1 .42 -4.95 -9.51 -1.41
18 Jun-93 2.41 1 .21 2.09 -4.12 6.68 2.74 1.54 2.42 -3.79
19 Jul-93 -1.98 4.06 1.98 -1.41 6.56 -1.86 4.18 2.10 -1.29
20 Aug-93 0.89 11.00 4.56 4.81 6.23 1.22 11.33 4.89 5.14
21 Sep-93 1 .08 -1.70 4.63 1.98 6.27 1 .04 -1.74 4.59 1.94
22 Oct-93 2.72 0.07 -5.26 -14.57 6.23 2.76 0.11 -5.22 -14.53
23 Nov-93 -2.99 -4.17 -15.26 -10.35 6.51 -3.27 -4.45 -15.54 -10.63
24 Dec-93 -2.51 -1 .95 -3.51 -5.52 6.54 -2.54 -1.98 -3.54 -5.55
25 Jan-94 1 .72 1 .08 -2.51 -1.88 6.37 1.89 1 .25 -2.34 -1.71
The SAS System 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998 2
3BS MONTH SPDELTA TRANDELT FINDELTA INSDELTA TBOND SPLESS TRANLESS FINLESS INSLESS
26 Feb-94 -1.92 -2.69 -4.53 -3.45 6.82 -2.37 -3.14 -4.98 -3.90
27 Mar-94 -3.73 -4.16 -6.70 -5.76 7.25 -4.16 -4.59 -7.13 -6.19
28 Apr-94 -2.09 -10.48 0.31 -2.14 7.45 -2.29 -10.68 0.11 -2.34
29 May-94 0.33 -0.53 6.14 4.01 7.59 0.19 -0.67 6.00 3.87
30 Jun-94 0.24 4.48 2.28 2.63 7.74 0.09 4.33 2.13 2.48
31 Jul-94 -0.59 -3.11 -7.77 6.53 7.46 -0.31 -2.83 -7.49 -6.25
32 Aug-94 1 .31 -6.01 -0.43 -4.26 7.61 1.16 -6.16 -0.58 -4.41
33 Sep-94 -0.55 -1.89 -3.57 -3.42 8.00 -0.94 -2.28 -3.96 -3.81
34 Oct-94 -1 .70 -4.37 -2.71 2.10 8.09 -1.79 -4.46 -2,80 2.01
35 Nov-94 -0.39 -4.55 5.11 6.71 8.08 -0.38 -4.54 5.12 6.72
36 Dec-94 -1.90 -3.49 -3.23 2.76 7.99 -1.81 -3.40 -3.14 2.85
37 Jan-95 0.67 1 .69 2.01 5.30 7.80 0.86 1 .88 2.20 5.49
38 Feb-95 3.83 3.26 6.71 3.56 7.58 4.05 3.48 6.93 3.78
39 Mar-95 4.14 6.92 3.82 7.15 7.55 4.17 6.95 3.85 7.18
40 Apr-95 7.24 9.56 3.41 1 .66 7.45 7.34 9.66 3.51 1.76
41 May-95 2.60 0.69 3.04 0.89 6.77 3.28 1.37 3.72 1.57
42 Jun-95 2.41 0.41 0.76 -0.08 6.70 2.48 0.48 0.83 -0.01
43 Jul-95 4.90 11.48 4.46 1.28 6.91 4.69 11.27 4.25 1 .07
44 Aug-95 -3.04 3.25 0.42 3.34 6.74 -2.87 3.42 0.59 3.51
45 Sep-95 3.50 8.10 11.49 14.08 6.63 3.61 8.21 11.60 14.19
46 Oct-95 1.74 1.80 9.54 5.40 6.41 1 .96 2.02 9.76 5.62
47 Nov-95 3.50 6.03 3.29 1.10 6.23 3.68 6.21 3.47 1 .28
48 Dec-95 5.83 5.10 7.26 2.28 6.03 6.03 5.30 7.46 2.48
49 Jan-96 0.29 -9.36 -5.97 -4.77 6.09 0.23 -9.42 -6.03 -4.83
50 Feb-96 -2.70 2.56 1 .97 0.93 6.59 -3.20 2.06 1.47 0.43
The SAS System 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA TRANDELT FINDELTA INSDELTA TBOND SPLESS TRANLESS FINLESS INSLESl
51 Mar-96 -1.83 -0.53 -1.10 -5.40 6.84 -2.08 -0.78 -1.35 -5.65
52 Apr-96 -2.59 -4.94 -6.45 -5.92 7.06 -2.81 -5.16 -6.67 -6.14
53 May-96 -0.84 4.86 -6.04 -4.43 7.17 -0.95 4.75 -6.15 -4.54
54 Jun-96 -3.39 -4.70 -2.69 1.10 7.03 -3.25 -4.56 -2.55 1 .24
55 Jul-96 -10.25 -16.49 -5.18 -1.28 7.07 -10.29 -16.53 -5.22 -1.32
56 Aug-96 2.65 -0.76 4.40 0.22 7.26 2.46 -0.95 4.21 0.03
57 Sep-96 2.18 -3.29 -6.97 -9.06 7.04 2.40 -3.07 -6.75 -8.84
58 Oct-96 1 .62 5.29 4.11 4.83 6.71 1 .95 5.62 4.44 5.16
59 Nov-96 6.63 1 .45 9.84 7.21 6.43 6.91 1 .73 10.12 7.49
60 Dec-96 -6.25 -0.44 -3.10 -4.03 6.73 -6.55 -0.74 -3.40 -4.33
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = TRANDELT
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
BSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1021.44 
17.92 
343.8243 
0.4284
Durbin-Watson 1.8129
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
4.233203
339.6692
0.4284
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.353767
0.965443
0.5514
0.1477
■0.642
6.535
0.5237
0.0001
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure 
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 17.31255 1.000000 1
1 1.297563 0.074949 1 1*
2 -1.57204 -0.090804 1
3 0.512604 0.029609 1 1*
4 0.342647 0.019792 1 1
5 -2.44261 -0.141089 1 *** 1
6 -0.97731 -0.056451 1 *1
7 2.931823 0.169347 1 1***
8 0.591834 0.034185 1 1*
9 -1.96042 -0.113237 1 **l
10 0.554553 0.032032 1 1*
11 -2.75143 -0.158927 1 ***!
12 -7.14021 -0.412430 1 *.......1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
3 0.012948
10 -0.016744
t-Ratio Prob 
0.0951 0.9247
-0.1255 0.9007
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
1 -0.016513 -0.1232 0.9025
8 -0.035676 -0.2781 0.7821
4 -0.037008 -0.2863 0.7758
2 0.063317 0.4961 0.6220
5 0.066751 0.5297 0.5986
9 0.102261 0.8287 0.4111
6 0.108670 0.8788 0.3835
7 -0.117515 -0.9554 0.3436
11 0.128739 1.0556 0.2958
Preliminary MSE = 14.36771 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.41242973
Std Error
0.121736
t Ratio 
3.388
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.4124
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
725.6372
12.95781
332.0506
0.4287
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
3.599695 
325.818 
0.5939
Durbin-Watson 1.8399
Variable DF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(12)
■0.263340
0.943375
0.549948
0.3276
0.1464
0.1311
-0.804
6.442
4.194
0.4248
0.0001
0.0001
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.5499
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Transportation- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.263340
0.943375
0.3273
0.1455
•0.804
6.482
0.4245
0.0001
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = FINDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1135.982
19.9295
350.095
0.5205
Durbin-Watson 1.6732
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
4.464247
345.9399
0.5205
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.114468 
1.225536
0.5815
0.1558
•0.197
7.867
0.8446
0.0001
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
0 19.25393 1.000000 1 I*****»'
1 2.527615 0.131278 1 1***
2 -2.88581 -0.149881 1 ***!
3 -4.97663 -0.258474 1 ***** 1
4 -0.38882 -0.020195 1 1
5 1 .299383 0.067487 1 1 *
6 -1.09323 -0.056780 1 * 1
7 -3.69692 -0.192008 1 **** 1
8 2.124256 0.110328 1 1 * *
9 5.61408 0.291581 1 1 ******
10 1.139227 0.059169 1 1 *
11 -3.19231 -0.165800 1 *** 1
12 -6.69489 -0.347716 1 ******* 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
5 0.002658
4 0.034836
t Ratio Prob 
0.0182 0.9855
0.2416 0.8102
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
11 0.043356 0.3107 0.7574
6 0.050599 0.3673 0.7150
2 0.063425 0.4830 0.6312
1 -0.083336 -0.6283 0.5327
10 0.071373 0.5426 0.5898
8 -0.117097 -0.9381 0.3525
7 0.150210 1 .2187 0.2283
3 0.176145 1.3779 0.1739
9 -0.216146 -1.6941 0.0959
Preliminary MSE = 16.92601 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.34771568
Std Error
0.125292
t Ratio 
2.775
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.3477
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
917.1122
16.377
344.1331
0.5146
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
4.046851
337.9005
0.6129
Durbin-Watson 1.8172
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(12)
0.138624 
1.231919 
0.440439
0.3911
0.1602
0.1365
0.354
7.691
3.228
0.7243
0.0001
0.0021
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.4404
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Finance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
-0.138624 
1.231919
0.3911
0.1599
-0.354
7.705
0.7243
0.0001
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = INSDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1702.163
29.86251
373.9548
0.2673
Durbin-Watson 1.4140
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
5.46466
369.7997
0.2673
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
■0.011903
0.869548
0.7118
0.1907
0.017
4.560
0.9867
0.0001
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
ag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 28.85022 1.000000 1
1 7.069775 0.245051 1 1....  1
2 -0.31539 -0.010932 1 1 1
3 -5.61688 -0.194691 1 ★***1 1
4 -0.35933 -0.012455 1 1 1
5 -0.48093 -0.016670 1 1 1
6 -2.2917 -0.079434 1 * * 1 1
7 -1.32916 -0.046071 1 * 1 1
8 -2.31034 -0.080080 1 * * 1 1
9 7.646223 0.265032 1 1 ***** 1
10 4.390246 0.152174 1 1 *** 1
11 -0.03046 -0.001056 1 1 1
12 -12.073 -0.418471 1 ******** 1 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
11 -0.000843
2 0.003455
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0058 0.9954
0.0250 0.9802
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
10 -0.029212 -0.2180 0.8284
7 -0.037556 -0.2839 0.7777
4 -0.051695 -0.3943 0.6951
5 0.037990 0.3052 0.7615
6 0.080186 0.6561 0.5147
3 0.081796 0.6799 0.4996
8 0.133075 1.1173 0.2689
9 -0.212628 -1.7978 0.0778
Preliminary MSE = 22.07182 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.24460942
12 0.41821243
Std Error 
0.117941 
0.117941
t Ratio 
-2.074 
3.546
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.3016
2 0.0909
3 0.0274
4 0.0082
5 0.0024
6 0.0004
7 -0.0009
8 -0.0037
9 -0.0124
10 -0.0411
11 -0.1362
12 -0.4515
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1113.869 
20.25217 
361.4654 
0.2609
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
55
4.500241
353.1553
0.5205
Durbin-Watson 1.8369
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPDELTA
A(1)
A(12)
0.059823
0.817995
0.243360
0.524361
0.4994
0.1884
0.0996
0.1111
0.120
4.341
2.443
4.719
0.9051
0.0001
0.0178
0.0001
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.3478
2 0.1210
3 0.0420
4 0.0145
5 0.0047
6 0.0008
7 -0.0023
8 -0.0082
9 -0.0240
10 -0.0693
11 -0.1993
12 -0.5729
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Insurance- Total Returns 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.059823 0.4993 -0.120 0.9051
SPDELTA 1 0.817995 0.1856 4.406 0.0001
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = TRANLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1021.352 
17.91845 
343.8192 
0.4403
Durbin-Watson 1.8120
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
4.233019
339.6641
0.4403
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.353232
0.964806
0.5513
0.1441
0.641
6.697
0.5243
0.0001
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 17.31105 1.000000 1 1****
1 1.306343 0.075463 1 1**
2 -1.55755 -0.089974 1 **l
3 0.510695 0.029501 1 1*
4 0.354774 0.020494 1 1
5 -2.42795 -0.140254 1 ***|
6 -0.97188 -0.056142 1 *1
7 2.9237 0.168892 1 1***
8 0.581585 0.033596 1 1*
9 -1.96404 -0.113456 1 **|
10 0.53323 0.030803 1 1*
11 -2.75316 -0.159041 1 ***1
12 -7.14125 -0.412526 1 ******** 1
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag
3
10
Estimate
0.013271
-0.016072
t-Ratio Prob 
0.0975 0.9228
-0.1205 0.9046
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
1 -0.016921 -0.1263 0.9001
8 -0.035415 -0.2760 0.7837
4 -0.037630 -0.2912 0.7721
2 0.062968 0.4934 0.6239
5 0.065974 0.5236 0.6028
9 0.102489 0.8306 0.4100
6 0.108161 0.8747 0.3857
7 -0.117456 -0.9551 0.3438
11 0.128643 1.0548 0.2961
Preliminary MSE = 14.3651
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.41252562
Std Error
0.121730
t Ratio 
3.389
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1,0000
1 0,0000
2 0,0000
3 0,0000
4 0,0000
5 0,0000
6 0,0000
7 0,0000
8 0,0000
9 0,0000
10 0,0000
11 0.0000
12 -0,4125
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
725.7371
12.95959
332.0529
0.4392
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
3.599943
325.8203
0.6023
Durbin-Watson 1.8394
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(12)
■0.262364
0.944862
0.549638
0.3278
0.1436
0.1311
-0.800
6.579
4.191
0.4269
0.0001
0.0001
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.5496
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Transportation- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable OF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
•0.262364
0.944862
0.3276
0.1427
0.801
6.622
0.4266
0.0001
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = FINLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1134.517
19.90381
350.0189
0.5326
Durbin-Watson 1.6759
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
4.461369
345.8638
0.5326
Variable OF 8 Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
■0.118590 
1 .223795
0.5810
0.1518
0.204
8.059
0.8390
0.0001
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
0 19.22911 1.000000 1 1******'
1 2.490068 0.129495 1 1 ***
2 -2.90085 -0.150857 1 ***!
3 -4.99315 -0.259666 I ***** 1
4 -0.42609 -0.022158 1 1
5 1 .350679 0.070241 1 1 *
6 -1.09392 -0.056889 1 * 1
7 -3.74041 -0.194518 1 **** 1
8 2.137343 0.111151 1 1 **
9 5.592383 0.290829 1 1 ******
10 1.135066 0.059029 1 1 *
11 -3.17872 -0.165308 1 * * * 1
12 -6.68269 -0.347530 1 ******* 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
5 -0.000494
4 0.039286
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0034 0.9973
0.2720 0.7868
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
11 0.042573 0.3053 0.7615
6 0.052422 0.3804 0.7054
2 0.062936 0.4793 0.6338
1 -0.081802 -0.6169 0.5401
10 0.072779 0.5532 0.5825
8 -0.118730 -0.9520 0.3455
7 0.152575 1.2380 0.2212
3 0.177698 1.3903 0.1701
9 -0.215090 -1.6847 0.0977
Preliminary MSE = 16.90668 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
12 0.34752976
Std Error
0.125301
t Ratio 
2.774
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.3475
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
915.5132
16.34845
344.0411
0.5253
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
56
4.043322
337.8085
0.6228
Durbin-Watson 1.8222
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
A(12)
0.143541 
1.231852 
0.441273
0.3907
0.1569
0.1367
0.367
7.852
3.229
0.7147
0.0001
0.0021
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.0000
2 0.0000
3 0.0000
4 0.0000
5 0.0000
6 0.0000
7 0.0000
8 0.0000
9 0.0000
10 0.0000
11 0.0000
12 -0.4413
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Finance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
•0.143541 
1.231852
0.3907
0.1565
•0.367
7.871
0 . 7 1 4 7
0.0001
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = INSLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
1704.559
29.90454
374.0377
0.2836
Durbin-Watson 1.4160
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
57
5.468504
369.8827
0.2836
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
•0.008071
0.884185
0.7122
0.1861
■0.011
4.750
0.9910
0.0001
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
0 28.89082 1.000000 1 1......
1 7.094701 0.245569 1 1*****
2 -0.3918 -0.013561 1 1
3 -5.6199 -0.194522 1 ****1
4 -0.37704 -0.013050 1 1
5 -0.51594 -0.017858 1 1
6 -2.29855 -0.079560 1 ** 1
7 -1.29213 -0.044725 1 * 1
8 -2.24161 -0.077589 1 * * 1
9 7.638092 0.264378 1 1*****
10 4.459182 0.154346 1 1***
11 -0.01721 -0.000596 1 1
12 -12.0812 -0.418168 1 ******** 1
4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
11 -0.002579
2 0.005772
t-Ratio Prob 
-0.0178 0.9859
0.0418 0.9669
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
10 -0.031212 -0.2329 0.8169
7 -0.038907 -0.2938 0.7702
4 -0.051981 -0.3962 0.6937
5 0.038141 0.3063 0.7607
6 0.080703 0.6600 0.5122
3 0.081294 0.6753 0.5025
8 0.130845 1.0977 0.2773
9 -0.211372 -1.7872 0.0795
Preliminary MSE = 22.10014 
Estimates of the Autoregressive Parameters
Lag Coefficient
1 -0.24532030
12 0.41802186
Std Error 
0.117933 
0.117933
t Ratio 
-2.080 
3.545
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.3024
2 0.0914
3 0.0276
4 0.0083
5 0.0024
6 0.0004
7 -0.0009
8 -0.0037
9 -0.0125
10 -0.0413
11 -0.1365
12 -0.4515
Dissertation Regressions: Non Regulated Industries 43
Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
SSE 1115.478 DFE 55
MSE 20.28142 Root MSE 4.503489
SBC 361.5404 AIC 353.2303
Reg Rsq 0.2719 Total Rsq 0.5312
Durbin-Watson 1.8378
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1 -0.057389 0.5008 -0.115 0.9092
SPLESS 1 0.827457 0.1856 4.459 0.0001
A(1) 1 -0.244984 0.0997 -2.457 0.0172
A(12) 1 0.523485 0.1113 4.703 0.0001
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Expected Autocorrelations
Lag Autocorr
0 1.0000
1 0.3498
2 0.1224
3 0,0428
4 0.0149
5 0,0049
6 0.0008
7 -0,0024
8 -0.0084
9 -0,0244
10 -0,0700
11 -0,2003
12 -0,5726
Autoregressive parameters assumed given.
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Insurance- Risk Premium 12:34 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
0.057389
0.827457
0.5008 
0.1826
■0.115
4.532
0.9092
0.0001
APPENDIX E
SAS OUTPUT FOR UTILITIES (MONTHLY RETURNS)
The SAS System 12:35 Tuesday, August 18 , 1998
3BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA T8ILL SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESÎ
1 Jan-92 7.10 -6.97 -5.66 0.40 3.84 0.31 6.78 -7.29 -5.97
2 Feb-92 -0.85 -2.26 -1.99 -1.51 3.84 0.31 -1.16 -2.58 -2.31
3 Mar-92 -1.26 0.00 -1.05 -3.33 4.05 0.33 -1.59 -0.33 -1.38
4 Apr-92 0.01 2.65 3.01 5.29 3.81 0.31 -0.30 2.34 2.69
5 May-92 1.82 1.13 0.86 3.22 3.66 0.30 1 .52 0.83 0.56
6 Jun-92 -1.58 -1.09 -1 .37 6.48 3.70 0.30 -1.88 -1.39 -1.68
7 Jul-92 1 .66 6.76 5.12 1 .45 3.28 0.27 1.39 6.49 4.85
8 Aug-92 0.69 -2.83 -2.35 1 .57 3.14 0.26 0.44 -3.09 -2.60
9 Sep-92 0.13 0.71 0.25 0.00 2.97 0.24 -0.11 0.47 0.01
10 Oct-92 -1.43 -0.20 -0.86 -3.34 3.10 0.25 -1.68 -0.45 -1.11
11 Nov-92 2.51 -0.65 0.31 -0.83 3.14 0.26 2.25 -0.91 0.05
12 Dec-92 3.03 1.06 2.08 2.16 3.25 0.27 2.76 0.79 1.82
13 Jan-93 -0.09 2.52 2.42 2.28 3.06 0.25 -0.35 2.27 2.17
14 Feb-93 1.49 5.99 5.87 5.64 2.95 0.24 1.24 5.75 5.63
15 Mar-93 1 .92 0.55 -0.39 3.13 2.97 0.24 1.67 0.31 -0.64
16 Apr-93 -1.57 -0.88 -1.31 -3.31 2.89 0.24 -1.81 -1.12 -1.54
17 May-93 0.49 -0.42 -0.78 0.51 2.96 0.24 0.25 -0.66 -1.02
18 Jun-93 0.63 2.70 1 .38 3.05 3.10 0.25 0.38 2.44 1.13
19 Jul-93 -0.17 2.13 2.52 3.73 3.05 0.25 -0.42 1.88 2.27
20 Aug-93 1.53 2.58 2.40 -0.47 3.05 0.25 1.28 2.33 2.15
21 Sep-93 1.13 -2.60 -1 .88 -1.77 2.96 0.24 0.88 -2.84 -2.13
22 Oct-93 1 .01 -3.61 -1 .54 -0.21 3.04 0.25 0.76 -3.86 -1.79
23 Nov-93 -0.22 -6.40 -6.00 -4.36 3.12 0.26 -0.47 -6.66 -6.25
24 Dec-93 0.66 1.75 1.73 2.77 3.08 0.25 0.41 1 .50 1 .48
25 Jan-94 1.51 -1.43 -2.79 -0.08 3.02 0.25 1 .26 -1.68 -3.04
The SAS System 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBILL SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLES!
26 Feb-94 -0.30 -6.88 -6.59 -4.27 3.21 0.26 -0.56 -7.15 -6.86
27 Mar-94 -1.65 -6.73 -4.65 -1.28 3.52 0.29 -1.94 -7.02 -4.94
28 Apr-94 -3.57 1.58 0.39 -1.64 3.74 0.31 -3.88 1.27 0.09
29 May-94 0.82 -6.68 -6.82 -4.05 4.19 0.34 0.48 -7.02 -7.17
30 Jun-94 0.87 -4.78 -5.05 -2.59 4.18 0.34 0.53 -5.12 -5.39
31 Jul-94 -0.75 5.21 5.32 1 .71 4.39 0.36 -1.11 4.85 4.96
32 Aug-94 2.84 1 .48 0.76 -1 .45 4.50 0.37 2.48 1.11 0.39
33 Sep-94 0.59 -4.08 -4.43 -1.84 4.64 0.38 0.21 -4.45 -4.81
34 Oct-94 -0.67 -0.03 -0.70 2.37 4.96 0.40 -1.08 -0.44 -1.10
35 Nov-94 -0.60 -1.02 0.35 -7.65 5.25 0.43 -1.03 -1.45 -0.08
36 Dec-94 -1.26 1.10 1 .32 2.04 5.64 0.46 -1.72 0.64 0.86
37 Jan-95 2.21 6.39 7.45 1 .92 5.81 0.47 1 .74 5.92 6.97
38 Feb 95 3.58 0.41 -0.48 2.93 5.80 0.47 3.11 -0.06 -0.95
39 Mar-95 2.33 -3.23 -2.91 1 .06 5.73 0.47 1 .86 -3.69 -3.38
40 Apr-95 2.99 3.65 2.50 1.75 5.67 0.46 2.53 3.19 2.04
41 May-95 3.13 6.13 6.59 -2.85 5.70 0.46 2.67 5.67 6.13
42 Jun-95 2.97 -2.11 -0.99 3.19 5.50 0.45 2.52 -2.55 -1.44
43 Jul-95 3.34 0.95 0.46 -1.73 5.47 0.44 2.90 0.50 0.02
44 Aug-95 0.31 -0.80 -0.23 2.65 5.41 0.44 -0.13 -1.24 -0.67
45 Sep-95 3.52 5.90 5.77 2.48 5.26 0.43 3.09 5.47 5.34
46 Oct-95 0.72 0.12 0.36 1 .41 5.30 0.43 0.29 -0.31 -0.07
47 Nov 95 2.16 0.58 -1 .09 5.34 5.35 0.44 1 .73 0.15 -1.52
48 Dec-95 3.20 4.45 4.69 2.85 5.16 0.42 2.78 4.03 4.27
49 Jan-96 2.43 2.42 2.10 0.47 5.02 0.41 2.02 2.01 1.69
50 Feb-96 1.51 -4.96 -4.32 -0.39 4.87 0.40 1.12 -5.36 -4.72
The SAS System 12:35 Tuesday, August 18 , 1998
)BS MONTH SPDELTA DJDELTA ELEDELTA LDCDELTA TBILL SPLESS DJLESS ELELESS LDCLESÎ
51 Mar-96 0.92 -3.03 -3.72 -1.76 4.96 0.40 0.52 -3.43 -4.13
52 Apr-96 0.96 -1.25 -5.36 -1.39 4.99 0.41 0.55 -1.66 -5.76
53 May-96 2.45 0.83 4.56 0.78 5.02 0.41 2.04 0.42 4.15
54 Jun-96 0.23 3.99 0.90 4.58 5.11 0.42 -0.18 3.57 0.49
55 Jul-96 -5.21 -6.88 -7.90 -5.31 5.17 0.42 -5.63 -7.30 -8.32
56 Aug-96 2.65 4.49 2.51 8.58 5.09 0.41 2.23 4.08 2.09
57 Sep-96 5.46 1.18 0.55 -6.73 5.15 0.42 5.04 0.76 0.13
58 Oct-96 2.09 4.54 4.40 5.84 5.01 0.41 1 .68 4.13 3.99
59 Nov-96 7.80 3.95 3.91 4.95 5.03 0.41 7.39 3.54 3.50
60 Dec-96 -1.89 -1.34 -1.59 -1.82 4.87 0.40 -2.29 -1.73 -1.99
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Electricity- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = ELEDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
673.4502
11.61121
323.5455
0.1001
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
3.407523
319.3568
0.1001
Durbin-Watson 1.8033
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
■0.595357
0.508992
0.4925
0.2003
1.209
2.541
0.2316
0.0138
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Electricity- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 10, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1
0 11.22417 1.000000 1 1***
1 0.476125 0.042420 1 r
2 -2.39363 -0.213256 1 ****1
3 0.775502 0.069099 1 1*
4 1.930592 0.172003 1 1***
5 0.629957 0.056125 1 1*
6 -0.83509 -0.074401 1 *1
7 -0.41094 -0.037325 1 *1
0 -0.64670 -0.057624 1 *1
9 0.001660 0.000149 1 1
10 -0.45756 -0.040766 1 *1
11 -2.31059 -0.206571 1 ****1
12 -0.63046 -0.056170 1 M
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
7 -0.004763
6 0.023684
t-Ratio Prob
-0.0320 0.9746
0.1610 0.0720
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Electricity- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
1 -0.024962 -0.1736 0.8629
12 0.039397 0.2822 0.7790
10 0.056102 0.4098 0.6837
9 0.061768 0.4521 0.6531
5 -0.074609 -0.5525 0.5830
3 -0.065316 -0.5023 0.6175
8 0.082016 0.6268 0.5334
4 -0.124665 -0.9530 0.3448
11 0.206539 1.6186 0.1112
2 0.213256 1.6480 0.1049
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Gas- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
BSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
610.0815
10.51865
317.6162
0.0707
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
3.243246
313.4275
0.0707
Durbin-Watson 2.3846
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
0.100920
0.400494
0.4688
0.1907
0.215
2.100
0.8303
0.0401
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Gas- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 10.16802 1.000000 1 1****’
1 -2.02058 -0.198719 1 ****!
2 1.975567 0.194292 1 1****
3 -0.86728 -0.085295 1 **l
4 -1.17153 -0.115217 1
5 -0.43377 -0.042660 1 *1
6 1.308331 0.128671 1 1***
7 -0.23651 -0.023260 1 1
8 0.493782 0.048562 1 1*
9 1.132526 0.111381 1 1-
10 0.229809 0.022601 1 1
11 -0.5255 -0.051682 1 *1
12 0.368995 0.036290 1 r
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
5 0.002447
7 0.019939
t Ratio Prob
0.0158 0.9874
0.1359 0.8925
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Gas- Total Returns 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
12 0.024737 0.1714 0.8646
3 0.051279 0.3716 0.7118
8 0.056819 0.3983 0.6921
11 0.082722 0.6170 0.5399
10 -0.117705 -0.8777 0.3842
9 -0.133040 -1.0402 0.3030
1 0.164023 1.2588 0.2135
6 -0.197777 -1.4963 0.1403
4 0.158968 1.2049 0.2333
2 0.194292 -1.4954 0.1403
Dissertation Regressions: Monthly Returns
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = DJDELTA
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
725.8918
12.51538
328.0447
0.0751
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
10
12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
58
3.537708
323.856
0.0751
Durbin-Watson 1.8135
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPDELTA 1
-0.386798
0.451498
0.5113
0.2080
0.756
2.171
0.4524
0.0341
Dissertation Regressions: Monthly Returns
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
Autoreg Procedure
11
12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 12.0982 1.000000 1
1 0.329675 0.027250 1
2 -1.84377 -0.152400 1 ***
3 1.050045 0.086794 1
4 2.066305 0.170794 1
5 -0.44824 -0.037050 1 *
6 -0.3566 -0.029476 1 *
7 0.20708 0.017117 1
8 -1.31971 -0.109083 1 * *
9 -0.06962 -0.005754 1
10 -0.57489 -0.047518 1 *
11 -1.0043 -0.083012 1 * *
12 -0.77041 -0.063680 1 *
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
I  * * *
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate t Ratio Prob
6 -0.004286 -0.0287 0.9772
Dissertation Regressions: Monthly Returns
Dow Jones Utility Composite- Total Returns
12
12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
7 -0.004976 -0.0338 0.9732
9 -0.011265 -0.0781 0.9381
5 0.014022 0.0993 0.9213
1 -0.025105 -0.1815 0.8567
12 0.039645 0.2849 0.7769
11 0.063700 0.4745 0.6371
10 0.082555 0.6144 0.5416
3 -0.080544 -0.6133 0.5423
2 0.129880 0.9847 0.3291
8 0.142408 1.0767 0.2863
4 -0.170794 -1.3087 0.1959
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Electricity- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = ELELESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
761.2843 
13.12559 
330.9011 
0.0230
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
3.622926
326.7124
0.0230
Durbin-Watson 1.8437
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
2.564534
6.699043
2.0490
5.7379
1.252
1.168
0.2157
0.2478
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Electricity- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
0 12.68807 1.000000 1
1 0.577624 0.045525 1 1*
2 -1.2924 -0.101860 1 **l
3 1.174437 0.092562 1 1**
4 1.838799 0.144923 1 1***
5 0.705525 0.055605 1 r
6 -0.03374 -0.002659 1 1
7 0.16645 0.013119 1 1
8 -0.96334 -0.075925 1 **i
9 -0.43878 -0.034582 1 *1
10 -1.11957 -0.088238 1 **i
11 -0.68434 -0.053935 1 *1
12 -1.16262 -0.091631 1 **i
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate 
1 -0.020327
7 -0.025055
t-Ratio Prob
-0.1383 0.8906
-0.1705 0.8654
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Electricity- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
6 -0.028961 -0.1999 0.8424
11 0.036948 0.2646 0.7925
9 0.035786 0.2583 0.7972
12 0.086167 0.6229 0.5361
5 -0.088056 -0.6447 0.5220
3 -0.098198 -0.7341 0.4661
2 0.094851 0.7090 0.4814
10 0.098941 0.7451 0.4594
8 0.099007 0.7446 0.4597
4 -0.144923 -1.1058 0.2734
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Gas- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Dependent Variable = LDCLESS
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
731.015 
12.60371 
328.4667 
0.0168
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
3.55017
324.278
0.0168
Durbin-Watson 1.7958
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept 1
SPLESS 1
2.325015
5.592565
2.0078
5.6226
1.158
0.995
0.2516
0.3240
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Gas- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation -1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (
0 12.18358 1.000000 1
1 0.972433 0.079815 1
2 -2.08114 -0.170815 1 * * *
3 1.245684 0.102243 1
4 1 .77318 0.145538 1
5 1.5938 0.130815 1
6 -0.3665 -0.030081 1 *
7 -0.94356 -0.077445 1 **
8 -0.15103 -0.012396 1
9 -0.72754 -0.059715 1 *
10 -0.94249 -0.077358 1 * *
11 -1.91148 -0.156890 1 ***
12 -1.04005 -0.085365 1 * *
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
I**
I***
I * * *
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate
6 -0.019972
7 0.029354
t-Ratio Prob
-0.1317 0.8958
0.1965 0.8451
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Gas- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
8 0.045670 0.3191 0.7511
12 0.056442 0.4038 0.6881
10 0.062359 0.4636 0.6450
1 -0.073471 -0.5414 0.5906
4 -0.089215 -0.6635 0.5099
9 0.132251 0.9927 0.3253
3 -0.146424 -1.1112 0.2714
5 -0.145869 -1.1205 0.2674
11 0.167688 1.2901 0.2023
2 0.170815 1.3089 0.1958
Dependent Variable = DJLESS
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
SSE
MSE
SBC
Reg Rsq
269.3762
4.644417
268.5672
0.0514
DFE
Root MSE 
AIC
Total Rsq
58
2.155091
264.3785
0.0514
Durbin-Watson 1.8174
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Approx Prob
Intercept
SPLESS
1.346240
6.051504
1.2188 
3.4132
1.105
1.773
0.2739
0.0815
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Dow Jones Utility Composite- Risk Premium 12:35 Tuesday, August 18, 1998
Autoreg Procedure
Estimates of Autocorrelations
Lag Covariance Correlation - 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1
0 4.489603 1.000000 1 1-
1 -0.00991 -0.002208 1 1
2 -0.34346 -0.076502 1 ** 1
3 0.022371 0.004983 1 1
4 -0.64994 -0.144766 1 ***!
5 -0.15034 -0.033487 1 * 1
6 0.12052 0.026844 1 1 *
7 -0.04451 -0.009914 1 1
8 0.253302 0.056420 1 1 *
9 -0.2043 -0.045505 1 * 1
10 0.161277 0.035922 1 1 *
11 0.248852 0.055429 1 1 *
12 -0.53589 -0.119362 1 *<*1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Backward Elimination of Autoregressive Terms
Lag Estimate t-Ratio Prob
1 -0.001771 -0.0121 0.9904
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Autoreg Procedure
3 0.005955 0.0411 0.9674
6 -0.016112 -0.1111 0.9120
7 0.016711 0.1176 0.9069
8 -0.025828 -0.1828 0.8557
10 -0.035145 -0.2557 0.7992
5 0.043465 0.3176 0.7521
11 -0.046398 -0.3442 0.7320
9 0.050721 0.3807 0.7049
2 0.083714 0.6314 0.5304
12 0.111549 0.8477 0.4002
4 0.144766 1.1046 0.2740
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